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ABSTRACT
The United States Postal Service continues to face difficult financial conditions, due primarily to
electronic diversion of mail volume. The largest component of the Postal Service's cost structure is
labor, with retirement benefits representing a significant portion of those costs. This thesis provides a
historical retrospective of the development of the pension system that the Postal Service currently
participates in, and assesses the impact that the pension system has had on the Postal Service through
history. The ultimate objective of this thesis is to study the United States Postal Service pension system
as it relates to its current obligations to the United States federal government, provide a review of
alternative pension arrangements operating in other sectors, and analyze the leading alternatives as
they apply to the Postal Service to understand their potential impact on the finances of the United
States Postal Service.
Two simulations models are developed in the study, based on an analysis of the current workforce,
historical and projected retirement patterns, and the current pension contribution profiles of workers.
The models are used to assess the impact of various plan designs on the Postal Service's cost structure,
and on a typical individual employee's post-retirement income.
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Page | 3
[Page intentionally left blank]
Page | 4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To my wife, Carrie, my baby, Lucy and baby to be created during the process of writing this thesis, thank
you for your patience and forgiveness during this process
To my family for providing me a foundation very few are provided
To Pat, Megan and Dave for providing me incredible opportunities within the organization
To Jeff for all of your contributions to my career and your mentorship over many years
To all of the help received from the Postal Service, most especially Stephen and Vinay
To my advisor, Deborah Lucas for your wisdom, knowledge, guidance, teaching and patience
Page | 5
[Page intentionally left blank]
Page 1 6
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official views,
policies or positions of the United States Postal Service.
No official United States Postal Service approval is expressed or implied.
Page 1 7
[Page intentionally left blank]
Page 1 8
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 15
United States Postal Service Overview .............................................................................................. 15
The Postal Service: Financial Reality and Political Constraints .......................................................... 17
T h e sis O v e rv ie w ...................................................................................................................................... 19
Chapter 2 Understanding Private Pension Development and Financing ............................................... 21
Private Pension Development.................................................................................................................21
Studebaker Pension Default....................................................................................................................23
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ......................................................................... 24
Moral Hazard and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation........................................................ 26
Pension Protection Act of 2006...............................................................................................................26
The M igration of Defined Benefit Plans to Defined Contribution Plans ............................................ 27
Chapter 3 Overview of Academic Research on the Modern Theory of Pension Economics .................. 29
Deferred Compensation..........................................................................................................................29
Eco no m ic Se cu rity ................................................................................................................................... 3 1
W orker Attraction, Retention and Performance ................................................................................ 31
Chapter 4 The history of the U.S. Postal Service Pension System - Foundation (1792-1971)............... 35
Early Pensions Systems ........................................................................................................................... 35
Civil Service Act of 1883 .......................................................................................................................... 36
"T h e La ze a r T ra p" .................................................................................................................................... 3 7
Civil Service Retirement Act of 1920 ................................................................................................... 39
Social Security Act of 1935 ...................................................................................................................... 42
Amendments to the Civil Service and Social Security Acts ................................................................ 42
Chapter 5 The history of the United States Postal Service Pension System - Independence (1971 -1989)
..................................................................................................................................................................... 4 5
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 ..................................................................................................... 45
Federal Employee Retirement System Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-335) ..................................................... 47
Chapter 6 The history of the United States Postal Service Pension System - Surplus and Deficit (1989 -
P re se n t) ....................................................................................................................................................... 5 1
Background on USPS Payments for Pensions..................................................................................... 51
Federal Budget Scoring and the Postal Service ................................................................................... 55
Postal Civil Service Retirement System Funding Reform Act of 2003................................................. 56
Page | 9
Postal Accountability and Enhancem ent Act of 2006 .......................................................................... 57
Chapter 7 An Overview of the Fundamentals of the Current United States Postal Service Pension System
..................................................................................................................................................................... 5 9
Civil Service Retirem ent System (CSRS) .............................................................................................. 59
Federal Em ployee Retirem ent System (FERS)..................................................................................... 59
Postal Service Contributions to Retirem ent System s.......................................................................... 63
Sum m ary of TSP Contribution Data .................................................................................................... 71
Current Potential TSP Cost Liability................................................................................................. 73
Postal Service Age Dem ographics ....................................................................................................... 73
Postal Service Retirem ent Age Analysis .............................................................................................. 74
Postal Service Retirem ent Age Insights.......................................................................................... 76
Chapter 8 - Alternative Approaches to Pensions - Public and Private................................................... 79
Types of Pension Plans ............................................................................................................................ 79
Defined Benefit & Defined Contribution Plans .............................................................................. 79
Cash balance plans..............................................................................................................................80
Hybrid Offerings .................................................................................................................................. 80
Public and Private Sector Trends.............................................................................................................80
Pension Benefits Offered in the Private Sector................................................................................... 81
Risks Associated w ith Participating in the Federal Retirem ent Plans ............................................ 83
Chapter 9 - Application of Alternative Pension System s to the Postal Service ...................................... 85
Com parison of Postal Service Com pensation Levels w ith Other Sectors .......................................... 86
Studies of Public versus Private Com pensation Levels ................................................................... 86
Aggregate W ages.................................................................................................................................87
Alignm ent Requirem ents .................................................................................................................... 88
Retirem ent Required Replacem ent Rates.......................................................................................... 89
Alternative Design Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 90
Description of Scenarios......................................................................................................................90
Description of Analytic Fram ew ork................................................................................................. 93
Results ..................................................................................................................................................... 94
Individual Em ployee Results................................................................................................................94
Cautionary Note on Cost Savings Results........................................................................................ 99
USPS Retirem ent Results.....................................................................................................................99
Page 1 10
Effects of Contribution Changes........................................................................................................101
USPS Aggregate Savings Results........................................................................................................101
Chapter 10 - Legal, Union, and Human Resource Considerations ............................................................ 103
Legal Considerations ............................................................................................................................. 103
Union Considerations ............................................................................................................................ 103
Human Resource Considerations..........................................................................................................103
Chapter 11 - Conclusions, Recom mendations and Further Areas of Research........................................105
C o n c lu sio n s............................................................................................................................................10 5
Critique of the methods utilized ........................................................................................................... 108
Recom m endations for further action ................................................................................................... 109
Further areas of research ...................................................................................................................... 110
R e fe re n ce s ................................................................................................................................................. 1 1 3
A p p e n d ix ................................................................................................................................................... 1 1 9
7-1 USPS Retirement Costs - 1970 - 2012.............................................................................................120
8-1 Private Sector Defined Contribution Contribution Rates................................................................121
Em ployee Retirem ent Sim ulation Assumptions, M ethodology, and Detailed Results.........................132
Em ployee Retirem ent Sim ulation Assum ptions:...............................................................................132
Em ployee Retirem ent Sim ulation M ethodology:..............................................................................132
Em ployee Retirem ent Sim ulation Detailed Results: ......................................................................... 134
USPS Financial Im pact Assum ptions, M ethodology, and Detailed Results...........................................137
USPS Financial Im pact Assum ptions: ................................................................................................ 137
USPS Financial Im pact M ethodology: ............................................................................................... 137
USPS Financial Im pact Detailed Results ................................................................................................ 139
Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Contributions Assumptions, Methodology, and Results
............................................................................................................................................................... 1 4 2
Individual Em ployee Estimates of Retirem ent Contributions Assum ptions:....................................142
Individual Em ployee Estimates of Retirement Contributions M ethodology:...................................142
Individual Em ployee Estimates of Retirement Contributions Results: ............................................. 143
Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Income Methodology, Assumptions and Results........147
Individual Em ployee Estimates of Retirem ent Income Assum ptions ............................................... 147
Individual Em ployee Estimates of Retirem ent Income M ethodology .............................................. 147
Individual Em ployee Estimates of Retirem ent Income Results (Risky Investm ents)........................149
Page | 11
Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Income Results (Risk Free Investments)..................162
Table of Figures:
Figure 1: Operating Statistics of the U.S. Postal Service (2001 - 2012): ................................................ 17
Figure 2 - Classification of Retirees - 1920 .............................................................................................. 41
Figure 3 - TSP Regression A nalysis- ............................................................................................................. 72
Figure 4 - TSP Co rrelatio n M atrix ................................................................................................................ 72
Figure 5 - Individual Employee Financial Impact Summary - Growing Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits95
Figure 6 - Individual Employee Financial Impact Summary - Level Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits......96
Figure 7 - Individual Employee Financial Impact Summary - Growing Life Annuity with Survivor Benefits
.................................................................................... ...................................................................- 
......... 9 6
Figure 8 - Individual Employee Financial Impact Summary - Level Life Annuity with Survivor Benefits ....97
Figure 9 - Comparison of Income amongst different types of life annuities utilizing the risk free
in v e stm e n t...................................................................................................................................................9 8
List of Tables
Table 1 - Private Pension Plan Sum mary - 1990 to 2008 ....................................................................... 28
Table 2 - Contributions for hypothetical employee to each component of FERS over 35 year career ...... 62
Table 3 - Postal Service contribution to FERS - 2010-2012 ................................................................... 64
Table 4 - Postal Service retirement enrollment by program type - Fiscal Year 2012 ........ 64
Table 5 - Employees contributing 0% to the Thrift Savings Plan by years of service........68
Table 6 - Percentage of employees contributing 0% to the Thrift Savings Plan by Employee Type...........69
Table 7 - Propensity not to save by salary level and union membership .............................................. 70
Table 8 - Percentage of Employees contributing 0% to the Thrift Savings Plan by Salary Level ................ 70
Table 9 - USPS Em ployee age distribution by decile ............................................................................ . 74
Table 10 - USPS Retirement Summary - CSRS Employees..................................................................... 75
Table 11 - USPS Retirement Summary - FERS Employees..................................................................... 76
Table 12 - Private Sector Defined Contribution Benefits ....................................................................... 82
Table 13 - Retirement Plan Types Access and Participation ................................................................ 83
Table 14 - USPS Employee Expenses by Hour compared to Private Sector Expenses by Hour .................. 88
Table 15 - Required percent change necessary to align USPS retirement cost per work-hour with
alternative w o rker catego ries ..................................................................................................................... 89
Table 16 - USPS W orkforce Projections (2013 - 2030) ............................................................................. 100
Table 17 - Percent change of contribution towards retirement plans from current plans ..... 101
Table 18 - USPS Financial Im pact Sum m ary (In Thousands) ..................................................................... 102
List of Graphs
Graph 1 - USPS Contributions towards CSRS since 1970 ....................................................................... 52
Page | 12
Graph 2- Contributions of USPS towards Pension Costs Since 1970 ..................................................... 63
Graph 3 - USPS Distribution of Employee Ages for individuals contributing 0 to the Thrift Savings Plan..67
Graph 4 - Percentage of Employees Contributing 0 to their TSP ............................................................ 67
Graph 5 - Percentage of Employees contributing 0 to their TSP by years of service.............................68
Graph 6 - Relative Propensity not to save by salary level ..................................................................... 71
Graph 7 - USPS Distribution of Em ployee Ages..................................................................................... 74
Graph 8 - CSRS Employee Age Distribution Graph 9 - CSRS Years of Service Distribution..................75
Graph 10 - FERS Age Distribution Graph 11 - FERS Years of Service Distribution ............................. 76
Graph 12 - Percent Contributions for USPS and Employee for various plans........................................91
Graph 13 - Total Percent Contributions of USPS and Employee to various plans ................................. 92
Graph 14 - Dollar contributions by USPS towards various plans, beginning and ending salary............92
Graph 15 - Dollar contribution by Employee towards various plans, beginning and ending salary...........93
Page | 13
[Page intentionally left blank]
Page | 14
Chapter 1 Introduction
United States Postal Service Overview
The United States Postal Service is an independent agency of the Executive Branch of the United
States Federal Government, having received its independence from a cabinet department in 1971. From
its beginnings in the 13 colonies of America, the Postal Service has evolved to one of the most complex
logistic organizations in the world, delivering 160 billion pieces of mail to 152 million homes, businesses
and Post Office Boxes in every state, city, town and borough of the U.S.; this is more mail to more
addresses over a larger geographic area than any other post in the world (United States Postal Service
(a) 4). The Postal Service is governed by Title 39 of the U.S. code and its mission has been defined as
follows:
The United States Postal Service shall be operated as a basic and fundamental service provided
to the people by the Government of the United States, authorized by the Constitution, created
by Act of Congress, and supported by the people. The Postal Service shall have as its basic
function the obligation to provide postal services to bind the Nation together through the
personal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of the people. It shall provide
prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all areas and shall render postal services to
all communities. The costs of establishing and maintaining the Postal Service shall not be
apportioned to impair the overall value of such service to the people
(United States Government Code)
Over the past decade, the Postal Service has faced significant financial pressures in delivering on
its mission due to declining mail volume precipitated by changing consumer habits and electronic
diversion, exacerbated during the financial crisis of 2008. The Postal Service has been unable to pare
back its cost structure in keeping with declining revenues, leading to significant deficits. Much of the
cost structure of the Postal Service is mandated by law, including provisions to maintain delivery levels
to what they were in 1983, and mandatory participation in federal government benefit programs,
including health and pension systems. These mandates constrain the decisions of Postal management,
and limit its control over the finances of the Postal Service. The Postal Service's 10-k states, "We
participate in federal government pension and health and benefits programs for employees and
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retirees, including the Federal Employees Health Benefit (FEHB) Program, the Civil Service Retirement
System (CSRS), and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). We have no control or influence
over the benefits offered by these plans and make contributions to these plans as specified by law or
contractual agreements with our unions (in the case of health benefits for most active employees).
Several factors could cause us to make significantly higher future contributions to these plans; and many
of these factors are beyond Postal management's control." (United States Postal Service (b) 14).
This thesis provides a historical retrospective of the development of the pension system that the
Postal Service is currently a participant in, and assesses the impact the pension system has had on the
Postal Service through history. The ultimate objective of this thesis is to study the U.S. Postal Service
pension system as it relates to its current obligations to the U.S. federal government, provide a review of
alternative pension arrangements operating in other sectors, and analyze the leading alternatives as
they apply to the Postal Service to understand their potential impact on the finances of the U.S. Postal
Service.
Restructuring the Postal Serve pension system is not a new idea, in fact it is one that the Postal
Service itself has proposed to Congress as a method to deal with the ongoing financial issues impacting
the organization. Among the challenges are a number of complicated legal issues that arise due to the
complex relationship between the U.S. Postal Service and the Federal government. Those issues are
summarized in this thesis, but the required legal changes for any action to occur are beyond the scope
of the analysis. The Postmaster General recently testified before the Senate requesting Congress allow
the Postal Service to transition to a defined contribution plan for employees joining the Postal Service
after 2015, citing the ongoing need to control costs associated with employee benefits as well as provide
future employees retirement flexibility. The Postal Service has not yet proposed a level of matching or
agency contributions that would be made towards employee's defined contribution plan (Losey).
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The Postal Service: Financial Reality and Political Constraints
The Postal Service receives no tax dollars, and is self-supported through its sale of stamps and
services. Its revenue in Fiscal Year 2012 was $65 billion. Labor costs include all costs associated with
individuals working for the Postal Service. These costs include wages in the form of salary or hourly pay,
overtime pay, as well as benefits in the form of health benefits, life insurance benefits, and pension
benefits. In Fiscal Year 2012, total compensation and benefits for employees were $47.7B, retirement
health benefits were $2.6B, prefunding of future retiree health care benefits were $11.1B and workers
compensation was $3.71 1. Non-labor costs include those costs not associated with employee costs,
such as transportation, contracts with suppliers, supplies, and facility costs. In Fiscal Year 2012,
transportation costs totaled $6.6B and other expenses totaled $9.2B. The total expenses of the Postal
Service in Fiscal Year 2012 were $80.9B leading to a total loss from operations of $15.7B. Labor costs
accounted for over 80% of costs for Fiscal Year 2012 (United States Postal Service (b)).
Figure 1: Operating Statistics of the U.S. Postal Service (2001- 2012):
Revenue and Expenses 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Operating Revenues $ 65,900 $ 66,463 $ 68,529 $ 68,996 $ 69,907 $ 72,650
Total Operating Expenses $ 67,600 $ 65,234 $ 63,902 $ 65,851 $ 68,281 $ 71,681
Incomefrom Operations: $ (1,700) $ 1,229 $ 4,627 $ 3,145 $ 1,626 $ 969
Mail volume and Delivery Point: 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Mail volume (,000,000s) 207,462.6 202,821.9 202,184.7 206,105.7 211,742.7 213,137.7
Total Delivery Points (,000,000s) 135.0 139.4 141.3 142.3 144.3 146.2
Pieces/Delivery Point/Day 5.09 4.82 4.74 4.80 4.86 4.83
Revenue and Expenses 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Operating Revenues $ 74,778 $ 74,932 $ 68,090 $ 67,052 $ 65,711 $ 65,223
Total Operating Expenses $ 80,105 $ 77,738 $ 71,830 $ 75,426 $ 70,634 $ 80,964
Incomefrom Operations: $ (5,327) $ (2,806) $ (3,740) $ (8,374) $ (4,923) $ (15,741)
Mail Volume and Delivery Point: 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Mail Volume (,000,000s) 212,234.0 201,128.0 177,057.8 170,573.7 167,934.4 159,858.9
Total Delivery Points (,000,000s) 148.0 149.2 150.1 150.9 151.5 152.1
Pieces/Delivery Point/Day 4.75 4.46 3.91 3.74 3.67 3.48
1 Total compensation and benefits includes payments of cash wages to employees, overtime pay, as well as
payments made for their health insurance and retirement premiums. Retirement health benefits are the actual
cash payments made for health insurance premiums for current retirees. Prefunding of future retiree health
benefits are the payments accrued based on the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act which are owed, but
not yet paid to the Treasury department, and workers compensation charges paid to the Department of Labor.
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The operating statistics of the Postal Service contained in Figure 1 highlight the major issues
facing the organization. A growing delivery network, encapsulated in the number of delivery points,
combined with declining revenues associated with falling mail volumes. As volume has declined and the
number of delivery points has increased, the pieces per delivery point per day has fallen from
approximately 5.09 in 2001 to 3.48 in 2012. Labor within a fixed delivery network cannot fall
commensurately with volume declines and therefore structural changes within the network are
required, such as delivery frequency changes and/or service standard changes, or the unit cost of labor
has to decline. For the Postal Service, its current financial situation combined with the anticipated
decline in future volume suggests both may be necessary in order to bring costs and revenues into
balance.
Postal Service management proposed to align the cost structure of the Postal Service with its
anticipated revenues through a multi-pronged strategy released in February of 2012, entitled the Plan to
Profitability, 5 Year Business Plan. The plan identifies four interrelated problems contributing to the
financial problems at the Postal Service. They include declining volumes, a fixed cost base due to the
universal service obligation, prices capped by inflation, and rising labor costs which represent
approximately 80% of total costs. Of labor cost, approximately 40% are benefits-related which are
nearly all outside of the control of the Postal Service (United States Postal Service (c) 4).
In the Plan to Profitability, management identifies three key elements including an USPS-
sponsored healthcare plan; network changes to address the declining volume base--that include
consolidation of mail processing facilities and changes to service levels that include modifying service
standards and delivery frequency; and finally revenue management that includes targeted price
increases and the pursuit of new marketing initiatives which align with the competencies of the Postal
Service (United States Postal Service (c) 13). Taken together, these initiatives have the potential to
reduce costs by up to $22.5B by 2016, which would provide a significant opportunity for the Postal
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Service to align its costs and revenues. Much of the savings associated with the plan, however, require
Congressional approval through the revision of the laws governing the Postal Service. The Senate was
able to pass a Postal Reform bill containing some, but not all of the components of the plan during the
11 2th Congress. The House of Representatives did not bring a Bill to the floor for consideration during
the last session providing no changes to the laws governing the Postal Service. At the point this thesis
was written, it was unclear how Congress planned to move forward with changes in the laws governing
the Postal Service.
Thesis Overview
Within this framework of aligning the business of the Postal Service to the financial realities of
today as well as of the future, this thesis will assess the impact the pension system has had on the
organization and look at alternative methods for providing employee benefits that balance the needs of
the organization with the needs of the employee. The next chapter summarizes the major private
pension developments within the U.S., specifically focusing on the post-World War 11 period. It begins
with a historical overview of private pension development and then looks at the legal frameworks that
have impacted private pension systems since the Studebaker default and passage of ERISA.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the academic literature that serves as the foundation of the
modern theory of pension economics, and that explain the rationale behind pensions.
Chapters 4 through 6 review the history of the federal pension system as it relates to the Postal
Service. Chapter 4 looks at the period of time when the Postal Service was a cabinet level department
within the U.S.. Chapter 5 reviews the period between the Postal Reorganization Act and the
introduction of the Federal Employment Retirement System in 1986. Chapter 6 seeks to understand the
recent issues surrounding the pension plans of the Postal Service and their impacts on the development
of recent Postal laws.
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Chapter 7 assesses the current fundamentals of the Pension systems, reviewing the levels of
contributions and benefits to the defined benefit plans. In addition, patterns and determinants of Postal
employee contribution choices for the defined contribution portion of benefits are analyzed. The age
demographics of the Postal Service, as well as the recent retirement characteristics of employees, are
also summarized.
Chapter 8 discusses alternative pension arrangements and explains the basics of the leading
alternatives. In addition, this chapter looks at current contribution rates made towards defined
contribution plans by employers in the private sector.
Chapter 9 employs the data collected on employee demographics and behavior to simulate
future expected retirement payments from the Postal Service. This simulation is utilized to determine
the financial impact of 10 alternative pension plans on the Postal Service. In addition, a simulation is
performed at the individual employee level to understand the expected income an employee could
expect in retirement under each alternative.
Chapter 10 assesses the legal, union and human resource issues the Postal Service should
anticipate in advancing a change for their pension plan.
Chapter 11 provides a summary of the findings of this research, as well as offers a series of
policy considerations. Additional areas of future research also are highlighted.
Page | 20
Chapter 2 Understanding Private Pension Development and Financing
Private pensions provide an important source of income for retirees. Pension income derives
from savings invested over the workers career, funded through employer and/or employee
contributions. The contributions substitute for take-home pay, effectively creating a mandatory savings
scheme. Plans fall into two major categories: (1) defined benefit, where workers receive a contractual
benefit and employers bear investment risk; and (2) defined contribution, where worker benefits
depend on investment returns. The evolution of employer sponsored pensions from the 1910s until the
passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 was strongly influenced by the
tax code, evolving regulatory restrictions and incentives, and the implementation of Social Security
(McGill, Brown and Haley 25-26). Post-World War il labor market demographics also had a strong
influence on the trajectory of modern private pension development.
Private Pension Development
The first private pension offered in the U.S. was offered by American Express in 1875, a
stagecoach delivery service, and the railroads soon followed suit. These pension systems typically
required workers to remain with the company for 30 years to obtain benefits, making pensions a tool of
retention, as well as a means to place older workers into retirement. The first half of the 20 century
saw a growth in pension promises, partly in response to the creation of a tax deduction for pensions.
This became abused as companies used pension payments to provide additional benefits to their
executives. In order to combat that practice, the government tightened control and forced plans to
include their regular employees (Lowenstein).
During World War II, the dynamics of the labor market changed as younger men went to fight in
the war leaving the workplace to older men and women. After the war, many businesses found they
had a high proportion of older workers. The inflation of wartime had reduced the value of Social Security
many workers of retirement age did not want to leave the workplace. The "Lazear trap" (which will be
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discussed in Chapter 5) was at work in these industries, much as it was in the Federal Government
during the 1920s. Without an effective means of retiring workers, firms were unable to bring younger,
more productive individuals into the workplace. In addition, unions had bargained for systems of
seniority in which employers lay off employees starting with the least senior, hence, younger workers
first, created unemployment for younger workers which from a pragmatic perspective could diminish
the power of the union in the long-term if younger workers came to believe unions were only for the
protection of older workers (Wooten 687-688).
In the 1940s, unions sought an expansion of Social Security to guarantee private pension
benefits, but after Republicans took control of Congress in 1946 the political environment was not
conducive to such a change. During that same period the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held
that the Inland Steel Company committed unfair labor practices when it refused to negotiate with the
Steelworkers Union over a pension plan. Wooten writes, "This combination of demographics,
congressional politics and a legal mandate to negotiate pension issues prompted unions to pursue
"social security" in the private sector." (Wooten 689). Pensions soon became a standard request in
collective bargaining and pension plans began to expand rapidly in the private sector.
The plan structures left workers vulnerable to possibility of default. Many companies did not
accept contractual liability for paying retirement benefits, but rather agreed to make contributions to a
trust with the plan responsible for making payments to the retirees (Wooten 692). One of the main
issues in the creation of a retirement plan was the past service liability created. This past service liability
arose from workers being credited with accrued benefits from the period before the plan existed and
before the company initiated contributions. Tax laws at the time discouraged employers from rapidly
funding the past liability due annual deduction limits. Many plans utilized a 30 year window to pay off
this past liability (Wooten 702). The other major issue with the pension plans negotiated at this time
was they developed funding schedules that did not take into account higher benefits to be negotiated in
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the future (Wooten 703). Many of the plans that were developed would prove to be expensive. Alfred
P. Sloan warned in the 1940s that pensions and like benefits would be "extravagant beyond reason"
(Lowenstein). Lowenstein writes, "Companies might establish plans, but many were derelict when it
came to funding them. When companies failed, the workers lost much of their promised benefit."
One of the major reasons for the regulation of pension plans by the government includes the
belief that extended periods of employment under a plan generate a moral if not contractual obligation
for a plan sponsor to deliver those benefits. By the time people are old enough to qualify for benefits,
their ability to make alternative provisions for their economic needs may be limited (McGill, Brown and
Haley 27). In addition, the favorable tax treatment provides the government with an incentive to
restrict the value of tax exemptions, as well as to impose regulations that further social goals such as
ensuring the benefits be equitably distributed among workers across the earnings distribution (McGill,
Brown and Haley 27). Most importantly, pension regulations were put into place in order to protect
beneficiaries from a loss of benefits. The rationale for special protections is that retirees and older
workers have few or no alternatives to make up the lost income when a plan defaults. The event which
precipitated the enactment of comprehensive federal regulations of pensions was the default of the
Studebaker-Packard Corporation pension system.
Studebaker Pension Default
Studebaker, a car manufacturer, had fallen on difficult economic circumstances due to falling
demand for its vehicles. In order to appease its employees, in 1959 it agreed with the UAW to increase
pension benefits for a third time in six years, in return for stretching out its pension funding schedule.
This allowed for increased wages, as well as reduced costs which in turn would hopefully lead to
profitability. This agreement also required all parties to "pretend that Studebaker could afford a
pension plan that was clearly beyond its means. Four years later, the company collapsed." (Lowenstein).
When the facility closed in December 1963, the plan assets were insufficient to pay for the pensions of
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hourly workers, and it defaulted on the obligations to younger workers. Some workers received lump
sum payments worth a fraction of what was expected while others receiving nothing. Retirees and
retirement eligible employees aged sixty years and older did receive their benefits (Wooten 683-684).
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 came about as a means to regulate
private pension plans so as to limit default risk. The default of the Studebaker pension plan allowed the
United Autoworkers Union to propel the issues around pension risk front and center on the legislative
agenda (Wooten 684). Wooten writes of Studebaker as a "focusing event" for pension reform. He
reiterates political scientist John Kingdon's observation that social problems often "need a little push to
get the attention of people in and around government. That push is sometimes provided by a focusing
event like a crisis or disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem." (Wooten 684) In
addition, Wooten writes, "A calamity is more likely to draw attention to a social problem when people
interested in the problem are prepared to take advantage of the opportunity the calamity presents". In
this case, the United Auto Workers union (UAW) had been aware of the default risk inherent in many of
the pension plans that they had negotiated and had already devised remedies to this risk including
pension reinsurance. The default of Studebaker and its direct impact to so many individuals allowed the
UAW to push the default risk of pension plans onto the legislative agenda (Wooten 684-685). In
response to this focusing event, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
which has come to be known as ERISA. ERISA does the following:
e Requires plans to provide participants with information about the plan including
important information about plan features and funding. The plan must furnish some
information regularly and automatically. Some is available free of charge, some is not.
* Sets minimum standards for participation, vesting, benefit accrual and funding. The law
defines how long a person may be required to work before becoming eligible to
participate in a plan, to accumulate benefits, and to have a non-forfeitable right to those
benefits. The law also establishes detailed funding rules that require plan sponsors to
provide minimum funding levels for their plans.
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* Requires accountability of plan fiduciaries. ERISA generally defines a fiduciary as anyone
who exercises discretionary authority or control over a plan's management or assets,
including anyone who provides investment advice to the plan. Fiduciaries that do not
follow the principles of conduct may be held responsible for restoring losses to the plan.
* Gives participants the right to sue for benefits and breaches of fiduciary duty.
* Guarantees payment of certain benefits if a defined plan is terminated, through a
federally chartered corporation, known as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
(Department of Labor)
These changes provided considerable security to workers' pension plans, especially through the
establishment of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation which provided insurance to participants in
covered plans. In addition, a key component of ERISA is that it places legal constraints on the ability of
companies to make changes that impact the accrued pension benefits for employees. Specifically,
benefits earned to date are irrevocable, but employers are allowed to change future benefits in
response to economic conditions (Munnell 218). ERISA created an environment in which pensions
would have to be more fully funded, which would lead to the true costs of the pension plans that existed
to become more obvious.
The stricter rules also have had the unintended consequence, of causing many firms to move
away from defined benefit plans of the past. The benefits that were promised to workers are
exceptionally expensive even when spread over a long period of time. To fund such benefits would
require the appropriate funding be made and insurance premiums be paid to the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). These changes led to higher expenses for pension plans (which should
have been in place since inception), forcing many companies to reassess their pension plans due to the
actual expense. This has led to many of the pension changes that have been witnessed over the last 20
years. Such changes are not necessarily to be frowned upon, for if a company cannot afford to pay for
generous pension benefits, they should not be promised. These issues have led to many alternative
pension arrangements including defined contribution plans.
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Moral Hazard and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
Moral Hazard is a situation where a party has the tendency to take risks because the costs that
could result will not be felt by the party taking the risk. There are several parties that face moral hazard
arising from PBGC insurance. Because the consequences of pension underfunding are mostly absorbed
by the PBGC, union leaders were less concerned about excessive benefit promises, and had little
incentive to demand that pensions be fully funded (Lowenstein). Firms too faced an incentive to avoid
making contributions in order to utilize the money for other purposes. In addition, in order to make up
shortfalls, firms could take excessive risks with the plan assets under the assumption that if the risky
bets paid off they would be rewarded with lower contributions, and if the risky bets did not meet their
objectives and the firm became insolvent, their shortfall would be covered by the PBGC.
The result of those incentives led to a precarious situation for the PBGC by 2005. The economic
environment at that time led to the termination of several large underfunded pension plans, with nine
of the ten largest pension claims in history occurring between 2001 and 2005. In addition, the agency
itself was legally limited in terms of setting appropriate insurance premiums or funding levels because
Congress sets premiums and funding rules (McGill, Brown and Haley 573-574). If the agency were to
become financially insolvent and Congress did not authorize additional funding, it could impact the
retirement income of millions of Americans who had earned benefits under defined benefit plans
(Purcell, Summary of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 2). These issues led to the passage of the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 which led to many of the developments in the private pension market
that have occurred (Purcell, Summary of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 2).
Pension Protection Act of 2006
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 was signed into law on August 17, 2006 receiving
overwhelming support in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The act established new
funding requirements for defined benefit plans and included reforms to cash balance plans, defined
contribution plans, and deferred compensation plans for executives and highly compensated employees
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(Purcell, Summary of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 2). An exhaustive list of the provisions can be
found at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pensionreform.html; the key effect of the bill was to establish new
rules for determining whether a defined benefit plan is fully funded, the contribution needed to fund
the benefits that the plan participants will earn in the current year, and the contribution to the plan that
is required if previously earned benefits are not fully funded. The bill strengthened the PBGC through
stricter standards related to premiums and created an incentive for the automatic enrollment of
employees into 401(k) plans (Purcell, Summary of the Pension Protection Act of 2006).
The Migration of Defined Benefit Plans to Defined Contribution Plans
The Revenue Act of 1978 included a provision that became Section 401(k) of the Internal
Revenue Code which allowed tax deferral on employees' income that was received as deferred
compensation rather than as a direct cash payout (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1). It was not
until 1980 when Ted Benna, a benefits consultant, was assessing a client's profit-sharing plan and
realized this provision of the tax code could be used for employees to save for retirement (Fetini). As
more and more companies realized the risks associated with defined benefit plans, corporations
modified plans to reduce the risk and cost. Robert Merton argues that "the simplest explanation for
what happened to defined-benefit plans is that they were mispriced, not three or five years ago but
from the outset...From the very beginning, providers and sponsors should have recognized that the
accounting treatment of these plans was systematically underpricing the cost of benefits. Because of
this underpricing, I can say with confidence that we will not go through a cycle that brings us back to
defined-benefit plans, at least not to plans with such a pricing structure." (Merton, The Future of
Retirement Planning 5). The underpricing of cost was largely hidden from view for the first two
decades after ERISA due to increasing equity prices and interest rates that provided returns in excess of
inflation. As the world stock markets began declining with the dot-com bust in 2000 through 2002,
combined with falling interest rates, pension fund assets declined in value just as pension liabilities
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increased. This perfect storm of pension underfunding combined with bankruptcies at large firms in the
steel and airline industries showed surviving companies the significant extent to which pension plans
could impact the ongoing operation of the firm. The result of these events was the movement of many
companies toward defined contribution plans (Allianz Global Investors 34).
This trend towards defined contribution plans was highlighted when IBM announced in 2006
that it intended to close its defined benefit plan to both existing and new employees. IBM is known as
employee-centric with strong financials and with an overfunded defined benefit plan which made this
shift noteworthy (Merton, The Future of Retirement Planning 5). The following table shows the change
in private pension plan participation from 1990 to 2008 based on the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. from
2012 by the U.S. Census Bureau:
Table 1 - Private Pension Plan Summary - 1990 to 2008
Item Unit Total Defined contribution plan Defined benefit plan
1990 2000 2005 2008 1990 2000 2005 2008 1990 2000 2005 2008
Number of plans 1000 712.3 735.7 679.1 717.5 599.2 686.9 631.5 669.2 113.1 48.8 47.6 48.4
Total participants Million 76.9 103.3 117.4 124.9 38.6 61.7 75.5 82.5 38.8 41.6 41.9 42.3
Active participants Million 61.5 73.1 82.7 86.2 35.6 50.9 62.4 67.3 26.2 22.2 20.3 19
Assets Bil. dol 1674 4203 5062 4704 834 2216 2808 2663 962 1986 2254 2041
Contributions Bil. dol 98.8 231.9 341.4 419 80.9 198.5 248.8 311.7 24.7 33.4 92.7 107.3
Benefits Bil. dol 129.4 341 354.5 431.1 64 213.5 218 265.1 66.4 127.5 136.6 166
(U.S. Census Bureau 359)
The total active participants in defined contribution plans from 1990 to 2008 have just about
doubled, while the total active participants in defined benefit plans during this same time period have
decreased by 27%.
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Chapter 3 Overview of Academic Research on the Modern Theory of Pension Economics
Pensions are a form of compensation for an employee. Various economic rationales have been
suggested for why firms offer pensions in lieu of higher wages. One set of views focuses on the use of
pensions to defer compensation for employees in order to achieve a level of efficiency in the long-term
employer-employee relationship. Another perspective focuses on the superior ability of the employer
to manage money for the employee over the long-term career of the employee giving rise to the
employer centric source of pensions. There is also the notion that pensions are a means of managing
worker attraction, retention and performance.
The migration of the U.S. economy from small family owned and operated farms and businesses
where every member of a family was part of the production process to large scale industrialization
changed individual economics. When the economy was dominated by small family businesses, as the
productivity of older family members declined, the family reshuffled tasks and moved less demanding
tasks to the older generation. In addition, the family structure, as well as generational involvement
within the family business gave rise to the protection of older individuals well into later years. This
combined with a lower life expectancy meant the need for pension systems was limited. As industry
grew and employers at large scale operations demanded increased efficiency, older workers could not
meet the new standards. Early in the industrial revolution, employers would simply fire older
employees. Compounding the difficulty for these individuals was the fact that new employment was
difficult to find; by 1930, 54 percent of men over 65 were out of work and looking for a job (McGill,
Brown and Haley 5-6).
Deferred Compensation
Birchard Wyatt, an early promoter of private pension systems, developed the idea of an
efficiency cycle of typical employees in most organizations. The idea was that a worker's marginal
contribution reaches a peak and then declines to less than the associated compensation cost. Early in
an employee's career, generally, the value of services rendered actually exceeds worker compensation,
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which was known as a period of "efficiency surplus". This surplus could be utilized to finance a pension
benefit to discourage workers from becoming a hidden pensioner on the active payroll. A hidden
pensioner was someone who simply remained employed, while not contributing to a level
commensurate with their compensation (McGill, Brown and Haley 5-6).
The notion of pensions as deferred compensation is known as the labor economics perspective.
This idea is that pension benefits are deferred compensation and therefore designed to achieve
efficiency in a long-term relationship between employer and employee. This idea explains the vesting
and retirement provisions of pension plans. The vesting rules reduce turnover and early retirement
incentives to encourage less productive workers to retire more quickly. (Bodie 29).
Many defined benefit pension systems have been established to provide incentives for workers
to retire within a range of specific ages or for early retirement age (McGill, Brown and Haley 167). For
example, the rationale for the development of the first public pension systems was the retirement of
superannuated workers. This impetus for the development of the Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS) will be explored in Chapter 5. The Postal Service itself has relied upon the incentives offered
within the retirement system to encourage early retirement as a means to reduce employee headcount
through attrition to deal with its current financial condition.
The type of pension, whether defined benefit or defined contribution, also plays a role in the
retirement of workers. Friedberg and Webb found that workers with defined benefit plans retire almost
two years earlier on average than workers with defined contribution plans (Friedberg and Webb 306).
Of important note, legislation passed in 1967 prohibits mandatory retirement because of age. This has
limited the ability of employers to control the age composition of their workforce by any means other
than financial incentives (McGill, Brown and Haley 6).
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Economic Security
Zvi Bodie in his research paper entitled "Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance" writes of the
many sources of economic security provided through pension schemes. One such component of
economic security is the insurance-like features designed to protect an employee from economic
uncertainty. Sources of retirement income risk include: replacement rate inadequacy, social security
cuts, longevity, investment risk and inflation risk (Bodie 31). The crux of the argument is that individual
workers face a great deal of uncertainty, and that by sponsoring retirement plans for their employees,
employers can utilize economies of scale to provide benefits that an individual could not achieve as
efficiently on their own (McGill, Brown and Haley 145).
The efficiency that can be achieved by companies also includes the use of tax shelters. Under
the U.S. tax code contributions towards qualified pension plans are tax deductible and earnings of the
investments are tax-exempt. Only when benefits are paid to the employees are taxes paid. This
provides the company the ability to utilize pension plan payments as a means to limit their tax liability.
The fact that the limits as to what a company can contribute exceed what an individual can contribute
tax free means a company can realize greater tax advantages for themselves, their employees and their
shareholders.
Worker Attraction, Retention and Performance
Many have viewed traditional defined benefit plans as 'golden handcuffs' that discourage
covered workers from changing jobs . This desire to restrict workers' mobility relates to the costs of
turnover, their investment in their workers and a desire to minimize labor costs over time (McGill,
Brown and Haley 147). These types of plans are structured in a way to link job-turnover patterns with
substantial financial losses or gains at different points in the career. A key component of the benefit
formula is the measure of pay on which benefits are based, as well as the timing of benefits. Many of
these types of plans base retirement benefits on average pay levels in the three to five years
immediately prior to retirement. However, the evidence is mixed; a number of studies discount the
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notion of the pension providing the impetus for employment longevity. Specifically, Gustman and
Steinmeier found that pension covered workers in general received higher cash wages than similar
workers in non-pension jobs. In addition, they found that turnover among workers covered by a defined
contribution plan was almost identical to turnover among workers covered under defined benefit plans:
6.2 and 6.0 percent, respectively (McGill, Brown and Haley 151). Steven Allen, Robert Clark and Ann
McDermed also looked to identify the effects of pensions and tenure due to pensions, and concluded
that it was higher overall pay levels rather than the level of pension compensation that lead to lower
turnover (McGill, Brown and Haley 152). Ippolito remarked that pensions bond the worker's promise to
stay with the firm thereby attracting those who anticipate staying for the long term. This idea explains
why pensions are affiliated with lower quit rates and on time retirement (Ippolito 17).
Richard Ippolito in his analysis in Pension Plans and Employee Performance, Evidence, Analysis
and Policy looked at two hypotheses, the first being the traditional view that defined benefit pensions
help employers reduce quit rates at early ages and increase retirement rates at later ages.
The second less traditional view he explores is that pensions sort workers based on
characteristics desirable to the firm. This mechanism is not based on the ability of pensions to influence
behavior, but rather the ability of the firm to attract workers who have desirable behavior patterns
(Ippolito 3). That perspective suggests 401k plans can also help the firm to obtain the best workers and
reduce quit rates (Ippolito 4). Ippolito utilizes what is known as implicit contract theory as the basis for
establishing the productivity theory of pensions. A policy that returns pension contributions contingent
upon the fulfillment of tenure is a tool that a firm can use to influence its workforce (Ippolito 17). He
found the following impacts on employee performance:
* Defined Benefit Pensions reduce quit rates by approximately 20 percent and increase tenure
levels at older ages by over 25 percent (Ippolito 27)
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* The matching feature of 401k plans allows the firm to selectively pay higher wages to those who
reveal themselves as savers based on their elected contributions (Ippolito 85)
* 401k contributors are less likely to quit than are non-contributors, more likely to obtain pay
raises, and more likely to obtain higher job performance ratings (Ippolito 139)
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Chapter 4 The history of the U.S. Postal Service Pension System - Foundation (1792-1971)
To understand the Postal Service Pension system is to first and foremost understand the
development of the U.S. Civil Service pension system. The U.S. Postal Service was established as a
cabinet level department in 1792 (National Postal Museum). From 1792 until 1971, the U.S. Postal
Service was known as the Post Office Department, and all decisions related to the pensions of Postal
employees were in the hands of the federal government.
Early Pensions Systems
The federal government has a history of involvement with pension systems beginning with the
development of military pensions for the Navy and Army. The American Revolution ushered in a
pension plan for naval personnel. The creation of this plan was one of necessity; American naval
personnel were promised pension benefits if they were injured during their service, which became a
recruitment tool to populate the early Navy ships (Clark, Craig and Wilson 43). This pension plan was
paid out of a fund which was financed by the sale of prizes captured by the Navy. The benefits of this
system were twofold. First, by linking some form of compensation to prizes, the government could
incentivize Naval personnel who could not be directly supervised to meet the objectives set out for
them, and do so in a way that could be quantified, i.e., through the sale of prizes captured (Clark, Craig
and Wilson 43). The second was to develop a reserve fund for payment to naval veterans. The initial
payments were for those men disabled in service, with retirement pensions developing later in the
nineteenth century. A unique aspect of the Navy Pension fund was that it was the earliest examples of
pension fund management by the government (Clark, Craig and Wilson 63). Important parallels will be
drawn in later chapters to some of the issues that government management of pension funds has and
methods employed to mitigate mismanagement of assets.
The U.S. Army Pension plan also was established by the Continental Congress during the
Revolution. The Army Pension plan, like the Navy pension plan, developed out of necessity. In order to
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attract troops, the continental Congress offered a disability plan to provide for soldiers injured as a
result of their military service. In addition, the Army pension plan, unlike its Navy counterpart also
initially provided retirement pensions for officers of the Continental Army. Much of the reason for the
retirement pension was to provide an incentive for the officers to remain with the Army until the end of
the Revolution (Clark, Craig and Wilson 123). A major difference in the funding of the Army Pension
plan was that it was funded on a pay-go basis based on the general revenues of the government, as
opposed to a fund set aside to cover liabilities. The reasons for this difference were in general the Army
could be more directly supervised being a land force, with relatively strong chains of command. In
addition, prizes captured by troops on land were not officially sanctioned by national governments as
prizes at sea (Clark, Craig and Wilson 123).
The Army and Navy pension plans continued to develop throughout the nineteenth century.
Each began to expand who would be covered, and eventually became retirement pension plans. The
other development during this time was the conversion of the Navy pension plan from a funded system
to a pay-go pension plan (Clark, Craig and Wilson 119). These early precursors to other federal pension
plans provide an early understanding of the rationale of pensions and various schemes utilized to ensure
funding availability.
Civil Service Act of 1883
Discussions around a federal service pension dated from the late nineteenth century. A
prerequisite for a pension plan, however, was the establishment of a civil service system whereby
employees could retain their positions beyond the tenure of their political benefactors. Prior to 1883,
civil service employees of the U.S. were essentially patronage employees. Post Office jobs up until the
passage of the Pendleton act were provided to the party faithful. Local politicians utilized the Post
Office as patronage. The result was with any turnover in power, postal personnel could be completely
changed (Walsh and Mangum 47). During the nineteenth century, there was a tremendous growth in
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federal employees and the benefits of the patronage system were outweighed by the costs of managing
it, for example, over the course of the nineteenth century, the number of Post Offices went from 906 to
44,848 (Clark, Craig and Wilson 157). With the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1883, a system of
meritocracy within the Federal government and Postal organization began. It would take an additional
90 years, however with the passage of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1971 for the spoilage system to
be completely eradicated within the Postal Service (Public Law 91-375 - August 12, 1970 §1001).
The rationale for a stable civil service system was to ensure continuation of knowledge within
the organizations of the federal government. Managing the growth of the federal government within
the spoilage system became practically impossible and the Republicans in control of Congress and the
White House felt the passage of this act would provide an opportunity to gain the loyalty of an entire
cohort of federal workers. This opportunity, however, came at a price, and once federal workers were
protected from changes in employment due to the whims of the political environment, they did not
want to give up their jobs (Clark, Craig and Wilson 158).
"The Lazear Trap"
From 1792 until 1920, most Federal employees including Postal employees were paid salary, but
were not entitled to a pension. Until 1920 there was no mandatory retirement arrangement, and
without benefits provided, the only source of income in retirement was private savings. The Civil Service
Act of 1883 led directly to many instances of employees remaining employed even in advanced years
since the employment of the Civil Service was firmly established as a lifetime entitlement. This issue
was seen within the Navy and Army early in the development of their pension plans, and is one of the
reasons those organizations began offering retirement benefits.
This issue around those advanced in age refusing to retire is known as the "Lazear trap" and was
coined by Lee A. Craig based on Edward P. Lazear of the University of Chicago's paper "Why is there
Mandatory Retirement" (Craig 312). The crux of the argument made by Lazear is that it is beneficial for
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both employer and employee to agree to a long-term wage stream which pays workers less than their
value of the worker's marginal product when young and more when old so long as there is a date at
which employment ends. The reason for this benefit is that both workers and firms benefit from the
existence of mandatory retirement; lifetime wealth is increased for workers, and firms gain from the
ability to reduce the workforce commensurate with matching the lifetime marginal product with wages.
This ensures the overall stream of payments matches the marginal product over the life of the
employment (Lazear 1283). Lazear found that mandatory retirement is more likely to be found where
job tenure is long and wages are paid based on salary as opposed to piece-rates (Lazear 1277).
What Craig found was that based on the Civil Service Act of 1883, civil service employees shared
many of the attributes associated with Lazear's findings of employees likely to have mandatory
retirement, however, there was no mandatory retirement scheme in place. This created an
environment in which there was no financial incentive for employees to retire since there was no
pension system. After nearly a generation of meritocracy within the Federal government, officials
discovered many employees receiving wages much greater than their marginal product. This created a
less than efficient environment for productivity and the pension became one of the methods to
compensate federal workers for their loss of income beyond their retirement age (Craig 312).
The Lazear Trap was seen within the Post Office Department during the time period between
the Civil Service Act and the passage of the Civil Service Retirement Act, specifically in January of 1920,
the Postal Record of the National Association of Letter Carriers wrote the following under the heading
"Retirement":
The department has gone on record many times urging Congress to provide some retirement
measures for superannuated employees in the postal service. To dismiss these employees who
have been faithful because they have become inefficient on account of increasing age is very
hard, yet to continue them in office to the detriment of the service cannot be justified under the
law. It is hoped that some legislation of this character will be enacted before the end of the
present Congress. (National Association of Letter Carriers 7)
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Civil Service Retirement Act of 1920
The Civil Service Retirement Act of 1920 (also known as the Sterling-Lehlbach Act) put in place a
consistent pension system for the Civil Service of the United States federal government, of which the
Post Office Department was a part. This act culminated almost two decades of Congressional debate
whereby every session of Congress going back to the beginning of the twentieth century had seen a bill
to create a pension plan for non-military personnel debated but not passed (Craig 306).
Significant lobbying pressure came from the postal unions, U.S. Civil Service Retirement
Commission, and the National Association of Civil Service Employees, which joined forces to form the
Joint Conference on Retirement, which led the campaign to push for passage of Federal Employment
Retirement Act (FERA) (Clark, Craig and Wilson 158). The Postal Service employees were involved in
lobbying Congress and the administration to approve a retirement plan. To understand the level of
interest in the proceedings of the debates of the FERA act by the Post Office employees, one can look to
the National Association of Letter Carriers Postal Record from 1920 which published the entire debate
proceedings of the House and Senate throughout 1920. The following Resolution, published by the
National Association of Letter Carriers in the Postal Record in February of 1920, exhorts policymakers to
take action:
Whereas It Is in most part well-nigh, if not absolutely, Impossible for the average civil service
employee to secure a competency that will guarantee a civilized maintenance for his declining
years; and
Whereas a retirement plan has come to meet with the distinct favor of the popular mind of our
country, as evidenced by the constantly growing number of business enterprises that are
retiring their aged faithful employees with a generous annuity; and
Whereas It is a conceded fact that the corporate business of the future will be conducted on a
retirement basis; and
Whereas the enactment of a retirement measure Into law will directly operate to increase the
efficiency of every department of administrative and executive government and will especially
rehabilitate the postal service by removing Its worn-out element of senility, and recruiting it
with the vigor and elasticity of youth; and
Whereas two civilized countries only on the face of this great globe are yet withholding
annuities from their faithful superannuated civil service employees, the United States of
America being as yet one of this Ignoble twain; and
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Whereas an equitable retirement plan has the unqualified endorsement of the heads of the
administrative and executive branches of the government, not excluding the President himself;
and
Whereas two great political parties have recently pledged their support to civil service
retirement-the so-called Sterling-Lehlbach bill having already been favorably reported in
committees of both Houses; and
Whereas a well defined public sentiment is now prevalent throughout the wide domain of the
Eleventh Congressional District In substantial support of the immediate enactment of some
suitable retirement measure into the statutes; therefore be it
Resolved, That at this ripe and propitious time we, the members of the Eleventh Congressional
District Civil Service Association, will, through committee of this convention and otherwise,
redouble our energy and assiduously employ every available means looking to the immediate
statutory relief of the poor old men of the service who, frail, stooped and enfeebled, have
drawn their last draft on their physical resources, and can totter their weary way but a little
longer. And be it further
Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be sent to our President of the National Association
of Letter Carriers, one to each of our Congressmen, one to the Postal Record, and one to the
central organ of the Rural letter Carriers for publication; as well as one to each publication from
the various presses throughout the district.
(Resolution Committee of the National Association of Letter Carriers 30)
Much of the discussion in Congress during the debates of over the final structure of Federal
Employees Retirement Act of 1920 centered on a few concerns which included the contribution level of
the government, whether there should be a mandatory retirement age and whether in the postwar
budgetary situation it was feasible to undertake such large financial commitments (Clark, Craig and
Wilson 156-161). Many of these debates were similar to those that are occurring today. The question
then and now is not whether there should be a pension plan or system, for there is general agreement
in principle that some form of pension system for retirees should exist; but rather it is what the system
should look like and how it should be paid for.
The retirement act became law on May 22, 1920. The following is a summary of the key
provisions of the Retirement Act of 1920:
Retirement Age: The retirement age was set at 70 years with fifteen years of service for Civil
Service employees. Postal employee retirement ages were set separately. Mechanics, city and rural
letter carriers and post-office clerks were eligible for retirement at 65 years of age and railway clerks
were set at 62 years of age with both requiring at least 15 years of service (United States Civil Service
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Commission 1-2). An employee could be maintained two years beyond the mandatory age if his or her
department head and the head of the Civil Service Commission approved (Clark, Craig and Wilson 163).
Classification and Rates: The act created 6 classes of employees and corresponding rate
schedules (See figure 2 below).
Figure 2 - Classification of Retirees - 1920
/Year
Max percent of
employee's avg Avg Salary Period for
Class Years of Service 10 year pay Percentage Min Max
A 30+ 60% 10 Years $ 360 $ 720
B 27-30 54% 10 Years $ 324 $ 648
C 24-27 48% 10 Years $ 288 $ 576
D 21-24 42% 10Years $ 252 $ 504
E 18-21 36% 10 Years $ 216 $ 432
F 15-18 30% 10 Years $ 180 $ 360
(United States Civil Service Commission 5-6)
Disability Protection: Individuals who after 15 years of service become disabled prior to reaching
retirement age could receive an annuity pursuant to the provisions of the act so long as they are
examined by a medical official and deemed disabled (United States Civil Service Commission 8).
Payroll deductions to support the system: Payroll deductions in the amount of 2.5% of basic pay
were authorized for all employees the Act applied (United States Civil Service Commission 11).
Treasury Directives: The Treasury Department was to create a special fund for the payroll
deductions to be deposited in known as the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund, which still
exists today and is similar to the Social Security trust fund. Any excess funds not required for the
immediate payment of annuities, refunds and allowances were to be invested in interest-bearing
securities of the United States government (United States Civil Service Commission 11-12).
The Federal pension plan that was created was a rarity at the time within the broader economy
of the United States. Approximately 13 percent of the private nonfarm labor force was covered by a
retirement plan, and over 75% of workers lost their pension benefits during the first years of the Great
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Depression. The few plans that remained were not as generous as the plan for federal civil servants,
echoing many of the debates that are occurring within the United States regarding pension benefits for
private versus public workers in a time of financial unease (Clark, Craig and Wilson 164-165). The issues
concerning a minimum of retirement security for all individuals within the United States was addressed
during the Great Depression leading to the Social Security Act of 1935.
Social Security Act of 1935
The Social Security Act of 1935 was signed into law by President Roosevelt on August 14, 1935.
The Act provided for old-age pensions of two types: The first was for those individuals 65 and over who
were considered indigent, or those individuals without other income or means of support. This
provision provided support to those who were unable to contribute to the fund since the law did not
exist at the time they had wage income. The second type of pension was an annuity plan sponsored by
the government. Social Security was to be funded jointly through a 3% payroll tax on both employee and
employer up to the first $3,000 of income. Pensions would vary in amounts based on the period of
employment and the salary, with a range of $17.50 - $81.25 per month (Special to the New York Times
4). The Social Security Act of 1935 did not apply to the Civil Service since pensions were already in place.
Amendments to the Civil Service and Social Security Acts
Until the passage of the Social Security Reform Act of 1983 and the Federal Employee
Retirement System Act of 1986, only piecemeal changes had been made to both laws, which included
expansions in coverage, and changes to benefits and benefit formulas. Changes were also made to the
Civil Service Act prior to the major reform that established the Federal Employee Retirement System in
1986. The list below highlights some of those more critical changes that affected the postal pension
system and that contributed to the current financial predicament of the Postal Service:
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" Withdrawal of retirement funds: Individuals with between 10 and 19 years of service could
withdraw their contributions from CSRS, previously only those with less than 10 years of service
could withdraw their funds (Social Security Bulletin 14).
" Automatic cost of living adjustments: Cost of living increases in retirement annuities were provided
in the Amendments of 1952, and were made permanent by the Amendments of 1954. (Social
Security Bulletin 24).
" Calculation of annuity: The calculation of the annuity changes from an average of 10 years of salary
in 1920, to an average of 5 years of salary to ultimately an average of the 3 years of highest salary
that exists today (Jones).
* Employee contributions: contributions were modified and increased during the time period up to
6.5% of base wages by 1959 (Jones).
* Fund management: The Treasury department was required to set the interest rate on the special
issue bonds within the CSRS fund according to the current average coupon rate on all outstanding
U.S. public marketable interest-bearing securities with greater than 5 year maturity (Jones).
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Chapter 5 The history of the United States Postal Service Pension System - Independence
(1971 -1989)
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970
The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 established, "as an independent establishment of the
executive branch of the Government of the United States, the United States Postal Service" (Public Law
91-375 -August 12, 1970 720). The Act was signed into law after significant upheaval within the nation's
postal network. Due to issues around compensation and fragmented control of facilities, and
equipment and management efficiency, mail movement ground to a halt in 1966 in Chicago under
significant mail volumes (United States Postal Service (d) 38). In March of 1970, after extensive
hearings, the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee reported a compromise measure with a 5.4
percent retroactive pay raise. Postal employees were not impressed and began a work stoppage on
March 18, 1970. After much discussion between the Post Office Department, the unions, Congress and
the Administration, a compromise agreement was reached which ultimately became Public Law 91-375,
the Postal Reorganization Act on August 12, 1970 (United States Postal Service (d) 39). As part of the
Act, officers and employees of the Postal Service were deemed part of the civil service, subject to the
provisions of Title V of the United States Code (Public Law 91-375 -August 12, 1970 §1001). In addition,
the Act restricted patronage in employment.
The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 ushered in a new and complex relationship between the
Postal Service and the Federal Government. One of its key objectives was to establish the Postal Service
as a financially independent entity that would pay its costs from its own revenues (Purcell and Stevens,
Funding Postal Service Obligations to the Civil Service Retirement System 3). While the Postal Service
was to be financially independent, it remained subject to the rules governing the Civil Service system.
Hence the Postal Service's pension system remained tied to Federal pension policy and outside of its
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control. This complex financial relationship, especially as it relates to pensions, will be further explored
in chapters 7 and 8.
Social Security Reform Act of 1983
The Social Security Reform Act of 1983 was signed into law on April 20, 1983 and represented a
bipartisan effort to deal with the short and long-term financing problems of the Old-Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance (OADSI) program, of which Social Security was a major component. Expenditures
had exceeded revenues since 1975, and without legislative action, it would not be possible to continue
paying cash benefits by July 1983. In addition, the program faced a projected long-range deficit of
almost 1.80 percent of taxable payroll (Svahn and Ross 3). In order to deal with these fundamental
issues, President Reagan, working with a Democratic House of Representatives and a Republican Senate,
passed the bipartisan agreement. The core components of the law included the following changes
related to Social Security:
* Coverage: Coverage became mandatory for newly hired federal employees hired on or after
January 1, 1984. In addition, current and future employees of nonprofit organizations were
to be covered effective January 1, 1984 on a mandatory basis (Svahn and Ross 25).
* Revenue: Social Security tax rates were increased faster than had been previously
proscribed. Previous law had established the increase to go to 5.7% in 1985 and 6.2% in
1990, whereas the new law provided an increase from 5.7% effective in 1984, 6.06% in 1988
and 6.2% in 1990 (Svahn and Ross 27-28).
* Retirement age: The normal retirement age was to be gradually increased from age 62 to
age 67 for those reaching age 62 after 2022. Reduced benefits would still be available at age
62 (Svahn and Ross 30).
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* Cost of living adjustments: Cost of living adjustments were to be made in January as
opposed to July of each year. In addition, the cost of living increases were to be based on a
lower of wage or price increase if the trust fund balances were low (Svahn and Ross 25).
They key provisions of the reform act which affected the Postal Service as it relates to pensions
was the fact that newly hired employees would be required to participate in Social Security. This created
a new complexity within the pension retirement system not just for the Postal Service, but for the entire
CSRS. With Social Security in effect, offering and paying for full CSRS benefits no longer made sense; the
contribution rate to CSRS was 7%, adding the additional 6.2% of Social Security contributions would
require a contribution of 13.2% of compensation to fund retirement. This was deemed excessive and
therefore, civil service retirement benefits would have to be redesigned to accommodate these changes
(Schreitmueller 545). In the interim period, a temporary plan was enacted whereby employees hired
after January 1, 1984 would receive CSRS benefits offset by social security benefits earned during their
federal service. These employees would contribute 1.3% of pay to CSRS which when added to the 5.7%
contribution rate for social security would match the 7% of pay for employees hired prior to January 1,
1984 (Schreitmueller 545).
Federal Employee Retirement System Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-335)
Richard Schreitmueller in his article on the Federal Employee Retirement System Act (FERS) of
1986 stated, "The design of FERS reflects technical, actuarial, and investment decisions that were made
in a political environment" (Schreitmueller 543). This keen insight as to the role of politics within the
design of the system is critical as we review the development of the FERS system.
The design of the Federal Employee Retirement System Act occurred during a period of time in
which defined contribution plans had become popular in the private sector. The growth of 401(k) plans
and their deferral of taxes on contributions and investment income made these a good option for
organizations looking to attract talent, in a much more mobile labor market. A key element within the
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design of FERS therefore was the recognition that employment patterns were much different than they
had been when CSRS was designed in the 1920s. A more highly flexible labor force created an
environment in which many employees were unlikely to spend their entire career with one employer. As
a consequence, the framework of FERS provided for a portability of benefits through its three tiers of
benefits (Hustead and Hustead 69). These three tiers included the Social Security component for federal
workers agreed to in 1983, a less generous defined benefit annuity component, and a 401(k)-like
defined contribution option including a match of contributions.
The most innovative feature of the FERS system was this 401(k)-like option, the Thrift Savings
Plan (TSP). With TSP, the United States government allowed employees to choose to invest a portion of
their retirement in the private market. This would be the first time retirement savings of federal
workers was placed in the private markets since the elimination of the Naval Pension fund in the 1800s.
Throughout the debates in Congress there was much discussion around concerns of
governmental control of private assets. Robert J. Myers explained the following concerns for private
investment (Schreitmueller 21-22):
1. Investing in corporate securities implies government control of much of the private economy,
assuming that government officials would control investment decisions. If funds instead were
invested widely and indiscriminately, there might be loss of principal or investment return.
2. Another possibility would be for agency officials to invest the funds in activities deemed
socially and economically desirable, such as housing. This would be even more objectionable,
involving government control by persons not directly accountable to voters.
Other concerns that arose during the debates around a private investment vehicle included
concerns that investment decisions could be influenced by social and political considerations. This was
seen during the United States' management of the Navy fund. The big questions to be answered were
who would decide the investment vehicles, what the process would be and how such large decisions
could be separate from politics (Schreitmueller 564-565).
Page 1 48
On the positive side, there was a recognition that greater investment returns could be realized
through the private sector which also would provide additional savings invested in the private sector
contributing to increased capital formulation and long-term economic growth. In addition, Jamie
Cowen, counsel for Senator Ted Stevens (AK)'s subcommittee and the principle draftsman for the FERS
legislation gave the following reasons for offering such a plan (Schreitmueller 563-565):
* Employees would be encouraged to save toward their retirement.
* Employees would appreciate the early vesting and loan provisions.
* Employees would have portable benefits, allowing them to change jobs without heavy
forfeitures of benefits.
* Employees would own their accounts, which would not be subject to possible benefit cuts to
help balance the budget.
* The plan would use private investments, producing higher investment returns and aid capital
formation in the U.S. economy
In the discussions around what type vehicles were to be utilized, Congress developed four
alternatives which included: (1) government securities only, (2) active investments, with investment
managers insulated from elected officials, (3) IRA-type investments with employees having full control
and (4) passive investments, controlled by statute, with an index fund. The final legislation provided for
some governments securities, as well as index funds. The initial thrift savings plan offerings provided
just 3 index funds: the first was the government securities fund mentioned previously, the second was a
fixed income fund, and the third was an index fund invested in common stocks (Schreitmueller 565-567).
The rationale for such a choice was summed by the Senate committee:
By offering only a few alternative choices of investment funds, just as private plans do, this plan
uses its size and mass purchasing power to make the funds available for investment work harder
and more efficiently than is otherwise possible, and avoids turning the workplace into a
marketplace where numerous promoters would contact employees to sell them investment
products.
The final FERS legislation was enacted into law on June 6, 1986 (Schreitmueller 1). A further
discussion of all of the components and benefits offered through FERS as they relate to the United
States Postal Service will be provided in chapter 8.
Page | 49
[Page intentionally left blank]
Page 1 50
Chapter 6 The history of the United States Postal Service Pension System - Surplus and Deficit
(1989 -Present)
The special status of the Postal Service as an independent agency has implications for how it
affects the federal budget. In contrast to most federal agencies whose cash flows are directly tracked in
the budget, only the net cash flows between Treasury and the Post Office have a budgetary effect.
Therefore, any increases or decreases of payments by the Postal Service to Treasury affect the reported
surplus or deficit. This budgetary relationship helps to explain many of the legislation changes regarding
the Postal Service throughout the last 20 years.
Background on USPS Payments for Pensions
The independence of the Postal Service from the federal government added additional
complexity to the funding of the federal pension systems. Historically, the contributions to CSRS made
by employees and their employing agencies were not adequate to fully fund CSRS. The amendments of
1969 required both employer and employee to pay 7.0% of basic pay into the system. This contribution
funded CSRS as if there were neither annual pay raises nor cost of living adjustments to annuitants. In
order to deal with this shortfall, for non-Postal employees the federal government paid little more than
half of the spread between the required funding and agency funding. (Purcell and Stevens, Funding
Postal Service Obligations to the Civil Service Retirement System 2-4). From 1974-1993, Congress
passed several laws that required the Postal Service to pay all costs associated with CSRS accrued by
employees since July 1971, the date the Postal Service came into existence. This included the additional
contributions to the CSRS system to fully fund the future retirement costs of increases to pay that were
granted to employees through labor contracts and cost of living adjustments. The Postal Service made
these payments without additional contributions from employees (General Accounting Office 4-5).
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Graph 1 - USPS Contributions towards CSRS since 1970
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There were two components which affected the unfunded liability payments to be made by the
Postal Service. Those were the increases in pay and cost of living adjustments. When pay was
increased, the Postal Service was liable to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for the present
value of the additional future retirement benefits to be paid to employees upon retirement from the
Postal Service. The Postal Service was required to pay for the additional liability over 30 annual
payments with interest, utilizing the rate used in the most recent valuation of CSRS, which had been 5
percent for the previous 29 years. In fiscal year 1972, the first year of operation for the Postal Service,
the unfunded liability to be paid over 30 years was calculated to be approximately $1 billion, with an
initial payment of $63 million in 1972. In each year following the initial year, additional liabilities were
added as a result of pay increases. The effect of this process created an environment whereby liabilities
were added each year to be paid over 30 years, causing the unfunded liability to grow dramatically,
reaching $25.9 billion by 2000. From 1972 through 2000, the total assessments to the Postal Service for
pay increases was $42.1 billion, with the Postal Service contributing $16.2 billion in principal payments,
along with interest of $21.6 billion (General Accounting Office 17-18).
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The second component which impacted the Postal Service's payment into CSRS was the portion
of liability attributable to cost of living adjustments. As prescribed by law, CSRS retirees and survivors
receive annual cost of living adjustments. Each year, OPM determines the estimated increase in the
Postal Service's liability for these COLAs and establishes the amount to be paid on an installment basis
over 15 years with an interest rate of 5 percent. Since fiscal year 1990, the first year it was required to
make such payments, the Postal Service recorded a total liability of $11.1 billion for retirement COLA
increases over that period with payments to OPM of $4.8 billion plus interest of $2.3 billion (General
Accounting Office 18).
The other component of the Postal Service's pension system is FERS, which had grown by March
of 2002 to include 66% of the active workforce of the Postal Service. Unlike CSRS, FERS has no unfunded
pension liabilities. The full cost of the FERS annuity is proscribed by law to be fully funded by the sum of
employee and agency contributions. This includes the effect of employee pay raises and cost of living
adjustments (Purcell and Stevens, Funding Postal Service Obligations to the Civil Service Retirement
System 4).
It is against this financial background that we can understand the laws that have been enacted
most recently as they relate to the pension system of the Postal Service. In April of 2001, the General
Accounting Office placed the United States Postal Service on their high risk list due to their
transformational efforts and their long-term outlook as it related to their finances. The major issues
identified by the GAO included declining net income, with a fiscal year deficit in 2001 of $2 billion to $3
billion combined with an increase in outstanding debt to the Treasury at the end of each fiscal year since
1997. The Postal Service was facing competition both domestically and abroad, with significant
electronic diversion expected to cause substantial declines in First Class mail volume. There were
concerns related to whether the Postal Service could achieve the agency announced $2.5 billion in cost
reductions by 2003 through increased productivity and improved human capital programs due to
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historic difficulties in achieving such objectives. Finally, it was noted the Postal Service had periodic
conflicts with some of its major stakeholders including postal unions and the Postal Rate Commission.
Most importantly, the Postal Service was placed on the high risk list "so that we and others can focus on
its financial, operational, and human capital challenges before the situation escalates into a crisis where
the options for action may be more limited." (Government Accounting Office 2-3)
As part of the GAO's review of the Postal Service, they released a report on the Postal Service
retirement plans in December of 2001. Following this report, the GAO in the course of its review of the
Postal Service recognized there was no contemporary accounting of the Postal Service's obligations to
CSRS. The Postal Service had been carrying a $32 billion liability for CSRS pension obligations that had
not been analyzed to determine if it were an accurate figure. The GAO along with most postal analysts
believed it would turn out to be too low (Stevens, Pension Issues Cloud Postal Reform Debate 2). To
address this question, the GAO was asked in May of 2002 to review the CSRS financing as if a separate
retirement account had been established for the Postal Service in 1971 (Purcell and Stevens, Funding
Postal Service Obligations to the Civil Service Retirement System 4). The results of the analysis were
provided in a memorandum to the Postmaster General on November 1, 2002 by the director of OPM
indicating the actuaries "project that future payments required under current legislation will overfund
your estimated CSRS liability by approximately $71 billion." (Purcell and Stevens, Funding Postal Service
Obligations to the Civil Service Retirement System 5). Because the potential overfunding of CSRS was
prescribed by law, and there was nothing that could be done from a payment perspective without
legislation, OPM provided to Congress a legislative proposal to address the situation. OPM found there
were two elements which distinguished the Postal Service from any other agency:
First, the Postal Service is responsible only for CSRS benefits that were earned by USPS
employees after June 30, 1971. Consequently, a significant proportion of the Postal Service's
early contributions to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund have remained in the
Fund for a number of years, during which interest has accrued. Second, due to a series of laws
passed between 1989 and 1993, USPS is required to pay for the increases in CSRS pensions that
result from annual cost-of-living adjustments. As a result, the Postal Service-unlike any other
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federal agency-is required to pay into CSRDF an amount that approximates the full cost of the
CSRS. It is these two factors, in combination with the interest earnings in excess of the assumed
5 percent rate of return that have led to projected pension contributions and interest earnings
exceeding the value of CSRS benefits owed to USPS retirees and survivors.
According to OPM, the assumed interest rate used in CSRS financing has been set at 5 percent
since 1972. However, while OPM uses a 5 percent interest rate in its static valuation of CSRS, it
currently uses a nominal interest rate of 6.75 percent when valuing the liabilities of the CSRS on
a dynamic basis. The dynamic valuation of CSRS liabilities is a more accurate measure of the
present value of future CSRS annuities. Since the enactment of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990-which required the Postal Service to pay for the increase in
CSRS liabilities resulting from COLAs granted since 1971 and to amortize the cost of future
COLAs-USPS has been paying the full dynamic cost of its CSRS liabilities.
(Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate 3)
Congress asked the GAO to review the calculations made by OPM as well as the legislative
proposal provided, and on January 31, 2003, the GAO released their findings (Purcell and Stevens,
Funding Postal Service Obligations to the Civil Service Retirement System 7). The GAO had found that
when OPM developed their analysis they had treated the retirement benefits associated with postal
employee veteran service as obligations of the Postal Service, which was inconsistent with current law.
By eliminating this funding requirement, GAO concluded the projected overfunding was as much as
$103.1 billion. On net, instead of a current underfunding of $20.5 billion, USPS had overfunded its
obligation by $4.5 billion (Purcell and Stevens, Funding Postal Service Obligations to the Civil Service
Retirement System 8).
Federal Budget Scoring and the Postal Service
During the review process that took place in 2002 for the Postal Civil Service Retirement System
Funding Reform Act of 2003, the Congressional Budget Office said the proposed changes could increase
the federal deficit by as much as $41 billion in the unified budget over the 10 year period depending on
what the Postal Service did with the savings associated with the reduced contribution to CSRS. If USPS
utilized the savings to hold down rates, government receipts would be reduced by the full amount of
reduced payments. If, however, USPS utilized the money to pay down debt to Treasury, the impact on
the federal deficit would be limited to the foregone interest payments on the debt owed. In addition,
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the report emphasized the unfunded liability associated with its retiree health care benefits. Due to this
report, the Postal Service was directed to utilize the savings to reduce the outstanding debt, which at
this time was approximately $11.9 billion. In addition, future reductions in CSRS payments were to be
held in escrow until later proscribed by law as to what those funds could be utilized (Stevens, Pension
issues Cloud Postal Reform Debate 2-3).
Postal Civil Service Retirement System Funding Reform Act of 2003
With the GAO analysis of the OPM legislative proposal and evaluation of the Postal Service's
contributions to CSRS, Congress introduced the Postal Civil Service Retirement System Funding Reform
Act of 2003 which became law on April 23, 2003. The key provisions of this act included the following:
e Changed USPS funding of its Civil Service Retirement System pension liabilities based on
dynamic assumptions as opposed to static assumptions while retroactively transferring
responsibility for the funding of the cost of CSRS benefits attributable to the military
service of postal employees from the U.S. Treasury to USPS;
* Reduced payments into CSRS by $3.5 billion in FY2003 and $2.7 billion in FY2004 with
resultant savings going towards debt reduction (Stevens, Postal Reform 5)
e Required USPS to escrow the reduction in annual CSRS payments resulting from the
funding changes in the Act (about $3 billion)
e Required USPS to report to Congress on how it could use the CSRS savings realized after
fiscal year 2005. USPS proposed to Congress in 2003 that the responsibility for funding
the cost of CSRS benefits attributable to the military service of postal employees be
transferred back to the U.S. Treasury and that it use the resulting savings to prefund its
retiree health benefit liability.
(General Accounting Office 5-6)
Three issues were not settled through the Postal Civil Service Retirement System Funding
Reform Act of 2003 and would require additional legislation. Those three issues were:
* Use of the savings associated with the reduction in retirement funding
" Military retirement costs
" Unfunded liability for the health care costs of retirees
(Stevens, Postal Reform 5-6)
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Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006
The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 was passed by voice vote on December
08, 2006 in the House of Representatives and December 09, 2006 in the Senate during a lame duck of
Congress after the Republicans lost control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The
pursuit of Postal reform legislation began in 1996 with the recognition of the financial challenges of the
Postal Service. These challenges included both revenues and costs. On the revenue side, the decline in
First Class mail as customers migrated to electronic means, such as e-bill pay and e-mail would lead to
lower funds to finance the organization. In addition, the rate-setting process that was in place was
criticized for the length of time required which did not allow for the Postal Service to respond quickly to
changes in the competitive landscape. On the cost side, increasing labor cost due to the addition of over
2 million addresses each year and obligations for future retirees created a burden that many felt could
not be overcome with the existing framework. The eventual reform measure had over 150 changes to
postal law with significant alterations that would dramatically affect their finances (Kosar 1). This
framework will also provide the backdrop for the current financial issues plaguing the organization.
The key provisions of the 2006 Act which relate to the pension systems and long-term liabilities
include the following:
* Return of military obligations to the Treasury department.
* OPM estimated the Postal Service to be fully funded with CSRS obligations and
therefore suspended employer contributions to CSRS until 2017 at which point OPM will
determine the unfunded liability to be paid by the Postal Service
* Repeal of the escrow account provision of the Postal Civil Service Retirement System
Funding Reform Act of 2003
* Establishment of the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund with payments of more
than $5 billion annually from FY2007 through FY2016
e Initial funding of the Retiree Health Benefits Fund would come from any CSRS surplus
attributable to Postal employees which were estimated to be $17.1 billion and 2006
escrowed savings of $2,958 billion
(United States Postal Service (e) 46)
The final passage of Postal Reform in 2006 ushered in a new period for the Postal Service and
provides the framework for the current state of the Postal Service Pension Systems. The key element to
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be recognized through the preceding historic review is the extent to which the pension system financing
has driven Congressional decisions as they relate to the Postal Service. Other methods of providing
pension benefits could allow for reduced costs for both the Postal Service and the Federal Government,
while allowing the Postal Service to develop a system that is beneficial to its specific pool of workers.
Page | 58
Chapter 7 An Overview of the Fundamentals of the Current United States Postal Service
Pension System
The current United States Postal Service pension system is governed by Title V of the United
States Code which sets the framework for the Civil Service employment including the Civil Service
Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS). The history of the
evolution of the system has been provided in Chapters 5-7. This chapter provides an overview of the
current pension system of the Postal Service, including metrics on employees and contribution levels.
Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS)
The Civil Service Retirement System offers a basic annuity computed on the length of service of
an employee and high 3 year average salary. The basic annuity is calculated by adding 1.5% of the high-
3 year average basic pay times the years of service up to 5 years plus 1.75% of the high-3 year average
basic pay times the years of service over 5 and up to 10 years plus 2% of the high-3 year average basic
pay times the years of service over 10 years. The annuity is capped, however, at 80% of the high-3 year
average pay (United States Office of Personnel Management 4). An example of the calculation is as
follows for an individual whose average high 3 years was $50,000 over a career of 35 years: $50,000 * 5
* 1.5% + $50,000 * 5 * 1.75% + $50,000 * 25 * 2.00% = $33,125 per annum with COLA adjustments
made each year. This would provide an income replacement rate of 66.3%.
Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS)
The Federal Employee Retirement System provides a three-tiered retirement plan consisting of
Social Security benefits, a basic annuity and the Thrift Savings Plan.
Social Security benefits are defined by law and the benefits received in general are based on
average earnings upon which Social Security taxes have been paid, family composition and the
consumer price index which dictate cost of living adjustments. In addition, benefits are subject to
individual and family maximums (United States Office of Personnel Management 4). For example, an
individual who had worked steadily until retiring at age 62, starts collecting Social Security beginning at
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age 62, and whose final salary was $50,000, can expect of benefit of approximately $13,044 per annum
based on the calculator provided at the Social Security Administration website (Social Security
Administration).
The retirement age for collecting full Social Security benefits has been modified throughout the
history of the program. Beginning with a retirement age of 62, the retirement age was raised to 67
based on the reforms of 1983. A retirement age of 67 portends an environment in which employees will
have to work almost 47 years assuming a starting age of 20 before receiving full Social Security benefits.
The applicability of Social Security to retirees at a certain age is critical to determine the amount of
funding required prior to the eligibility for benefits from Social Security. In some instances, stopgap
measures are necessary to provide for the gap in income between actual retirement and when Social
Security benefits become available.
The second component of FERS is a basic annuity plan which is computed based on the length of
service of an employee and high 3-year average salary. The basic annuity is calculated by multiplying
the 1% of the "high-3" average basic pay times the years of service. If an individual retires at age 62 or
later with at least 20 years of service, a factor of 1.1% is utilized (United States Office of Personnel
Management 8). An example of the calculation is as follows for an individual retiring at age 60 whose
average high 3 years was $50,000 over a career of 35 years: $50,000 * 35 * 1.0% = $17,500 per annum.
The final component of FERS is the Thrift Savings Plan, which is similar to a 401(k) plan with tax
deferred contributions made by employees and matched by the agency. The Postal Service contributes
automatically to the Thrift Savings account of employees in an amount of 1% of their basic salary. In
addition, employees may choose to elect contributions up to the maximum amount governed by IRS
regulation. The Postal Service matches those additional contributions. For the first 3% of basic pay
contributed, the Postal Service matches 100% of contributions, for the next 2% of basic pay, the Postal
Service matches 50%. In effect, if an employee elects 5% of their basic pay to be contributed to their
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Thrift Savings Plan account, the Postal Service will match 4% (United States Office of Personnel
Management 13). The expected income to be derived from the Thrift Savings Plan is based on a number
of assumptions including rates of elected contribution, asset allocations, investment returns, and the
decision after retirement about annuitization.
Adding together the three components of the Federal Employee Retirement System yields total
estimated retirement income from this source. In the previous example, the defined benefit annuity
and Social Security would provide approximately $30,544 per annum with the defined contribution
portion providing the remainder through the investment gains realized and the decision of annuity at
the end of the career (Chapter 9 provides various current FERS retirement income levels based on a
simulated investment environment. Utilizing this analysis, an individual can expect total retirement
income of $39,112-$46,079 depending on the type of annuity selected assuming the use of a risk free
investment).
The contributions that are collected for these pension benefits includes the following:
- Social Security payroll taxes of 6.2% for each the employer and the employee
for a total of 12.4% of basic pay
- Thrift Savings Plan contributions of 5% of basic pay by employees, and agency
match of 5% for a total of 10% of basic pay
- FERS annuity contribution of 0.8% of basic pay by employees and agency
contribution of 11.9% of basic pay for a total of 12.7% of basic pay
The combined amount of contribution is 35.1% of basic pay.
For this hypothetical employee, total contributions over the career of this worker were
$410,472.84 by both employee and employee.
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Table 2 - Contributions for hypothetical employee to each component of FERS over 35 year career
YearofSvc Income Employee USPS Employee USPS Employee USPS Total indiv Pmt. USPS Pmt
Percent: 6.2% 6.2% 5.0% 5.0% 0.8% 11.9% 35.1% 12.0% 23.1%
PV: $ 787,996 $ 48,856 $48,856 $ 39,400 $39,400 $ 6,304 $ 93,771 $276,586 $ 94,559 $182,027
Total: $1,169,438 $ 72,505 $72,505 $ 58,472 $58,472 $ 9,356 $139,163 $410,473 $140,333 $270,140
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20,599
21,217
21,854
22,509
23,185
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25,335
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28,514
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31,158
32,093
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34,048
35,069
36,121
37,205
38,321
39,470
40,655
41,874
43,130
44,424
45,757
47,130
48,544
50,000
50,000
50,000
$ 1,204
$ 1,240
$ 1,277
$ 1,315
$ 1,355
$ 1,396
$ 1,437
$ 1,481
$ 1,525
$ 1,571
$ 1,618
$ 1,666
$ 1,716
$ 1,768
$ 1,821
$ 1,876
$ 1,932
$ 1,990
$ 2,049
$ 2,111
$ 2,174
$ 2,240
$ 2,307
$ 2,376
$ 2,447
$ 2,521
$ 2,596
$ 2,674
$ 2,754
$ 2,837
$ 2,922
$ 3,010
$ 3,100
$ 3,100
$ 3,100
$ 1,204
$ 1,240
$ 1,277
$ 1,315
$ 1,355
$ 1,396
$ 1,437
$ 1,481
$ 1,525
$ 1,571
$ 1,618
$ 1,666
$ 1,716
$ 1,768
$ 1,821
$ 1,876
$ 1,932
$ 1,990
$ 2,049
$ 2,111
$ 2,174
$ 2,240
$ 2,307
$ 2,376
$ 2,447
$ 2,521
$ 2,596
$ 2,674
$ 2,754
$ 2,837
$ 2,922
$ 3,010
$ 3,100
$ 3,100
$ 3,100
Recent legislation increased the required contribution rate to the FERS annuity by newly hired
workers after December 31, 2012 by 2.3%, for a total employee contribution of 3.1% (current law is
0.8%) (Isaacs, Federal Employees' Retirement System: Benefits and Financing 15).
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Postal Service Contributions to Retirement Systems
Graph 2 shows the total contributions into the pension systems since independence. This
includes all contributions made by the Postal Service for its employees for both CSRS and FERS, as well
as the Social Security contributions for FERS. Contributions have been adjusted for inflation based on
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers in 2012 dollars. The complete table broken down by
each category is provided in Appendix 7-1.
Graph 2- Contributions of USPS towards Pension Costs Since 1970
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Under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, the Postal Service is not required
to make contributions to the CSRS fund until 2017, at which time OPM will determine whether
additional funding is required (United States Postal Service (b) 97). Therefore, the only contributions
from the Postal Service into the system are through employee contributions of 7.8%. The Postal
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Service's total contributions to the FERS system for fiscal year 2010 through 2012 (in current dollars) are
broken out in Table 3.
Table 3 - Postal Service contribution to FERS - 2010-2012
FERS Retirement Contributions:
FERS
Social Security
FERS Thrift Savings Plan
Total Retirement Expense: $
(Dollars in Millions)
(United States Postal Service (b) 97)
2012 2011 1 2010
2,980
1,853
1,021
5,854
2,983
1,856
1,040
5,879$ $
The enrollment of Postal Service employees by type of retirement system is shown in Table 4 for
2010 through 2012. The population of CSRS and dual CSRS employees has been declining as those
workers hired prior to 1983 leave the Postal Service. The population of FERS employees has also been
declining as the Postal Service adjusts its workforce to workload declines.
Table 4 - Postal Service retirement enrollment by program type -
Retirement Enrollment by Program:
Fiscal Year 2012
1 2012 2011 [ 2010
CSRS,
Dual CSRS
FERS,
67,224
3,942
457,292
79,014
4,551
473,686
90,480
5,206
488,222
Total Enrollment: [ 528,458 [ 557,251 [ 583,908
(United States Postal Service (b) 98)
Thrift Savings Plan Analysis
The Thrift Savings Plan is a key component of retirement security, yet, much of that security is
dependent on the decision of employees to elect to contribute to their retirement. Many postal
employees choose not to contribute to TSP or contribute very little, which threatens their retirement
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2,904
1,856
1,049
5,809
security and is a source of concern to policy makers. As a response to those concerns, the Thrift Savings
Plan Enhancement Act was enacted in 2009 as P.L. 111-31. The law required automatic enrollment of
newly hired workers at a default contribution rate of 3% of basic pay to enhance employee
contributions; it required the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board to establish within TSP a
qualified Roth contribution program providing after-tax contributions with tax free accumulation and
distribution; and it provides the Board the authority to allow TSP participants to invest in mutual funds
in addition to the five investment funds included within the TSP (Isaacs, Federal Employees' Retirement
System: The Role of the Thrift Savings Plan 18).
In order to understand current TSP contribution rates of the Postal Service and its employees,
data was acquired from the United States Postal Service on January 15, 2013 which contained
information for the last pay period of calendar year 2012. This data included the basic salary earned by
each employee, their elected contribution, and the agency match. In addition, the analysis incorporated
demographic information. This data was used to understand how different types of FERS employees
elect to contribute by age, years of service, wage level, as well as position within the organization. The
data provided was a list of each employee with their FICA code, which determines which retirement
system they are under, date of birth, years of service, RSC code which represents the type of employee,
basic pay, employee TSP contribution, USPS 1% agency match, and additional matching contribution by
the Postal Service. Additional fields were created including the percent contribution of pay elected by
the employee and an estimate of basic pay when basic pay was not included for some types of
employees, utilizing the information provided within the 1% match. This data accounted for 524,893
employees who were paid during Pay Period 26 in 2012. That headcount does not match the numbers
reported in the Annual Report since each provides different snapshots in time. Of the 524,836
employees in the dataset, 449,555 (or 85.6%) of the employees were coded as FERS employees with a
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FICA code equal to 8. These are the employees whose contributions are matched by the Postal Service
up to 5%, and for whom the Thrift Savings Plan is a vital component of their retirement security.
Tabulations using this data provide several new insights, including to what extent age is a factor
in the contribution rate of the employee, whether the type of employee is a critical factor, i.e., union
versus non-union, and how much the level of basic pay affects contribution rates.
An initial data cleansing step was performed on the data; in some instances, the basic pay was
simply unknown, and that data was removed from the dataset. There were 5,624 (or 1.2%) records for
which the basic pay could not be calculated. In addition, there were some negative estimated
contributions, which accounted for 59 records (or .0131%), as well as estimated contribution
percentages in excess of 100% which accounted for 15 records (or .003%) for a combined elimination of
1.2671% of the dataset. The remaining dataset had 443,857 records.
An important goal of this data analysis is to better understand the population of individuals who
are contributing nothing to the Thrift Savings Plan; the analysis looks at that group by age, years of
service, type of employee, and salary range. Those individuals are foregoing saving for their own
retirement and missing out on the match of the organization.
Employee Age: Of the 443,857 individuals in this dataset, 72,198 employees are not contributing
to TSP, accounting for 16.27% of employees in FERS. The average age of employees not contributing to
their TSP account is 49.8 years old, with a median of 50 years old. An estimate of the relative
propensity not to save was calculated by employee age. This was calculated by taking the population of
individuals contributing zero to the Thrift Savings Plan and dividing that by the count of all employees of
that age. Graph 4 shows that a substantial share of very young employees (under the age of 23, of
which there are relatively few) are contributing to their TSP accounts, whereas those employees in the
age 28-44 age cohort have the greatest percentage of employees not contributing. After age 44,
however, the percentage of employees not contributing declines. These findings are consistent with a
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body of research that suggests age as a key factor in motivating retirement saving. As one gets closer to
retirement, the more real retirement becomes.
Graph 3 - USPS Distribution of Employee Ages for individuals contributing 0 to the Thrift Savings Plan
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
0 1,500
.0
d 1,000 -
500
18222426283032343638404244464850525456586062646668707274767880828486889093
Age of Employees
4 - Percentage of Employees Contributing 0 to their TSP
25.00% -
A-
0.00% +,r-r ,,, r-r,,,,,,-r-r r V-r - -,F,,,T-rr- T,,
27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67
Employee Age
Graph
2000% -
0
0
to
.5 15.00%
.0
e 10.00%
iif
5.00%t
Page | 67
Years of Service: The years of service of employees was also assessed to determine its impact on
the relative propensity not to save. Years of service is highly correlated with the employee's age,
therefore the same pattern is exhibited. As the years of service increased, the relative propensity not to
save decreased.
Table 5 - Employees contributing 0% to the Thrift Savings Plan by years of service
Relative
Yrs Count of Os Count of All propensity
not to save
0-5 3,134 16,836 18.6%
6-10 12,719 68,631 18.5%
11-15 19,157 109,399 17.5%
16-20 14,820 89,849 16.5%
21-25 11,626 80,425 14.5%
26-30 10,696 78,135 13.7%
31+ 46 582 7.9%
Graph 5 - Percentage of Employees contributing 0 to their TSP by years of service
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Employee Type: Employees are classified according to 1 of 17 rate schedule codes. Graph 11
provides the percentage of employees by rate schedule codes that are not contributing to TSP. The
highest percentage of employees not contributing are the unionized employees, specifically mail
handlers, city carriers, APWU employees and rural carriers.
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Table 6 - Percentage of employees contributing 0% to the Thrift Savings Plan by Employee Type
Rate Schedule Total in Total OsType of Employee PercentCode dataset in dataset
K OSD - HQ Operating Services Division 2 1 50.0%
F EPM - Postmasters (Part time postmasters) 605 169 27.9%
M MH - Mail Handlers 35,895 7,889 22.0%
Q CC - City Carriers 151,759 24,940 16.4%
P PS - Postal Service - APWU 150,430 24,362 16.2%
R RC - Rural Carriers 62,922 10,030 15.9%
Y PPO - Postal Police Officers 425 60 14.1%
G PNS - Postal Nurses 66 8 12.1%
E EAS - Executive & Administrative Schedule 39,416 4,588 11.6%
MESC - Mail Equipment Shops and MaterialC 98 11 11.2%Distribution Centers
N IT/ASC - Information Technology / Accounting 886 76 8.6%
Service Centers
U APS - Attorneys 177 10 5.6%
Z OIG - Office of the Inspector General 506 26 5.1%
V HQPB - Headquarter Pay Bands 266 13 4.9%
S PCES - Postal Career Executive Service 345 15 4.3%
D Postal Regulatory Commission 58 - 0.0%
B RAUX - Rural Authority 1 - 0.0%
Total: 443,857 72,198 16.3%
To determine whether union employees have in general a higher propensity not to save which
does not relate to wage levels, a summary of the data was developed that looked at the propensity not
to save by salary range for union and non-union employees. The results of this analysis are provided
below and indicate for a given salary level, union employees have a higher propensity not to save than
non-union employees. The reason for this is unknown, but is of importance to the financial security of
these employees to determine the impediments towards voluntary saving by these employees.
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Table 7 - Propensity not to save by salary level and union membership
Salary Range I
0-15000
15001-30000
30001-45000
45001-60000
60001-75000
Salary Level: The relative propensity not to save was also assessed by salary level. Table 8 shows
the relative propensity not to save falling as salary level increases.
Table 8 - Percentage of Employees contributing 0% to the Thrift Savings Plan by Salary Level
Pe rcent of 0 Percentage ofCount of 0 Cnt on Total Employees in emlee in Relative PropensitySalary Range Contribution nrbto aae employees in notoSvContributionDaaenotoSvEmployees dataset
0-15000 1,499 2.08% 4,987 1.12% 30.06%
15001-30000 1,864 2.58% 9,131 2.06% 20.41%
30001-45000 6,815 9.44% 28,732 6.47% 23.72%
45001-60000 56,626 78.43% 352,568 79.43% 16.06%
60001-75000 4,418 6.12% 36,899 8.31% 11.97%
75001-90000 765 1.06% 8,092 1.82% 9.45%
90001-105000 138 0.19% 2,014 0.45% 6.85%
105001-120000 49 0.07% 818 0.18% 5.99%
120001-135000 12 0.02% 277 0.06% 4.33%
135001-150000 8 0.01% 174 0.04% 4.60%
150000+ 3 0.00% 165 0.04% 1.82%
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Propensity Not to Save
Non-Union Union
20.63% 30.37%
12.00% 20.63%
18.79% 23.89%
10.75% 16.19%
12.82% 10.89%
Graph 6 - Relative Propensity not to save by salary level
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Summary of TSP Contribution Data
The TSP contribution data provides useful insights as to the factors that influence employees of
the Postal Service whether to contribute to the Thrift Savings Plan or not. Through the focus on those
employees that are contributing 0% to the defined contribution portion of their retirement plan, the
savings decision can be isolated. Each of these contributors are correlated with each other, i.e., within
the Postal Service, increasing years of service lead to higher salary levels, and increasing age also is
associated with higher years of service. To understand the combined impact each of these components
has on the decision to contribute towards the thrift savings plan, a regression analysis was run utilizing
the binary choice of contribution or no contribution as the dependent variable, and years of service, age,
union/non-union and salary bucket as the independent variable. The results of the regression analysis
are provided below:
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Figure 3 - TSP Regression Analysis-
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.094831892
R Square 0.008993088
Adjusted R Square 0.008984157
Standard Error 0.367394479
Observations 443857
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 543.6702618 135.9175654 1006.955635 0
Residual 443852 59910.56721 0.134978703
Total 443856 60454.23747
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.595326803 0.005685673 104.7064814 0 0.584183058 0.606470547 0.584183058 0.606470547
Years of Svc 0.000530885 8.98416E-05 5.909124726 3.4418E-09 0.000354798 0.000706972 0.000354798 0.000706972
Age 0.002268815 7.39879E-05 30.66465933 2.774E-206 0.002123801 0.002413829 0.002123801 0.002413829
Union/NonUnion -0.013704439 0.002191572 -6.253246455 4.02371E-10 -0.017999853 -0.009409025 -0.017999853 -0.009409025
Salary Bucket 0.032299844 0.000890993 36.25151925 2.4865E-287 0.030553525 0.034046162 0.030553525 0.034046162
In addition, a correlation matrix was developed to determine whether collinearity could impact the
results. The correlation matrix is provided below and indicated that correlations are not high enough to
render the results inoperable.
Figure 4 - TSP Correlation Matrix
Contribute,
Union/Non Salary 'otiue
Years of Svc Age Union Salary NoUnion Bucket
Contribute
YearsofSvc 1.0000
Age 0.4781 1.0000
Union/NonUnion -0.0582 0.0122 1.0000
Salary Bucket 0.1820 0.0811 -0.5041 1.0000
Contribute,No Contribute 0.0474 0.0621 -0.0429 0.0753 1.0000
The results of the regression analysis suggest the greatest impact on an individual's decision to
contribute or not contribute towards their defined contribution plan is their salary level followed by
union membership, age and years of service. The results suggest an increase of 1 year of age has 4
times the impact of an increase of a year of service, suggesting age is more critical in the contribution
decision. The results also highlight the difference between union and non-union employment in the
sense that union employees are less likely to contribute towards their retirement savings holding all
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other factors constant. Overall, the results highlight younger, lower paid workers are more likely not to
contribute to their defined contribution plan, thereby forgoing the opportunity to benefit from the
compounding of returns over time, and making it more likely that they will be dissatisfied with their
standard of living in retirement. Any shift in plan design will have to include educational resources that
encourage individuals who are the least likely to contribute to contribute to their retirements.
Current Potential TSP Cost Liability
The Thrift Savings Plan data can also be used to estimate the cost that would be borne by the
Postal Service costs if all employees were to contribute to the Thrift Savings Plan so as to receive the full
match. That calculation shows that in 2013(?) there would be approximately $238,908,125 of additional
contributions required by the Postal Service to fully match employees not currently contributing to the
maximum extent allowable.
Postal Service Age Demographics
The age of employees will determine how an alternative system may be transitioned to, as well
as whether such a transition could occur, and at what point. The estimated age was calculated from the
dataset obtained by the Postal Service by subtracting the employees year of birth from 2013. The
average age was estimated at 52.17, with a median of 53.00. The distribution of these ages is provided
in the following graph:
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Graph 7 - USPS Distribution of Employee Ages
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The following table provides the percentage of employees by age decile and highlights the age of the
current USPS workforce.
Table 9 - USPS Employee age distribution by decile
Age Decile 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 91-100
Count of Employees - 1 5,109 50,458 144,542 241,107 79,424 4,027 222 3
Cumulative 0-100 - 1 5,110 55568 200110 441,217 520641 524668 524890 524,893
Cumulative 100-0 524,893 524,893 524,892 519,783 469,325 324,783 83,676 4,252 225 3
Percentage 0.00% 0.00% 0.97% 9.61% 27.54% 45.93% 15.13% 0.77% 0.04% 0.00%
Cumulative 0-100 0.00% 0.00% 0.97% 10.59% 38.12% 84.06% 99.19% 99.96% 100.00% 100.00%
Cumulative 100-0 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.03% 89.41% 61.88% 15.94% 0.81% 0.04% 0.00%
Postal Service Retirement Age Analysis
To understand the average age of retirement within the Postal Service, a dataset was obtained
from the United States Postal Service which provides information on the retirement age of workers,
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I
their number of years of service, and whether they are CSRS, FERS, or dual eligible(?), for the period for
2000 through early 2012. Tables 10 and 11 summarize the average age at retirement, the standard
deviation of age at retirement, the average number of service years and the standard deviation of
service years for CSRS employees, and FERS employees.
Table 10 - USPS Retirement Summary - CSRS Employees
Year IAverage of Svc Yrs IStdDev of Svc Yrs Average of AgeAtASD IStdDev of AgeAtASD
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Overall Avg
31.24
31.76
32.29
31.67
31.96
32.67
33.57
33.81
33.94
33.50
34.78
35.17
35.23
32.93
6.54
6.23
5.84
5.73
5.66
5.55
5.45
5.29
5.41
5.52
5.47
5.00
4.80
5.77
60.07
59.63
59.04
57.92
58.00
58.58
59.25
59.51
59.31
58.50
60.00
59.85
60.06
58.97
4.60
4.66
4.61
4.79
4.82
4.85
4.67
4.48
4.48
5.29
4.40
4.41
4.61
4.81
(Note, ASD = Actual separation date)
Graph 8 - CSRS Employee Age Distribution
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Table 11 - USPS Retirement Summary - FERS Employees
Year jAverage of Svc Yrs IStdDev of Svc Yrs Average of AgeAtASD StdDev of AgeAtASD
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Overall Avg
15.25
15.78
16.35
17.50
17.96
18.13
18.61
19.36
19.98
21.93
20.64
21.50
20.92
19.65
6.02
6.00
6.04
6.41
6.48
6.10
6.11
6.13
6.26
5.54
6.81
6.84
7.63
6.50
61.82
61.72
61.56
61.25
61.20
61.51
61.72
62.04
61.76
59.47
62.32
61.93
62.52
61.21
4.26
4.28
4.30
4.50
4.44
4.24
4.06
3.94
3.99
5.35
3.78
4.31
3.60
4.59
Graph 10 - FERS Age Distribution
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Postal Service Retirement Age Insights
Comparing the retirement age data for CSRS employees and FERS employees highlights the
differences between these two employee populations. CSRS employees on average retire
approximately 2 years younger than FERS employees, with significantly more years of service. Much of
the difference in the years of service at this point can be explained by the fact that the FERS system
began in 1983, and for the pool of employees retiring between 2000 and 2012, they necessarily can only
have between 17 and 29 years of service (2012-1983=29, 2000-1983=17). We see in the data that as
time passes, the years of service for retiring FERS employees also increases (15.25 in 2000 to 21.5 in
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2011 [the last full year of data]). Of particular interest, however, is the fact that the average age for
FERS retirement age has held relatively steady over the entire period averaging 61.21 years with a low
standard deviation of .742 years (61.8 years in 2000 to 61.93 years in 2011 [the last full year of data]).
The average age of retirement falls close to the earliest point at which an employee becomes eligible for
Social Security benefits, with the largest spike in the data occurring at age 62 which is the point at which
employees can apply for social security benefits which suggests Social Security eligibility may play a key
part in an employee's decision to retire.
A similar pattern is seen for CSRS employees with regards to years of service and retirement
age. As for FERS employees, we see that over time, the years of service for retiring CSRS employees
increases (31.24 in 2000 to 35.17 in 2011 [the last full year of data]). The population of CSRS employees
is declining because no additional CSRS employees are being hired; the only remaining employees are
those that were hired prior to 1983. Therefore, the years of service for this employee pool must increase
over time. For CSRS employees, the average retirement age has held steady over the entire period,
averaging 58.97 years with a low standard deviation across the years of .756 years (60.1 years in 2000 to
59.9 years in 2011 [the last full year of data]). The largest spike within the data occurs at the age of 55,
which is the earliest point CSRS employees can retire; the ability to retire provides an incentive for
retirement. Since CSRS employees are not eligible to collect Social Security, the eligibility to collect
Social Security is not a factor in the decision to retire, and therefore leads to an employee focusing on
their years of service and the defined benefit annuity earned.
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Chapter 8 - Alternative Approaches to Pensions - Public and Private
In laying out the features of an ideal pension system, Robert Merton posits that "The pension
goal is to obtain the desired income at retirement. That desired income represents an inflation-
protected annuity for life, adequate to maintain the standard of living enjoyed in the latter part of work
life." (Merton, Developing the Potential of the Individually Funded Pension Systems) This pension goal is
unique to each individual and must take into account various components of an individuals' life
situation.
Retirement systems generally are classified as defined benefit, defined contribution, or some
combination of the two. As discussed in Chapter 3, in the private sector there has been significant
movement away from defined benefit plans due to the risks to the employers associated with such
systems. The movement towards defined contribution plans, however, has placed additional risks and
responsibilities on employees. The following section will discuss some of the different approaches to
retirement systems that exist, specifically looking at benefit systems, as well as contribution levels made
by employers to fund employee retirement.
Types of Pension Plans
Defined Benefit & Defined Contribution Plans
There are two main designs to pension plans - defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
In a defined benefit plan, a life annuity is paid to an employee in an amount based on a formula that
typically includes years of service and salary history. In a defined contribution plan, the employer
maintains what is essentially an investment account on behalf of each employee. A certain dollar
amount or percent of salary is contributed to into this account and invested in various financial
instruments such as stocks and bonds. When the employee retires, they receive the balance of the
account which includes all contributions and investment returns, net of management fees. The
distribution at retirement can be provided as a lump sum, or as a structured income stream such as a
term or life annuity. A key difference between the plan types is that with a defined benefit plan the
Page | 79
employer bears the investment risk, whereas with a defined contribution plan the employee bears the
investment risk (Isaacs, Federal Employees' Retirement System: Benefits and Financing 1).
Cash balance plans
A cash balance plan is a form of a defined benefit plan in which an employee is credited each
year with a percent of their pay, as well as an interest credit from the employer. Relative to a defined
contribution plan, there is little investment risk for participants, as the only uncertainty arises from
variations in the interest rate. When a participant becomes eligible to receive benefits, the benefits are
defined in terms of the account balance, as opposed to the traditional defined benefit arrangement in
which a percentage of final salary and years of service define the benefit. The cash balance plan differs
from the 401k type plan in that: generally employees do not directly contribute; the investment risks are
managed solely by the employer; participants must be offered the opportunity to receive their benefit
as lifetime annuities; and the plans are insured by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (United
States Department of Labor).
Hybrid Offerings
The current FERS system is a hybrid defined benefit and defined contribution plan. Taking into
account that FERS participants also receive Social Security, the defined benefit portion of retirement
income is provided by Social Security and the FERS annuity, while participation in the Thrift Saving Plan
provides a defined contribution portion component.
Public and Private Sector Trends
The private sector has generally led the way towards adapting pension plans to fit ongoing
economic and labor market realities. IBM is an example of a company that was in the forefront of
change within the private pension arena, and the changes they have made over the last two decades
have dramatically influenced the pension policies of many other private companies.
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More recently, due to ongoing budgetary and economic constraints, increasing numbers of
public plans also have introduced changes to their pension plans aimed at managing costs and avoiding
the need for increased taxes to fund them. Recent changes by state and local governments have
included suspending the cost of living adjustment for current and future retirees. Some have also linked
the future COLA to the funded status of the plan or returns on the assets of the fund. Other states have
raised employee contribution rates for current and future employees. Some states have reduced
benefits for new employees primarily through increasing the age when full benefits are paid, and some
have introduced less expensive hybrid defined benefit/defined contribution systems for new employees.
Munnell argues that these changes will reduce the pension compensation received by new employees
(Munnell 216).
Pension Benefits Offered in the Private Sector
The U.S. Department of Labor released in 2011 the National Compensation Survey, which
reviewed employee benefits in private industry in the United States in 20102. Of particular interest is
information provided on contribution levels, matching policies, and participation rates by plan type.
Table 12 below provides a summary of the three components that determine the maximum level an
employer contributes to an employees' defined contribution account each year. The first component is
the maximum amount of salary the employee can contribute that will be fully or partially matched. The
second component is the employer's match rate. The final component is the combination of the two,
which provides the effective maximum potential contribution provided by the employer which assumes
the employee contributes to the maximum percentage. As an example, for the median unionized
private employee in the United States, the employer matches 50% of up to 6% of an employee's salary
for an effective maximum contribution of 3% of salary. The combined total contribution in this instance
2 The 2010 survey included a sample of approximately 3,200 establishments. The NCS samples a portion of all
occupations in a portion of all establishments in a portion of all local areas in the Nation to obtain a representative
sample of the population. (Bureau of Labor Statistics)
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towards retirement would be 9% of salary. Similarly, the 9 0 th percentile for a union employee is
between 5 and 6% of salary for a total contribution towards retirement of 12% of salary. Detailed tables
providing additional employee characteristics are included in appendix 8-1.
Table 12 - Private Sector Defined Contribution Benefits
50th
10th 25th 50h 75th 90thWorker Characteristics 1h 25h Percentile 75h0hPercentile Percentile Percentile Percentile(median)
Maximum employee contribution matched by employer
All w orkers............................. 3 4 5 6 6
Union................................... 3 4 6 6 6
Nonunion................................ 3 4 5 6 6
500 workers or more................... 3 4 5 6 6
Specified matching percent
All workers............................. 25 50 50 100 100
Union................................... 50 50 66 100 100
Nonunion................................ 25 50 50 100 100
500 workers or more................... 35 50 75 100 100
Maximum potential employer contribution
All workers.............................
Union...................................
Nonunion................................
500 workers or more...................
1.5
1.5
1.5
2
2
2
2
2.1
3
3
3
3.5
4.8
4.5
5
5
6
5
6
6
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 103-116)
The survey also provides information on the types of retirement plans offered and the degree of
worker participation in them. This is of interest for understanding the prevalence of employers offering
multiple or hybrid plans to employees. Table 13 below indicates that multiple or hybrid plans are
relatively rare. Approximately 64% of all workers have access to retirement benefits, 20% of all workers
have access to defined benefit plans and 58% have access to defined contribution plans. The
combination of that exceeds 64%, because 14% of employees have access to both types of plans. In
those cases, the employer contribution rates reported in Table 12 may understate the total retirement
benefit provided each year by the employer.
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Table 13 - Retirement Plan Types Access and Participation
All retirement benefits Defined benefit Defined contribution
Worker Characteristics Take-up Take-upTaeuAccess Participation Access Participation Access Participation Take-up
rate rate rate
All workers 64 49 76 20 18 91 58 41 70
Union 90 83 93 70 67 96 53 42 79
Nonunion 61 45 74 14 13 89 59 41 69
500 workers or more 86 76 88 46 43 94 77 60 77
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics)
Risks Associated with Participating in the Federal Retirement Plans
The Postal Service in its annual 10-k filing has identified risks associated with its participation in
the federal retirement plans which are different than single-employer retirement systems. These key
risks were identified as follows:
* Assets contributed to the plans by one agency may be used to provide benefits to employees of
other participating agencies.
* If a participating agency stops contributing to the plans, the unfunded obligations of the plan
may be borne by the remaining participating agencies.
* Postal Service participation in the federal retirement plans is required by law. If the Postal
Service were permitted by a change in law to stop participating in some of the Federal
retirement plans, it may be required to pay those plans an amount based on the underfunded
status of the plan, referred to as a withdrawal liability if such a liability exists at that time
(United States Postal Service (b) 97)
Along with increasing the financial viability of the Postal Service, and reducing those risks are a
consideration in evaluating alternatives for reforming the postal pension system.
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Chapter 9 - Application of Alternative Pension Systems to the Postal Service
Any redesign of the Postal Service pension system would ideally take into account the unique
circumstances and characteristics of its employees, which differ from those of other Federal government
employees. Further, it would allow the Postal Service more flexibility to deal with the severe economic
challenges it is facing, treat employees equitably, and borrow from the best evolving practices in private
sector pension designs. In evaluating alternative pension systems, it is essential to consider both the
costs to the employer and the benefits to the employee. This section will look at various alternative
plan designs and contribution rates, and assess the impact of each on the finances of the Postal Service
and the well-being of Postal Service employees.
Any change to the system would raise transition issues, importantly, which employees would be
covered under the new plan. One possibility would be to limit participation to new employees, leaving
current FERS and CSRS participants in their respective systems. Over time, the percentage of employees
covered under those older systems would decline. Another alternative would be to allow employees to
elect whether to switch into the new system or remain with their current plan. A third but more
complicated possibility would be to switch all employees over to the new system immediately, freezing
their currently earned benefits and accruing future benefits under the new system.
It should be recognized that the stylized plans considered in the analysis that follows are
designed to put the retirement benefits offered by the Postal Service more in line with private sector
offerings. Chapter 1, Section 101 of Title 39 U.S.C. governing the Postal Service stipulates the following:
"As an employer, the Postal Service shall achieve and maintain compensation for its officers and
employees comparable to the rates and types of compensation paid in the private sector of the
economy of the United States. It shall place particular emphasis upon opportunities for career
advancements of all officers and employees and the achievement of worthwhile and satisfying
careers in the service of the United States. (United States Government Code 8)
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Comparison of Postal Service Compensation Levels with Other Sectors
Studies of Public versus Private Compensation Levels
There have been numerous students over time comparing federal and private sector
compensation, but no recent study has made the comparison specifically for the Postal Service. For
example, Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently undertook such a study, but the data did not
include the Postal Service. CBO's main findings were that the differences in wages of federal civilian
employees between 2005 and 2010 differed widely depending on the educational attainment of the
employee. Specifically the lower the educational attainment, the higher the wages for federal
employment compared to a private sector employer on average, and the higher the educational
attainment, the lower the wages for federal employment compared to a private sector employer on
average. In addition, on average the federal workforce is older, more educated and more concentrated
in professional jobs than the private sector (Falk VII-VIII).
With regard to benefits, the CBO study found that Federal workers received more generous
benefits than their private sector counterparts, with the extent of the premium dependent on
educational level. On average, the CBO found the cost of hourly benefits was 48 percent higher for
federal civilian employees than for private sector employees. This premium was 46 percent for
employees with a bachelor's degree, and 72 percent for employees with no more than a high school
education when compared to private sector employees. The key driver of the premiums was the
defined benefit plan available to Federal employees; that benefit is becoming increasingly rare in the
private sector (Falk VIII-IX).
While the CBO study did not include the Postal Service, one can reasonably draw inferences
about the likely relative compensation of the Postal Service workforce. Postal workers by and large fit
into the lower skilled tier of the federal workforce. Because the Postal Service workforce receives the
same benefits as other federal employees, CBO's benefit comparisons are applicable, and suggest that
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postal workers probably receive significantly more generous benefits than similar private sector
employee.
Aggregate Wages
In order to provide more direct evidence on how the Postal Service pension benefits and other
components of compensation compare with those of other sectors, this study analyzes data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on employer costs for employee compensation in September 2012 in
combination with data reported by the Postal Service. The BLS estimates the various components of
compensation on an hourly basis. The BLS found an average total compensation of $30.80 per hour
worked in September 2012, with wages and salary averaging $21.32 per hour worked, and benefits
averaging $9.48 per hour worked. The total employer compensation costs for private industry averaged
$28.95 per hour worked (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1).
In order to compare the Postal Service's compensation to these averages, its financial
statements of 2012 were utilized. Employee costs were broken down in the Postal Service's 10-k filing,
which show total compensation, retirement payments, health care benefit payments, and other. In
addition, total work-hours for Fiscal Year 2012 were provided. Total costs were divided by work-hours
to estimate the average cost per hour for various categories. The data provided by the BLS was also
adjusted to be comparable to the data available from the Postal Service 10-k (the BLS provides data at a
more granular level, and therefore was aggregated to the same categories provided by the Postal
Service in order to make a level comparison). The BLS also provides data by various occupational
groups, industry group, and government versus private enterprise. Table 14 summarizes the
comparisons, which show that postal workers receive considerably higher levels of compensation than
do other categories of workers.
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Table 14 - USPS Employee Expenses by Hour compared to Private Sector Expenses by Hour
Total USPS
USPS All Union Goods ServiceCategory of Wages Cost
(Millions) Employees Workers Bargaining Producing Producing
Wages and Other Benefits* $ 36,279 $ 32.33 $ 24.94 $ 28.56 $ 27.17 $ 24.54
Retirement $ 5,854 $ 5.22 $ 2.81 $ 4.62 $ 3.13 $ 2.75
Health Benefits $ 5,187 $ 4.62 $ 2.62 $ 5.07 $ 3.05 $ 2.55
Other $ 369 $ 0.33
Total Compensation: $ 47,689 $ 42.50 $ 30.37 $ 38.25 $ 33.35 $ 29.84
USPS Total Workhours 1,122
Excluded Categories:
Workers'Comp 3,729 $ 3.32 $ 0.44 0.89 0.75 0.38
Retiree Health Benefit Premiums $ 2,629 $ 2.34
PSRHBF Prefunding $ 11,100 $ 9.89
* Other benefits include paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, medicare contributions, and federal
and state insurance
(United States Postal Service (b) 33-36), (United States Department of Labor 5)
Alignment Requirements
An estimate was made of the average pension benefits received by a Postal Service employee
for comparison with other workers to determine the percent change required to align benefits. The
results are provided in table 15. The first estimate is based on the current retirement cost per work-
hour. The remaining three estimates are based on the estimated annual salary for a new employee
grown through time utilizing the methodology employed later in this chapter. This salary estimate was
multiplied by the contribution level of USPS assuming a 9.6% FERS annuity contribution rate, a 6.2%
Social Security rate and a 5% TSP match rate. It was assumed employees would work 40 hours per week
for 50 weeks a year. The results indicate that for almost every class of employee, the benefits provided
by the Postal Service exceed those provided by the private sector. The only case in which they do not is
for an employee early in their career compared to a current union bargaining employee within the
aggregate economy. Once that employee reaches the 10 year mark, however, their retirement benefit
exceeds that of a union bargaining employee. These results will be utilized for comparison purposes
with the plans simulated in the proceeding section.
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Table 15 - Required percent change necessary to align USPS retirement cost per work-hour with alternative worker
categories
USPS Est. USPS Est. USPS Est.
Type of Worker: uRe 5 Yr 10 Yr 15 Yr
Employee Employee Employee
All Workers -46.2% -34.4% -44.6% -50.1%
Union Bargaining -11.5% 7.8% -8.9% -17.9%
Goods Producing -40.0% -27.0% -38.3% -44.4%
Service Producing -47.3% -35.8% -45.8% -51.2%
Retirement Required Replacement Rates
A major component of pension planning is to understand the replacement rate of salary an
individual should target. The RETIRE project at Georgia State University estimates the replacement
income required to continue a pre-retirement standard of living into post-retirement. They take into
account various components of the change in an individual's financial needs post retirement including
tax changes, elimination of FICA tax, pre-retirement savings (assuming one would no longer be saving
for retirement) and changes in household expenditures to arrive at an estimate (Palmer 5). Their
estimates suggest that a single worker retiring at age 65 with an average salary of $50,000 would
require a replacement ratio of approximately 80% -81% (Palmer 14). A similar academic analysis was
performed by Marlena Lee, who estimated a target replacement rate utilizing similar changes in an
individual's financial needs post retirement including changes in the tax framework, pre-retirement
savings, and changes in household expenditures. The estimates provided by Lee suggest required
replacement rate for an individual making between $49,941 and $86,882 approximately 61-73% of pre-
retirement income (Lee 17). The range of these two estimates suggests a required replacement ratio of
61-81%. Both papers acknowledge the replacement ratio declines as income increases and that each
individual's unique situation ultimately will inform the best target replacement level. The alternative
retirement plans analyzed later in this chapter will be compared to these suggested replacement ratios
to determine if the plan is likely to provide an adequate income.
* * ** *
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Alternative Design Analysis
Description of Scenarios
To assess the impact of alternative pension systems on the finances of the Postal Service and its
employees, simulations predicting future costs and benefit payments were run on the following
scenarios:
* Reduced defined benefit plan, with more generous defined contribution plan
o Plan 1: Current plan for comparison purposes
o Plan 2: Current plan except for incremental increase in employee contributions of 3.1%
towards the defined benefit portion of FERS (current law for new hires whose
contribution has increased will be used for alternative plan comparison)
o Plan 3: Reduce FERS defined benefit annuity by half and utilize .5% in calculation as
opposed to 1%; automatically contribute 4% to TSP, make TSP match percentage 4%,
and assume employees contribute 4%, so that total defined contribution is 12%.
o Plan 4: Reduce FERS defined annuity by 4, and utilize .25% in calculation as opposed to
1%; automatically contribute 4% to TSP, make TSP match percentage 6%, and assume
employees contribute 6%, so that total defined contribution is 16%.
e Complete defined contribution plan, with employer match to encourage ownership and savings
o Plan 5: USPS auto contribution of 6%, USPS Match of up to 6%, assumes employees
contribute 6%, total defined contribution is 18%.
o Plan 6: USPS auto contribution of 4%, USPS Match of up to 6%, assumes employees
contribute 6%, total defined contribution is 16%.
o Plan 7: USPS auto contribution of 2%, USPS Match of up to 8%, assumes employees
contribute 8%, total defined contribution is 18%.
o Plan 8: USPS auto contributions of 0%, USPS Match of up to 10%, assume employees
contribute 10%, total defined contribution is 20%.
* Complete defined contribution plan of various contribution levels:
o Plan 9: USPS auto contribution of 12%, assume employees contribute 5%, total defined
contribution is 17%.
o Plan 10: USPS auto contribution of 10%, assume employees contribute 5%, total defined
contribution is 15%.
o Plan 11: USPS auto contribution of 8%, assume employees contribute 5%, total defined
contribution is 13%.
O Plan 12: USPS auto contributions of 6%, assume employees contribute 5%, total defined
contribution 11%.
Within these hypothetic plans, it is assumed an employee chooses to contribute up to the match
of the company. The Thrift Savings Plan contribution data suggests the vast majority of employees
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currently contribute up to the match. For those plans in which the employer automatically contributes
to the defined contribution plan, and whatever savings the employee contributes is additional savings,
the assumption utilized was a 5% contribution rate.
Graphs 12 and 13 summarize the 12 plan contribution levels. Graphs 14 and 15 translate those
contribution shares into annual dollar amounts using the salary model described below.
Percent contributions for USPS and employee contributions:
Graph 12 - Percent Contributions for USPS and Employee for various plans
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Graph 13 - Total Percent Contributions of USPS and Employee to various plans
Percent contributions for USPS and employee contributions:
Graph 14 - Dollar contributions by USPS towards various plans, beginning and ending salary
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Graph 15 - Dollar contribution by Employee towards various plans, beginning and ending salary
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Description of Analytic Framework
This section provides an overview of the analytical framework that was used to assess the
impact of these various scenarios on the Postal Service and its employees. A more detailed description
of the analyses is provided in the Appendices.
Determine the new employee pool based on a simulation of the retirement of the current workforce
The first step of the analysis was to estimate future Postal Service employment levels, based on
an assessment of the need for the future postal workers. In order to determine this need, and to identify
the number of new workers that would be hired in each future year, a simulation was run that
combined the current employee dataset with their current ages and the datasets that contain the
average retirement ages and the variability of those retirement ages.
Determine the cost to the Postal Service of various scenarios
The alternative scenarios are evaluated under the assumption that only new employees would
be enrolled in the new pension plan; existing workers would continue in their current plans. Based on
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the estimated replacement workforce, an estimate of the benefits that would be paid under the various
scenarios is projected to determine the costs that would be borne by the Postal Service. The financial
analysis utilizes the wage rates expected for the average new employee each year and grown through
time, based on the Postal Service's current union contracts. For simplicity, results are reported in
current dollars, i.e., inflation was not taken into account, and therefore cost of living adjustments have
been excluded from the analysis. The estimated percent contribution by the Postal Service is applied to
the number of new employees multiplied by their average expected wage rate. This number is
compared to contributions by the Postal Service at the current required FERS contribution rate for new
employees to determine the savings that would occur. The second scenario which looks at costs and
benefits under current law takes into account that Public Law 112-96, Section 5001, the "Middle Class
Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012,"changed the employee contribution rate for new employees
hired after January 2013. The rate for the agency is 9.6% and the rate for the employee is 3.1% (Office
of Personnel Management).
Determine the impact to individual employees through a simulation of the market environment
The final component of the analysis assesses the lifetime impact on an average new employee
of the Postal Service of each alternative scenario. The estimates take into account the tax deferred
nature of contributions. Projected benefits are estimated based on two different types of portfolios,
one in which a reasonably conservative mix of 50% stocks and 50% bonds is utilized, and one in which
100% of contributions are invested in a risk free investment (treasury bonds).
Results
Individual Employee Results
The following figures summarize the individual employee results obtained from the simulation
model. (More detailed results are provided in the appendix along with the assumptions and detailed
methodology utilized.) The first line provides the total percent of base salary which has been
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contributed by employer and employee towards retirement inclusive of social security, any defined
benefit portion of the plan, and the defined contribution plan. The first section of the figure provides an
estimate of the total retirement income for the 12 plans when utilizing the risk free investment, as well
as the range of results associated with the potential outcomes based on the risky investment. The
second part of the figure provides an estimate of the replacement rate of retirement income compared
to the final year salary for the 12 plans when utilizing the risk free investment, as well as the range of
results associated with the potential outcomes based on the risky investment. There are four figures
which correspond to the type of annuity utilized: growing life annuity with no survivor benefits, a level
life annuity with no survivor benefits, a growing life annuity with survivor benefits and a level life
annuity with survivor benefits.
Figure 5 - Individual Employee FinancialI mpact Summary - Growing Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits
Growing Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
USPS Cont. 23.1% 20.8% 19.0% 18.6% 18.2% 16.2% 16.2% 16.2% 18.2% 16.2% 14.2% 12.2%
Employee Cont. 12.0% 14.3% 11.8% 13.0% 12.2% 12.2% 14.2% 16.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2%
Total % Cont. 35.1% 35.1% 30.8% 31.6% 30.4% 28.4% 30.4% 32.4% 29.4% 27.4% 25.4% 23.4%
TOTAL ESTIMATED INCOME
RISK FREE
Total: $ 41,276 $ 41,276 $ 33,573 $ 32,469 $ 29,533 $ 27,701 $ 29,533 $ 31,365 $ 28,617 $ 26,785 $ 24,953 $ 23,121
RISKY:
Minimum $ 34,947 $ 34,947 $ 25,977 $ 22,342 $ 18,140 $ 17,574 $ 18,140 $ 18,707 $ 17,857 $ 17,291 $ 16,725 $ 16,158
10th Percentile $ 41,319 $ 41,319 $ 33,624 $ 32,537 $ 29,610 $ 27,769 $ 29,610 $ 31,451 $ 28,690 $ 26,849 $ 25,008 $ 23,168
1st Quartile $ 43,753 $ 43,753 $ 36,544 $ 36,431 $ 33,990 $ 31,663 $ 33,990 $ 36,318 $ 32,827 $ 30,499 $ 28,172 $ 25,845
2nd Quartile $ 47,274 $ 47,274 $ 40,770 $ 42,066 $ 40,329 $ 37,298 $ 40,329 $ 43,361 $ 38,814 $ 35,782 $ 32,750 $ 29,718
3rd Quartile $ 51,987 $ 51,987 $ 46,426 $ 49,606 $ 48,813 $ 44,838 $ 48,813 $ 52,787 $ 46,826 $ 42,851 $ 38,877 $ 34,903
PERCENT INCOME REPLACEMENT
RISK FREE
Percent: 75.7% 75.7% 61.6% 59.6% 54.2% 50.8% 54.2% 57.6% 52.5% 49.2% 45.8% 42.4%
RISKY:
Minimum
10th Percentile
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
64.1%
75.8%
80.3%
86.8%
95.4%
64.1%
75.8%
80.3%
86.8%
95.4%
47.7%
61.7%
67.1%
74.8%
85.2%
41.0%
59.7%
66.9%
77.2%
91.0%
33.3%
54.3%
62.4%
74.0%
89.6%
32.3%
51.0%
58.1%
68.4%
82.3%
33.3%
54.3%
62.4%
74.0%
89.6%
34.3%
57.7%
66.6%
79.6%
96.9%
32.8%
52.7%
60.2%
71.2%
85.9%
31.7%
49.3%
56.0%
65.7%
78.6%
30.7%
45.9%
51.7%
60.1%
71.3%
29.7%
42.5%
47.4%
54.5%
64.1%
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Figure 6 - Individual Employee Financial Impact Summary - Level Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits
Level Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
USPS Cont. 23.1% 20.8% 19.0% 18.6% 18.2% 16.2% 16.2% 16.2% 18.2% 16.2% 14.2% 12.2%
Employee Cont. 12.0% 14.3% 11.8% 13.0% 12.2% 12.2% 14.2% 16.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2%
Total % Cont. 35.1% 35.1% 30.8% 31.6% 30.4% 28.4% 30.4% 32.4% 29.4% 27.4% 25.4% 23.4%
TOTAL ESTIMATED INCOME
RISK FREE
Total: $ 46,079 $ 46,079 $ 39,336 $ 40,153 $ 38,178 $ 35,385 $ 38,178 $ 40,970 $ 36,781 $ 33,989 $ 31,196 $ 28,404
RISKY:
Minimum $ 36,431 $ 36,431 $ 27,759 $ 24,717 $ 20,812 $ 19,949 $ 20,812 $ 21,675 $ 20,381 $ 19,518 $ 18,654 $ 17,791
10th Percentile $ 46,144 $ 46,144 $ 39,414 $ 40,257 $ 38,295 $ 35,489 $ 38,295 $ 41,101 $ 36,892 $ 34,086 $ 31,281 $ 28,475
1st Quartile $ 49,853 $ 49,853 $ 43,865 $ 46,192 $ 44,972 $ 41,425 $ 44,972 $ 48,520 $ 43,198 $ 39,651 $ 36,103 $ 32,556
2nd Quartile $ 55,221 $ 55,221 $ 50,307 $ 54,781 $ 54,634 $ 50,013 $ 54,634 $ 59,256 $ 52,324 $ 47,703 $ 43,081 $ 38,460
3rd Quartile $ 62,405 $ 62,405 $ 58,927 $ 66,275 $ 67,565 $ 61,507 $ 67,565 $ 73,623 $ 64,536 $ 58,478 $ 52,420 $ 46,363
PERCENT INCOME REPLACEMENT
RISK FREE
Percent: 84.6% 84.6% 72.2% 73.7% 70.1% 64.9% 70.1% 75.2% 67.5% 62.4% 57.3% 52.1%
RISKY:
Minimum 66.9% 66.9% 50.9% 45.4% 38.2% 36.6% 38.2% 39.8% 37.4% 35.8% 34.2% 32.7%
10th Percentile 84.7% 84.7% 72.3% 73.9% 70.3% 65.1% 70.3% 75.4% 67.7% 62.6% 57.4% 52.3%
1st Quartile 91.5% 91.5% 80.5% 84.8% 82.5% 76.0% 82.5% 89.0% 79.3% 72.8% 66.3% 59.7%
2nd Quartile 101.3% 101.3% 92.3% 100.5% 100.3% 91.8% 100.3% 108.7% 96.0% 87.5% 79.1% 70.6%
3rd Quartile 114.5% 114.5% 108.1% 121.6% 124.0% 112.9% 124.0% 135.1% 118.4% 107.3% 96.2% 85.1%
Figure 7 - Individual Employee Financial Impact Summary - Growing Life Annuity with Survivor Benefits
Growing Life Annuity, Survivor Benefits
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
USPS Cont. 23.1% 20.8% 19.0% 18.6% 18.2% 16.2% 16.2% 16.2% 18.2% 16.2% 14.2% 12.2%
Employee Cont. 12.0% 14.3% 11.8% 13.0% 12.2% 12.2% 14.2% 16.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2%
Total % Cont. 35.1% 35.1% 30.8% 31.6% 30.4% 28.4% 30.4% 32.4% 29.4% 27.4% 25.4% 23.4%
TOTAL ESTIMATED INCOME
RISK FREE
Total: $ 39,112 $ 39,112 $ 30,976 $ 29,006 $ 25,638 $ 24,238 $ 25,638 $ 27,037 $ 24,938 $ 23,539 $ 22,139 $ 20,740
RISKY:
Minimum $ 34,278 $ 34,278 $ 25,175 $ 21,272 $ 16,936 $ 16,504 $ 16,936 $ 17,369 $ 16,720 $ 16,288 $ 15,855 $ 15,423
10th Percentile $ 39,145 $ 39,145 $ 31,015 $ 29,058 $ 25,696 $ 24,290 $ 25,696 $ 27,102 $ 24,993 $ 23,588 $ 22,182 $ 20,776
1st Quartile $ 41,003 $ 41,003 $ 33,245 $ 32,032 $ 29,042 $ 27,264 $ 29,042 $ 30,819 $ 28,153 $ 26,376 $ 24,598 $ 22,821
2nd Quartile $ 43,693 $ 43,693 $ 36,473 $ 36,336 $ 33,883 $ 31,568 $ 33,883 $ 36,199 $ 32,726 $ 30,410 $ 28,095 $ 25,779
3rd Quartile $ 47,293 $ 47,293 $ 40,792 $ 42,095 $ 40,363 $ 37,327 $ 40,363 $ 43,398 $ 38,845 $ 35,809 $ 32,774 $ 29,739
PERCENT INCOME REPLACEMENT
RISK FREE
Percent: 71.8% 71.8% 56.8% 53.2% 47.0% 44.5% 47.0% 49.6% 45.8% 43.2% 40.6% 38.1%
RISKY:
Minimum
10th Percentile
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
62.9%
71.8%
75.2%
80.2%
86.8%
62.9%
71.8%
75.2%
80.2%
86.8%
46.2%
56.9%
61.0%
66.9%
74.9%
39.0%
53.3%
58.8%
66.7%
77.3%
31.1%
47.2%
53.3%
62.2%
74.1%
30.3%
44.6%
50.0%
57.9%
68.5%
31.1%
47.2%
53.3%
62.2%
74.1%
31.9%
49.7%
56.6%
66.4%
79.6%
30.7%
45.9%
51.7%
60.1%
71.3%
29.9%
43.3%
48.4%
55.8%
65.7%
29.1%
40.7%
45.1%
51.6%
60.1%
28.3%
38.1%
41.9%
47.3%
54.6%
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Figure 8 - Individual Employee Financial Impact Summary - Level Life Annuity with Survivor Benefits
Level Life Annuity, Survivor Benefits
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
USPS Cont. 23.1% 20.8% 19.0% 18.6% 18.2% 16.2% 16.2% 16.2% 18.2% 16.2% 14.2% 12.2%
Employee Cont. 12.0% 14.3% 11.8% 13.0% 12.2% 12.2% 14.2% 16.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2%
Total % Cont. 35.1% 35.1% 30.8% 31.6% 30.4% 28.4% 30.4% 32.4% 29.4% 27.4% 25.4% 23.4%
TOTAL ESTIMATED INCOME
RISK FREE
Total: $ 43,559 $ 43,559 $ 36,312 $ 36,121 $ 33,642 $ 31,353 $ 33,642 $ 35,931 $ 32,498 $ 30,209 $ 27,920 $ 25,632
RISKY:
Minimum $ 35,653 $ 35,653 $ 26,824 $ 23,471 $ 19,410 $ 18,703 $ 19,410 $ 20,118 $ 19,057 $ 18,349 $ 17,642 $ 16,935
10th Percentile $ 43,612 $ 43,612 $ 36,376 $ 36,207 $ 33,738 $ 31,439 $ 33,738 $ 36,037 $ 32,588 $ 30,289 $ 27,990 $ 25,690
1st Quartile $ 46,652 $ 46,652 $ 40,024 $ 41,071 $ 39,210 $ 36,303 $ 39,210 $ 42,117 $ 37,756 $ 34,849 $ 31,942 $ 29,034
2nd Quartile $ 51,052 $ 51,052 $ 45,303 $ 48,109 $ 47,129 $ 43,341 $ 47,129 $ 50,916 $ 45,235 $ 41,448 $ 37,661 $ 33,874
3rd Quartile $ 56,939 $ 56,939 $ 52,368 $ 57,529 $ 57,726 $ 52,761 $ 57,726 $ 62,691 $ 55,244 $ 50,279 $ 45,314 $ 40,350
PERCENT INCOME REPLACEMENT I I
RISK FREE 1 I
Percent: 79.9% 79.9% 66.6% 66.3% 61.7% 57.5% 61.7% 65.9% 59.6% 55.4% 51.2% 47.0%
RISKY:
Minimum
10th Percentile
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
65.4%
80.0%
85.6%
93.7%
104.5%
65.4%
80.0%
85.6%
93.7%
104.5%
49.2%
66.8%
73.5%
83.1%
96.1%
43.1%
66.4%
75.4%
88.3%
105.6%
35.6%
61.9%
72.0%
86.5%
105.9%
34.3%
57.7%
66.6%
79.5%
96.8%
35.6%
61.9%
72.0%
86.5%
105.9%
36.9%
66.1%
77.3%
93.4%
115.0%
35.0%
59.8%
69.3%
83.0%
101.4%
33.7%
55.6%
64.0%
76.1%
92.3%
32.4%
51.4%
58.6%
69.1%
83.2%
31.1%
47.1%
53.3%
62.2%
74.0%
The results of the individual employee impact analysis suggest utilizing the risky investment will
lead to returns in excess of the risk free investment in about 90% of instances. This excess return,
however, is paid for with the risk that in 10% of instances, retirement income will be below the risk free
rate, and in some instances significantly so. The research discussed earlier in this chapter suggests a
replacement rate of approximately 60-80% of pre-retirement income for an employee on average, in
most instances, the risk free rate can realize greater than 60% of pre-retirement income for retirement
with a level life annuity and no survivor benefits, and in some instances reached greater than 80% of
replacement income. The other types of plans would not allow for exceeding 80% replacement, with
only the most generous alternatives providing greater than 60% in a risk free environment. For those
plans that provide a defined benefit portion towards retirement (plans 1 - 4), the defined benefit
portion can be considered a risk free investment for the employee (with the exception of changes to the
law), but a risky investment by the employer, i.e., changes in discount rates can affect the payment
owed by the employer. Plans that are utilizing match rates that are considered generous in the private
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sector, for example plan 12 which contributes 6% of employee pay, with an assumption that the
employee contributes 5% assuming a level life annuity with no survivor benefits only provides
approximately 25% chance of supplying greater than 80% of pre-retirement income post career.
Another way of comparing the different types of annuities is to look at the risk free total
estimated income, as well as the percent income replacement for each:
Figure 9 - Comparison of Income amongst different types of life annuities utilizing the risk free investment
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
Total Estimated Income:
Growing Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits $41,276 $41,276 $33,573 $32,469 $29,533 $27,701 $29,533 $31,365 $28,617 $26,785 $24,953 $23,121
Level Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits $46,079 $46,079 $39,336 $40,153 $38,178 $35,385 $38,178 $40,970 $36,781 $33,989 $31,196 $28,404
Growing Life Annuity, Survivor Benefits $39,112 $39,112 $30,976 $ 29,006 $25,638 $24,238 $25,638 $27,037 $24,938 $23,539 $22,139 $ 20,740
Level Life Annuity, Survivor Benefits $43,559 $43,559 $36,312 $36,121 $ 33,642 $31,353 $33,642 $35,931 $32,498 $ 30,209 $27,920 $25,632
Income Replacement Percent:
Growing Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits 75.7% 75.7% 61.6% 59.6% 54.2% 50.8% 54.2% 57.6% 52.5% 49.2% 45.8% 42.4%
Level Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits 84.6% 84.6% 72.2% 73.7% 70.1% 64.9% 70.1% 75.2% 67.5% 62.4% 57.3% 52.1%
Growing Life Annuity, Survivor Benefits 71.8% 71.8% 56.8% 53.2% 47.0% 44.5% 47.0% 49.6% 45.8% 43.2% 40.6% 38.1%
Level Life Annuity, Survivor Benefits 79.9% 79.9% 66.6% 66.3% 61.7% 57.5% 61.7% 65.9% 59.6% 55.4% 51.2% 47.0%
The results show the generous benefits offered through the current FERS plan. For example,
comparing the current FERS plan for new hires (plan 2) with an extraordinarily generous defined
contribution plan when compared to the private sector (plan 8), in which there is a 10% match of
employee contributions, the total contribution towards retirement has decreased from 35.1% to 32.4%
or a reduction of 7.69%, whereas the income generated utilizing a risk free investment has declined
from $41,276 to $31,365, or a difference of 21.05%. In assessing the cause of the difference, an
estimate was made as to the rate of return that would have to be realized on the contributions towards
the FERS defined benefit annuity in order to obtain the necessary funds to purchase a growing life
annuity that pays the same profile as the FERS defined benefit annuity which was $19,072 (1% times the
high-3 average salary times the number of years of employment: 1%*35 Yrs * $54,490). The cost of an
annuity that would pay a growing life annuity beginning with $19,072 in the first year was estimated
utilizing the same FERS annuity factors. That cost was $514,337.66. In order to obtain this level of
investment at the end of an individual's career, the return on the contributions would have to yield a
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4.68% return. This return is significantly higher than the current risk free rate and accounts for the
premium that is obtainable through the current FERS annuity.
Cautionary Note on Cost Savings Results
The reported results are quite sensitive to a number of uncertain assumptions. Of particular
note is the estimate of future retirement age under the current FERS system for existing legacy
employees. That age is inferred from historical FERS retirement data from 2000 to 2012, a period during
which FERS employees hired in 1983 were first eligible for retirement. Graph 18 summarizes the
average age at retirement for these employees. It appears to be relatively stable during this period with
a standard deviation of average retirement age over the period of .742 years, which would indicate that
there is an age at which retirement is most likely is to occur. However, it is also possible that this sample
is not representative of future retirement trends, and in particular that the average retirement age may
increase. This would render the assumed hiring needs inflated, and cause some savings to appear
earlier than what would actually occur.
USPS Retirement Results
Table 16 summarizes the results associated with the retirement age simulation. The first panel
provides the results from 2013 - 2021 while the second provides the results associated with 2022 -
2030. The full simulation results are provided in the appendix, along with a detailed description of the
assumptions and methodology.
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Table 16 - USPS Workforce Projections (2013 - 2030)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Remaining Legacy Employees
Minimum 282,031 260,977 227,254 214,008 187,275 159,631 144,813 129,758 105,411
10th Percentile 374,191 353,915 332,832 311,168 289,320 267,502 245,957 224,546 203,678
1st Quartile 390,482 371,293 351,010 329,948 308,612 286,929 265,603 244,388 223,394
2nd Quartile 407,846 389,872 370,654 350,424 329,568 308,393 287,245 266,247 245,032
3rd Quartile 423,927 407,122 389,191 369,981 350,043 329,613 308,890 287,882 266,789
Total New Employees
Minimum - - - - - - - - 9,343
10 Percentile - 18,351 24,764 29,835 35,974 46,996 61,709 79,861 97,042
1st Quartile - 32,878 39,535 44,856 51,583 63,678 79,413 98,617 116,412
2nd Quartile - 50,128 57,202 62,889 70,082 83,310 100,055 119,943 137,957
3rd Quartile - 68,706 76,101 81,942 89,393 103,569 121,196 141,694 159,428
2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Remaining Legacy Employees
Minimum 90,223 90,218 67,289 67,289 55,884 43,224 40,434 33,841 28,111
10th Percentile 184,178 165,467 148,301 132,153 116,998 103,293 90,966 79,843 69,178
1st Quartile 202,849 183,515 165,193 148,147 132,183 117,174 103,446 91,185 80,053
2nd Quartile 224,096 203,995 185,021 166,725 149,629 133,867 118,951 105,210 92,827
3rd Quartile 245,563 225,043 205,449 186,444 168,244 151,308 135,732 121,101 107,229
Total New Employees
Minimum
10 Percentile
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
22,718
114,303
133,937
155,198
176,225
45,569
131,194
150,756
171,602
191,811
54,390
147,933
166,619
186,687
206,091
65,579
163,634
181,533
200,962
219,443
76,117
178,341
195,783
214,074
231,409
103,903
192,361
208,839
225,950
242,244
115,030
205,044
220,603
236,863
251,908
133,238
216,957
231,499
246,618
260,372
147,668
227,820
241,199
255,055
267,640
Of particular note, the analysis suggests that the Postal Service could face an unstable labor
force over much of the coming decade. The estimated worker need was based on workload projections
into the future. The estimated number of employees that would retire was based on the distribution of
retirement ages utilizing the historic retirement ages. There is significant uncertainty within this
dataset; the retirement decision is an individual one and the current legacy employee profile may not
conform to the historical retirement profile. Based on the current workforce age demographics and
historical retirement patterns the hiring needs of the organization in the immediate future have a large
distribution from a low of 0 to over 80,000 employees by 2016. This suggests significant due diligence
must be taken when it comes to hiring new employees in an environment of increasing ages leading to
increased retirement eligibility and declining workforce needs due to reduced workload levels. This
Page | 100
insight combined with the current age of the workforce will mean it is possible the average workforce
age could increase even more before new hiring brings it down which could have serious impacts on
productivity trends within the organization.
Effects of Contribution Changes
Table 17 highlights the recent change in the required employee contribution towards the FERS
annuity, which has increased the employee's share by approximately 19.2% and decreased USPS
contributions by 10%. The table also summarizes the percent change in contribution levels for
alternative scenarios 3 to 12 relative to the new contribution levels for newly hired employees under
FERS. In all instances the total contributions decline relative to the current system; those lower
contribution levels were chosen to be more in line with private sector practice.
Table 17 - Percent change of contribution towards retirement plans from current plans
New FERS
v. Legacy 3 v. New 4 v. New 5 v. New 6 v. New 7 v. New 8 v. New 9 v. New 10 v. New 11 v. New 12 v. New
FERS FERS FERS FERS FERS FERS FERS FERS FERS FERS FERS
USPS Contribution Change -10.0% -8.7% -10.6% -12.5% -22.1% -22.1% -22.1% -12.5% -22.1% -31.7% -41.3%
Employee Contribution Change 16.4% -15.6% -8.1% -12.8% -12.8% -0.6% 11.6% -18.9% -18.9% -18.9% -18.9%
Total Contribution Change 0.0%-12.4%-1.% -13.% -19.1% -13.4% -7.7% -16.2% -21.9% -27.6% -33.3%
The various alternative plans provide savings for the Postal Service of anywhere from 8.7% to
41.3% per employee due to a reduction or elimination of costs associated with the annuity portion of
the benefit. In addition, all the plans, save one, lead to a reduction in the employee contributions. The
current contribution by employees who are contributing up to the full match in combination with the
new required FERS contribution is 8.1% (5% match + 3.1% annuity) of base salary. The sole exception is
plan 8, which would match up to 10% of an employee's salary. Most of the reduction in the employee
contributions is from the elimination of the 3.1% required annuity payment.
USPS Aggregate Savings Results
Table 18 summarizes the financial implications of the alternative scenarios for the Postal
Service. (The Appendix provides more detailed results and a description of the methodology used.) The
first panel provides the range of net present values of savings associated with the alternative plans. The
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second panel provides the range of values for the year 2020 savings associated with the alternative
plans. The third panel provides the range of values for the 2030 costs minus the year 2013 costs. For
purposes of the table, the Current plan represents a combination of the existing legacy FERS employees
and the newly hired FERS employees in which the Postal Service contribution towards the defined
benefit plan has been reduced.
Table 18 - USPS Financial Impact Summary (In Thousands)
Cost Impact Current Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
NPv - 2013 - 2030 1 1
Minimum n/a $ (548) $ (670) $ (792) $(1,402) $(1,402) $(1,402) $ (792) $(1,402) $(2,011) $(2,620)
10th Pe rce nt ile n/a $(1,107) $(1,353) $(1,599) $(2,830) $(2,830) $(2,830) $(1,599) $(2,830) $(4,060) $(5,290)
1st Quartile n/a $(1,222) $(1,494) $(1,766) $(3,124) $(3,124) $(3,124) $(1,766) $(3,124) $(4,482) $(5,840)
2nd Quartile n/a $(1,351) $(1,651) $(1,951) $(3,451) $(3,451) $(3,451) $(1,951) $(3,451) $(4,952) $(6,452)
3rd Quartile n/a $(1,480) $(1,809) $(2,138) $(3,783) $(3,783) $(3,783) $(2,138) $(3,783) $(5,428) $(7,072)
Year 2020 Savings
Minimum n/a $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
10th Percentile n/a $ (58) $ (71) $ (84) $ (148) $ (148) $ (148) $ (84) $ (148) $ (213) $ (277)
2nd Quartile n/a $ (87) $ (106) $ (125) $ (221) $ (221) $ (221) $ (125) $ (221) $ (317) $ (414)
3rd Quartile n/a $ (102) $ (125) $ (147) $ (260) $ (260) $ (260) $ (147) $ (260) $ (374) $ (487)
Year 2030 Cost Minus Year 2013 Cost
Minimum
10th Pe rce ntile
1st Quartil e
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
$ (1,024) $(1,187)
$ (1,402) $ (1,615)
$ (1,467) $ (1,683)
$(1,535) $(1,753)
$ (1,599) $ (1,819)
$ (1,222)
$ (1,662)
$ (1,731)
$(1,802)
$ (1,868)
$ (1,257)
$ (1,709)
$ (1,779)
$(1,850)
$ (1,917)
$ (1,432)
$ (1,941)
$ (2,016)
$(2,093)
$ (2,164)
$ (1,432)
$ (1,941)
$ (2,016)
$(2,093)
$ (2,164)
$ (1,432)
$ (1,941)
$ (2,016)
$(2,093)
$ (2,164)
$ (1,257)
$ (1,709)
$ (1,779)
$(1,850)
$ (1,917)
$ (1,432)
$ (1,941)
$ (2,016)
$(2,093)
$ (2,164)
$ (1,607)
$ (2,170)
$ (2,252)
$(2,336)
$ (2,412)
$(1,781)
$ (2,397)
$ (2,487)
$(2,578)
$(2,662)
Those findings suggest there is savings to be realized through a change to the retirement benefit
offered to new employees. Due to the declines in labor needs, the savings associated with year 2020, a
point approximately 7 years away, are not of tremendous magnitude mostly due to the labor needs of
the Postal Service in the immediate future declining as individuals retire, therefore leading to little new
hiring. The net present value for the period 2013-2030 is significant, and the comparison of year 2030
cost minus year 2013 cost vis-b-vis the current plan suggests savings of over $250 million (in today's
dollars) can be realized through changes in the retirement plans.
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Chapter 10 - Legal, Union, and Human Resource Considerations
Legal Considerations
The major impediment to change from a legal perspective is the law that requires the Postal
Service to participate in the Federal Retirement Benefit system. A change to the current requirement
would require an Act of Congress signed by the President. Such legislative changes have occurred many
times during the history of the Postal Service. Other legal considerations would be similar to those
faced by other organizations changing their pension system. If the Postal Service were to apply the new
system only to newly hired employees, many of the issues related to the legal framework of pensions
would not be of concern. In addition, many organizations have faced questions of fiduciary
responsibility and the liability associated with individuals who are not prepared for retirement based on
their decisions during their working career which is something the Postal Service will have to investigate
as part of any change to the pension system.
Union Considerations
Unions are interested in the general welfare of their members. It is critically important for them
that any changes to the system are fair and provide sufficient retirement benefits for their members. A
search of the major Postal union websites has found limited discussion regarding pension changes, with
only the Mail Handler union discussing a change to a defined contribution type of system. The major
focus of the article, however, was on changes to health benefits, with the reference towards retirement
changes made in passing. At this point, the main motivation of the Postal Service unions appears to be
the focus on the protection of their current members' wages and benefits.
Human Resource Considerations
The education of workers concerning any new pension plan is critical. Based on the findings of
the thrift savings plan analysis, many individuals are choosing not to contribute towards their own
retirement, and those individuals tend to be at the lower pay scales, heavily concentrated in the union
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positions, and relatively younger. In order to ensure a reasonable replacement level of income, these
employees must contribute to their retirements. In addition, mandatory default contributions in which
an employee when hired automatically contributes can provide an additional method to ensure
employees contribute. Most employees leave their default election unaltered.
Without adequate pension plans, and no lay-off clauses, employees will have incentive to
remain in the workplace until they feel they can afford retirement. If the Postal Service implements a
system that does not provide sufficient means for retirement, the ability to retire older individuals will
prove difficult, and may lessen the flexibility of the Postal Service's human resource capital especially in
an environment of no-layoff clauses within employment contracts. The current retirement data
provides insights on the age of retirement, with FERS employees retiring at later ages as opposed to
CSRS employees; those FERS employees average retirement age corresponding very closely with the
earliest point in which Social Security can be collected. In addition, the academic research by Friedberg
and Webb discussed in Chapter 2 found workers with defined benefit plans retire almost two years
earlier on average than workers with defined contribution plans. The combination of no defined benefit
portion of the retirement system, and the age of Social Security in which full benefits can be collected
increasing is likely to impact the future age at which employees are likely to retire. If this is so, care
must be taken in determining hiring levels, especially as they are met with changing workload needs due
to changing mail volumes.
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Chapter 11 - Conclusions, Recommendations and Further Areas of Research
Conclusions
This objective of this thesis was to perform a historical retrospective of the development of the
pension system that the Postal Service is currently a participant, assess the impact the pension system
has had on the Postal Service through history, and determine the impact of alternative systems on the
Postal Service as well as its employees. Throughout the research, the intricate relationship between the
Postal Service and the federal government has stood out, with the recognition that the pension liabilities
have affected the laws governing the Postal Service since its inception. In light of this complex
relationship, an assessment was made to determine the impact to the Postal Service of changing its
system allowing it to migrate to a system whereby the unfunded liabilities would no longer be an issue
for future employees while enabling the organization to more closely resemble the private sector in
terms of benefits offered, thereby leading to a reduction in costs.
The focus of the research was to first understand why there are pensions, and how the Postal
Service's pension system evolved to its current state. The initial assessment reviewed the development
of private pensions, as well as the rationale for providing pensions through a review of pension
economics. The next component reviewed the historical development of pensions in the federal sector
in the U.S. which provided insight into the evolution of the system that the Postal Service is currently a
participant. The next component focused on the Postal Service itself, looking at the current
fundamentals of the system, and the contribution patterns of current Postal employees. The remainder
of the thesis provided insight into alternative pension designs, and what the impact would be to the
Postal Service and Postal employees based on changes to the system.
The history of pensions in both the public and private sector make it clear benefits that were
promised were too expensive to provide. Many inadequate assumptions were made which precipitated
many of the issues seen within pension systems throughout the country and government. The history of
the Federal Pension system has greatly affected the legal framework governing the Postal Service. Every
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law that has been passed over the last 10 years has come about due to the pension systems, with most
of the laws passed since independence coming about due to pension issues. Long-term liabilities are a
significant issue for the federal government and the relationship between the Postal Service and the
Federal Government may not always leave the two in alignment in terms of strategy, specifically the
unified Federal budget versus the Postal Service operating environment. A system that would eliminate
the defined benefit pension plan would eliminate some of the misalignment between the two entities.
The history of the private pension system and Postal pension system highlight the unintended
consequences of actions. Some of these include the creation of 401k plan, the impact ERISA legislation
has had on companies and their decision to offer defined benefit plans and the suggestion by the Postal
Service that they utilize the escrow account to prefund retiree health benefits. While the notion of
prefunding in and of itself makes sense economically, if benefits are promised in the future, they ought
to be paid for when they are earned, the accelerated timeline to make up contributions is one that can
give one pause.
The research on pension economics makes it clear that pensions have evolved as a means to
provide for individuals after their working career is over. Pensions provide employees a reasonably
straightforward mechanism to save for retirement, either through contribution by employers which can
be considered deferred compensation, or employees which can be considered retirement investment.
Pensions provide companies a means of differentiation to attract and retain workers, as well as retire
older workers, who without a pension may choose to stay in the workforce even when their marginal
product falls below their wages.
Based on the research performed, a change in the pension system will not be a short-term fix
for the Postal Service. Even the most optimistic simulation results do not show significant savings for
the organization until beyond 2017 due to the declining workforce needs in the upcoming years. Due to
these workforce need declines significant care must be taken over the next several years in terms of
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assessing hiring needs for the organization. The analysis performed in Chapter 7, highlights the
organization's aging workforce, and one in which a significant number are past the average year of
retirement based on recent retirement history. This creates several risks for the organization which
include productivity declines due to the labor intensive type of work performed, as well as the risk that
hiring could be required to fulfill work shortages in the short term, prior to workload declines which are
expected to occur in the future.
Changing the retirement system is a long term commitment to realigning the benefits of Postal
Employees to the comparable private sector. As seen in Chapter 8 and 9 within the context of the
private comparability standard within Title IX of the Postal Service's legal framework, the organization
currently is providing significantly higher pension benefits than the private sector and is therefore an
area the organization can potentially utilize to decrease its labor costs.
From an individual employee perspective, there are areas of concern with any changes to the
pension plans. One consideration is how such a switch is to be performed. Within the framework of this
thesis, the assumption was that the new retirement system would be for new employees hired by the
organization, and existing employees would continue within the existing pension framework. This limits
the disruption, but also limits the savings opportunity. For new employees entering into this new
system, however, the research suggests that for Postal Employees, and in particular, unionized
employees, lower wage and younger workers must be educated as to the benefits of contributing
towards their defined contribution plan. Currently, these employees have the highest levels of 0
contributions towards retirement which greatly inhibit what their standard of living will be post
retirement. In an alternative pension environment in which all of the benefit comes through
contributions provided by the employee and matched by the employer, it is even more important that
appropriate education is provided to ensure workers contribute towards retirement.
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In assessing alternative plans, the current benefits offered exceed those provided within the
private sector. The plan designs simulated within this thesis provide a general idea of the retirement
income opportunity available to employees. There are so many options and assumptions that could
have been utilized, but to be reasonable from a time perspective, as well as provide relevant
information, reasonably conservative assumptions were utilizing, assessing a risk free portfolio, as well
as a 50/50 portfolio containing stocks and bonds. The results of this analysis highlight that the required
savings in order to provide a comfortable retirement income when retiring at 62 is significant. For
current FERS employees, approximately 35% of base salary is saved through social security, the FERS
annuity, or the TSP defined contribution plan, and assuming a risk free rate of return, provides 71.8% -
84.6% of final salary depending on the type of life annuity chosen for the defined contribution portion of
TSP. The problem with this system, however, is it is simply too expensive in light of the current cost
issues of the Postal Service. The simulated plan that provides the highest income to employees without
requiring the FERS defined benefit portion is a system that matches up to 10% of employee base pay. Of
interesting note with that contribution level is the fact that the 9 0 th percentile organization in terms of
defined contribution benefits provided a 6% match which should cause concern for the general
opportunity for individuals to have sufficient accumulated assets for retirement. The benefit provided
through the FERS defined benefit portion is available due to the rate of return inherent within the
system. The current estimated rate is 4.68% is significantly higher than a 2% risk free rate.
Critique of the methods utilized
No one can forecast the future, and therefore, relying upon historical events to guide future
understandings is fraught with error. The methodologies employed within this thesis are based on
normal best practices within the investment community and provide a reasonable sense of what
individuals can expect in retirement. That being said past is not necessarily prologue and the actual
results may be more or less than those provided within this study. In addition, the current environment
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related to interest rates and investment returns is one of significant turmoil. Discussions of defined
contribution plans within this environment usually lead to concerns about investment returns that were
not had in periods of positive investment return and higher general interest rates. Considering future
estimated investments assuming a continuing period of low interest rates allows for significant
conservatism in calculations and can provide comfort as to the ability to achieve such results.
Recommendations for further action
The Postal Service should begin now educating workers on the importance of planning for
retirement. The research makes it clear; too many individuals within the organization are not
contributing towards their retirement, foregoing the company match. Even if the employee were to
contribute to receive the match, withdraw the money and pay the 10% tax penalty, they still would be
better off economically than if they did not contribute, since they would receive the 1% agency match,
with the 4% match of up to 5%.
Any change to the retirement system will require an act of Congress. Sufficient discussion
should be held with both parties to suggest changes to the retirement system that can realize future
benefits. Utilizing an approach of only applying the changes to new employees may lessen the
opposition and allow for meaningful changes to the retirement systems. There have been bills
introduced that would simply eliminate the FERS defined benefit portion of the retirement system.
Based on the analysis performed, the current defined contribution benefit would not be sufficient to
fund a reasonable retirement.
The Postal Service needs to assess its future workforce needs in light of the age of its workforce.
The majority of individuals within the organization fall between the ages of 51 and 60 (over 240,000
individuals). This creates a very unstable workforce over the next 10 years when the average retirement
age for a FERS employee is 61.2 which has held very stable over the past 10 years. In addition,
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consideration must be given to how to make the organization attractive to younger individuals in light of
the fact that less than 11% of the entire workforce is currently less than 40 years old.
Further areas of research
The arena of retirement planning and pension systems is vast, and one in which one thesis
cannot possibly contain. Based on the research and analysis performed in this thesis additional avenues
of additional research are suggested. Future research should assess the broader federal government
and their pension systems and how any withdrawal of the Postal Service could affect the finances of the
government.
The research was based on an assumed investment within certain asset classes and the risk free
asset class. Other areas of investment should be assessed, looking specifically at the employee life cycle
for a typical postal employee. This would allow for a broader understanding of the individual employee
and provide a more tailored assessment of the retirement needs of the individual, and what
contribution should be required in order to fulfill their needs. This thesis was based on an assumed
contribution rate, as opposed to assessing the desired income levels and then determining the required
contribution.
Many state and local governments have modified their pension systems and focused on utilizing
defined contribution plans to control their costs, as well as unfunded liabilities. Assessing how these
changes have impacted the employees can provide insight as to the best practices for changes, and
determine what may not work when changing the pension system. In addition, understanding the union
concerns and how they were dealt with would be of interest to any future changes to the retirement
systems.
The defined contribution pension revolution is still very much in its infancy, even though defined
contribution plans have been around for over 3 decades. Understanding how the defined contribution
pension plan affects the retirement of individuals when a greater majority of individuals rely solely on
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this type of plan would be of interest to determine what changes to the typical defined contribution
plan should be made. This type of research cannot come about for many years, as the dataset of
individuals who have only had access to a defined contribution plan throughout their entire career is
limited.
* * * * *
In conclusion, the creation of adequate retirement income for an employee must be balanced
with the financial realities of the organization. As Studebaker provided the "focusing event" for pension
reform in the 1970s, the realities of the Postal Service's financial condition may provide another
focusing event for pension reform in the federal sector. The question is not about whether we should
provide pension benefits to employees; the question is to what extent we can afford to provide these
benefits, and what is fair in light of the changes experienced in the private sector. This thesis provides
some insight as to what a reformed pension system might look like from a cost and benefit perspective
and provides insights into the opportunity the Postal Service currently has with an anticipated
reshuffling of its workforce due to the demographic realities. These demographic realities are
compounded across the federal government and provide a significant opportunity for controlling the
costs of the country.
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7-1 USPS Retirement Costs - 1970 - 2012
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
RETIREMENT COSTS
FY 1970 -2012
($ MILLIONS)
CSRS CSRS CSRS CSRS / Dual Dual FERS FERS FERS Thrift FERS FERS Other Annuitant Annuitant Retroactive Retroactive Employee Total Cost InflationFiscal Year Retirement Unfunded OBRA of Retirement OASDI OASDI Retirement Savings Fiduciary Unfunded OASDI COLA COLA OBRA 1990 OBRA 1993 Total Count Cost/Employee (Inflation Adjusted USD
Liability 1987 Insurance Liability OBRA 1990 OBRA 1990 Adjusted) Cost/Employee
1970 347.4 13.6 361.0 725,913 $ 497 $ 2,083 $ 2,869
1971 410.1 22.4 432.5 723,581 $ 598 $ 2,416 $ 3,339
1972 445.7 63.0 12.7 521.4 707,674 $ 737 $ 2,817 $ 3,980
1973 451.7 108.1 12.4 572.2 684,192 $ 836 $ 2,844 $ 4,156
1974 517.0 182.7 14.4 714.1 704,016 $ 1,014 $ 3,159 $ 4,487
1975 544.6 207.6 14.2 766.4 693,253 $ 1,106 $ 3,171 $ 4,573
1976 616.5 385.9 17.4 1,019.8 683,590 $ 1,492 $ 4,023 $ 5,885
1977 627.3 448.8 16.1 1,092.2 667,688 $ 1,636 $ 4,038 $ 6,048
1978 655.2 522.4 14.8 1,192.4 661,958 $ 1,801 $ 4,044 $ 6,109
1979 737.3 667.2 16.0 1,420.5 673,057 $ 2,111 $ 4,252 $ 6,318
1980 782.2 675.0, 15.5 1,472.7 679,184 $ 2,168 $ 3,918 $ 5,769
1981 801.4 738.1 16.7 1,556.2 680,327 $ 2,287 $ 3,801 $ 5,587
1982 868.0 852.5 16.1 1,736.6 680,280 $ 2,553 $ 4,085 $ 6,005
1983 887.0 976.6 17.5 1,881.1 688,791 $ 2,731 $ 4,264 $ 6,190
1984 897.2 949.8 15.4 25.0 20.5 1,907.9 725,086 $ 2,631 $ 4,160 $ 5,737
1985 1,008.2 1,2518 107.0 139.3 28.9 2,535.2 755,684 $ 3,355 $ 5,326 $ 7,047
1986 1,005.2 1,354.8 186.7 240.6 36.6 2,823.9 778,470 $ 3,628 $ 5,868 $ 7,537
1987 981.6 1,366.5 76.4 97.4 209.3 397.2 50.1 0.5 35.9 3,214.9 805,085 $ 3,993 $ 6,396 $ 7,945
1988 995.8 1,568.2 350.0 20.5 21.6 365.0 665.4 106.7 0.3 39.0 4,132.5 829,899 $ 4,980 $ 7,874 $ 9,488
1989 977.4 1,617.5 27.3 25.9 456.1 783.6 143.1 32.2 40.9 4,104.0 835,024 $ 4,915 $ 7,473 $ 8,949
1990 939.7 1,658.5 27.8 28.1 534.5 879.4 185.0 32.2 44.2 73.6 4,403.0 829,033 $ 5,311 $ 7,556 $ 9,114
1991 917.2 1,775.2 28.6 29.8 612.6 992.3 229.8 32.2 52.3 421.0 1,502.8 6,593.8 829,854 $ 7,946 $ 10,979 $ 13,230
1992 941.9 1,895.8 31.2 31.7 648.7 1,060.5 275.8 32.2 61.8 490.8 64.3 5,534.7 825,737 $ 6,703 $ 8,955 $ 10,845
1993 828.1 1,938.3 31.1 32.8 701.5 1,093.0 303.5 32.2 119.6 550.7 54.3 570.5 6,255.6 826,768 $ 7,566 $ 9,851 $ 11,915
1994 830.4 1,995.9 33.6 34.8 779.5 1,230.3 339.8 135.4 620.0 41.2 28.5 6,069.4 857,590 $ 7,077 $ 9,309 $ 10,855
1995 842.9 2,133.8 34.4 34.5 838.7 1,270.0 400.1 135.0 688.7 22.4 30.0 6,430.5 870,160 $ 7,390 $ 9,619 $ 11,054
1996 877.1 2,362.1 36.3 34.5 906.5 1,472.9 489.1 141.4 749.9 31.5 7,101.3 887,546 $ 8,001 $ 10,280 $ 11,583
1997 869.8 2,396.8 36.0 34.2 1,000.1 1,590.3 551.7 142.6 817.3 21.5 7,460.3 898,384 $ 8,304 $ 10,619 $ 11,820
1998 848.9 2,447.7 36.2 34.2 1,089.9 1,640.1 607.6 116.9 859.1 11.1 7,691.7 909,639 $ 8,456 $ 10,775 $ 11,845
1999 816.5 2,505.4 35.1 32.6 1,197.4 1,823.6 681.1 109.4 902.7 8,103.8 919,214 $ 8,816 $ 11,055 $ 12,027
2000 795.1 2,597.5 35.1 32.8 1,278.1 1,943.9 750.3 116.2 980.2 8,529.2 917,223 $ 9,299 $ 11,255 $ 12,270
2001 768.5 2,623.5 33.5 31.7 1,341.3 2,046.4 788.8 125.2 1,125.9 8,884.8 899,351 $ 9,879 $ 11,545 $ 12,837
2002 739.8 2,635.1 32.6 30.6 1,369.0 2,121.4 826.9 111.3 1,238.3 9,105.0 865,242 $ 10,523 $ 11,556 $ 13,356
2003 1,127.5 124.5 52.4 28.9 1,410.9 2,172.3 853.7 104.5 5,874.7 835,853 $ 7,028 $ 7,319 $ 8,756
2004 1,640.7 115.5 75.5 28.2 1,474.2 2,255.0 877.0 108.2 6,574.3 820,157 $ 8,016 $ 7,932 $ 9,671
2005 1,533.3 290.0 77.4 28.6 1,597.9 2,510.0 912.4 123.6 7,073.2 821,684 $ 8,608 $ 8,252 $ 10,043
2006 1,449.8 257.0 75.0 27.5 1,693.6 2,652.3 959.6 122.3 7,237.1 817,540 $ 8,852 $ 8,234 $ 10,072
2007 52.3 - 2.7 27.5 1,745.3 2,771.2 1,007.0 130.8 5,736.8 801,641 $ 7,156 $ 6,271 $ 7,823
2008 0.6 - - 28.3 1,755.2 2,909.2 1,058.1 148.0 5,899.4 773,542 $ 7,626 $ 6,443 $ 8,329
2009 0.5 - - 27.0 1,721.6 2,962.5 1,072.6 132.6 5,916.8 713,796 $ 8,289 $ 6,291 $ 8,813
2010 0.5 - - 21.7 1,705.0 2,904.6 1,048.9 128.8 5,809.5 670,200 $ 8,668 $ 6,086 $ 9,080
2011 0.5 - - 18.5 1,696.7 2,982.6 1,039.6 140.9 5,878.8 649,762 $ 9,048 $ 5,981 $ 9,205
Total 30,620.9 43,689.1 350.0 1,147.8 1,208.3 28,128.6 45,130.0 15,558.3 0.8 161.0 2,936.6 9,444.6 73.6 1,685.0 693.1 180,827.7
Source: USPS, Inflation calculated utilizing Bureau of Labor Statistics: Consumer Price Index All Urban Consumers U.S. City Average.
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8-1 Private Sector Defined Contribution Contribution Rates
Table 26. Savings and thrift plans: Maximum employee contribution matched by employer, private industry workers, National
Compensation Survey, 2010
(All workers participating in savings and thrift plans = 100 percent)
Maximum employee contribution matched by employer
Specified Not
Characteristics Total matching 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Other(1) determin-
percent percenti- percenti- percenti- percenti- percenti- able
le le le le le
(median)
Worker characteristic
All workers............................. 100 69 3 4 5 6 6 29 2
Management, professional, and related... 100 73 3 4 5 6 6 25 2
Management, business, and financial... 100 68 3 4 5 6 6 32 1
Professional and related.............. 100 77 3 4 5 6 6 20 3
Service................................. 100 75 3 4 5 6 6 25 -2
Protective service.................... 100 61 4 5 5 5 5 -
Sales and office........................ 100 68 3 4 5 6 6 30 3
Sales and related..................... 100 71 3 4 5 6 6 28 2
Office and administrative support..... 100 66 3 4 5 6 6 31 3
Natural resources, construction, and
maintenance............................. 100 74 3 4 6 6 7 24 2
Construction, extraction, farming,
fishing, and forestry................. 100 65 3 4 5 6 7 -
Installation, maintenance, and repair 100 79 3 4 6 6 7 21 1
Production, transportation, and material
m oving.................................. 100 57 3 4 6 6 6 42 1
Production............................ 100 56 4 4 6 6 6 41 2
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Transportation and material moving.... 100 58 3 4 5 6 6 42 -
Full tim e............................... 100 69 3 4 5 6 6 29 2
Part time............................... 100 73 3 4 5 6 6 26 1
Union................................... 100 62 3 4 6 6 6 37 2
Nonunion................................ 100 70 3 4 5 6 6 28 2
Average wage within the following
categories:(3)
Lowest 25 percent..................... 100 74 3 4 5 6 6 26 -
Lowest 10 percent................... 100 61 4 5 5 6 6 -
Second 25 percent..................... 100 64 3 4 5 6 6 33 3
Third 25 percent...................... 100 66 3 4 5 6 6 32 2
Highest 25 percent.................... 100 72 3 4 5 6 6 25 2
Highest 10 percent.................. 100 72 3 4 5 6 6 25 2
Establishment characteristic
Goods-producing industries.............. 100 63 4 4 6 6 8 34 3
Construction.......................... 100 72 3 4 6 6 6 -
Manufacturing......................... 100 62 4 4 6 6 8 35 3
Service-providing industries............ 100 71 3 4 5 6 6 27 2
Trade, transportation, and utilities.. 100 62 3 4 5 6 7 37 1
Wholesale trade..................... 100 72 3 5 6 6 7 28 -
Retail trade........................ 100 59 - - - - - 39 2
Information........................... 100 88 4 5 6 6 6 -
Financial activities.................. 100 78 4 4 5 6 6 22 -2
Finance and insurance............... 100 75 4 5 6 6 6 25 -2
Credit intermediation and related
activities........................ 100 81 4 5 5 6 6 19 -
Insurance carriers and related
activities........................ 100 63 3 4 5 6 7 37 -2
Professional and business services.... 100 64 3 3 5 5 6 36 -
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Professional and technical services 100 72 3 3 5 5 6 -
Education and health services......... 100 77 3 3 4 6 6 18 5
Educational services................ 100 79 - - - - - 18 2
Junior colleges, colleges, and
universities...................... 100 76 - - - - - 22 3
Health care and social assistance... 100 77 3 3 4 6 6 17 5
1 to 99 workers......................... 100 74 3 4 5 6 6 22 4
1 to 49 workers....................... 100 76 3 3 5 6 6 20 4
50 to 99 workers...................... 100 70 3 4 5 6 6 28 2
100 workers or more..................... 100 66 3 4 5 6 6 32 1
100 to 499 workers.................... 100 66 3 4 5 6 6 33 -2
500 workers or more................... 100 66 3 4 5 6 6 32 2
Geographic area
New England............................. 100 78 4 5 6 6 6 21 1
Middle Atlantic......................... 100 70 3 4 5 6 6 25 5
East North Central...................... 100 64 3 4 6 6 6 34 1
West North Central...................... 100 72 3 4 6 6 6 28 -
South Atlantic.......................... 100 72 3 4 5 6 6 28 -2
East South Central...................... 100 60 4 5 6 6 6 37 2
West South Central...................... 100 64 3 3 5 6 6 35 1
M ountain................................ 100 79 3 4 5 6 6 -
Pacific................................. 100 68 4 5 5 6 6 27 5
1 Other methods of employer matches include maximum dollar amounts specified by the employer, varying contributions by the
employer based on employee contributions or service, and other matching methods.
2 Less than 0.5.
3 The categories are based on the average wage for each occupation surveyed, which may include workers with earnings both above
and below the threshold. The average wages are based on the estimates published in the "National Compensation Survey: Occupational
Earnings in the United States, 2009." See Technical Note for more details.
NOTE: Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. Dashes indicate that no data were reported or that data
do not meet publication criteria. For definitions of major plans, key provisions, and related terms, see the "Glossary of Employee
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Benefit Terms" at www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/glossary20lO2Oll.htm.
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Table 27. Savings and thrift plans: Method of employer matching contributions, private industry workers, National Compensation
Survey, 2010
(All workers participating in savings and thrift plans = 100 percent)
Specified matching percent
Characteristics
Specified
Total matching
percent
10th
percenti-
le
25th
percenti-
le
50th
percenti-
le
(median)
75th
percenti-
le
90th
percenti-
le
Not
Other(1) determin-
able
Worker characteristic
All workers.............................
Management, professional, and related...
Management, business, and financial...
Professional and related..............
Service .................................
Protective service....................
Sales and office........................
Sales and related.....................
Office and administrative support.....
Natural resources, construction, and
m aintenance.............................
Construction, extraction, farming,
fishing, and forestry.................
Installation, maintenance, and repair
Production, transportation, and material
m oving..................................
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
69
73
68
77
75
61
68
71
66
74
65
79
57
25
25
25
30
40
25
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50 100
66 100
50 100
100
100
75
100
100
100
50 100
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2
2
1
3
-2
29
25
32
20
25
30
28
31
24
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
3
2
3
2
21
42
1
1
Production............................
Transportation and material moving....
Full tim e...............................
Part tim e...............................
U nio n ...................................
Nonunion................................
Average wage within the following
categories:(3)
Lowest 25 percent.....................
Lowest 10 percent...................
Second 25 percent.....................
Third 25 percent......................
Highest 25 percent....................
Highest 10 percent..................
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
56
58
69
73
62
70
74
61
64
66
72
72
41 2
42 -
25
50
25
25
25
25
25
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50 100
66
50
100
100
50 100
50
50
75
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Establishment characteristic
Goods-producing industries..............
Construction..........................
M anufacturing.........................
Service-providing industries............
Trade, transportation, and utilities..
W holesale trade.....................
Retail trade........................
Inform ation...........................
Financial activities..................
Finance and insurance...............
Credit intermediation and related
activities........................
Insurance carriers and related
activities........................
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
63
72
62
71
62
72
59
88
78
75
81
63
25
25
25
25
40
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
65
50 100
50
50 100
50 100
75
70
100
80
100
100
100
50 100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
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29
26
37
28
26
33
32
25
25
2
1
2
2
3
2
2
2
3
3
2
1
2
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
34
35
27
37
28
39
22
25
19
37
-2
-2
-2
Professional and business services....
Professional and technical services
Education and health services.........
Educational services................
Junior colleges, colleges, and
universities......................
Health care and social assistance...
1 to 99 w orkers.........................
1 to 49 workers.......................
50 to 99 workers......................
100 workers or more.....................
100 to 499 workers....................
500 workers or more...................
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
64
72
77
79
76
77
74
76
70
66
66
66
25
25
25
25
35
35
50 100
50
50
25
50
50
50
50
50
66
75 100
Geographic area
New England.................
Middle Atlantic.........................
East North Central......................
West North Central......................
South Atlantic..........................
East South Central......................
West South Central......................
M ountain................................
Pacific.................................
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
78
70
64
72
72
60
64
79
68
25
25
50
25
1 Other methods of employer matches include maximum dollar amounts specified by
employer based on employee contributions or service, and other matching methods.
2 Less than 0.5.
3 The categories are based on the average wage for each occupation surveyed, which
35
50
50
50 100
50 100
50 100
50 100 100
100
100
100
100
21
25
34
28
28
37
35
27
the employer, varying contributions by the
may include workers with earnings both above
and below the threshold. The average wages are based on the estimates published in the "National Compensation Survey: Occupational
Earnings in the United States, 2009." See Technical Note for more details.
NOTE: Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. Dashes indicate that no data were reported or that data
Page | 127
100
100
100
100
100
100 36
18
18
22
17
22
20
28
32
33
32
100
100
100
100
100
5
2
3
5
4
4
2
1
-2
2
1
5
1
-2
2
1
5
do not meet publication criteria. For definitions of major plans, key provisions, and related terms, see the "Glossary of Employee
Benefit Terms" at www.bis.gov/ncs/ebs/glossary2OlO2Oll.htm.
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Table 28. Savings and thrift plans: Maximum potential employer contribution,(1) private
industry workers, National Compensation Survey, 2010
(Includes all workers participating in savings and thrift plans that specify matching
contributions)
Maximum potential employer contribution
Characteristics 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
percenti- percenti- percenti- percenti- percenti-
le le le le le
(median)
Worker characteristic
All w orkers............................. 1.5 2 3 4.8 6
Management, professional, and related... 1.5 2 3 5 6
Management, business, and financial... 1.5 3 4 5 6
Professional and related.............. 1.3 2 3 4.8 6
Service................................. 1.5 1.5 2.5 4 5
Protective service.................... 2.5 3 5 5 5
Sales and office........................ 1.5 2.5 3 5 6
Sales and related..................... 1.5 2.5 4 5 6
Office and administrative support..... 1.5 2.5 3 5 6
Natural resources, construction, and
m aintenance............................. 1.5 2 3 4 5
Construction, extraction, farming,
fishing, and forestry................. 1.5 2 3 4 4
Installation, maintenance, and repair 1.5 3 3 4.5 6
Production, transportation, and material
m oving.................................. 1.3 2 3 3.5 5
Production............................ 1.3 2 3 3 5
Transportation and material moving.... 1.3 2 3 4 5
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Full tim e............................... 1.5 2 3 4.8 6
Part tim e............................... 2 2.1 3 5 5
Union................................... 1.5 2 3 4.5 5
Nonunion................................ 1.5 2 3 5 6
Average wage within the following
categories:(2)
Lowest 25 percent..................... 1.5 2 3 4 5
Lowest 10 percent................... 1.5 2.5 4 5 6
Second 25 percent..................... 1.5 2 3 4 5
Third 25 percent...................... 1.3 2 3 4 5.1
Highest 25 percent.................... 1.5 2.5 3.5 5 6
Highest 10 percent.................. 1.5 3 4 5 6
Establishment characteristic
Goods-producing industries.............. 1.5 2 3 4 6
Construction.......................... 1.5 2 3 4 4
M anufacturing......................... 1.3 2 3 4 6
Service-providing industries............ 1.5 2.1 3 5 6
Trade, transportation, and utilities.. 1.5 2.5 3.5 5 5
Wholesale trade..................... 1.5 2 3 4 5
Financial activities.................. 2 3 4 5 6
Finance and insurance............... 3 3 5 6 6
Credit intermediation and related
activities........................ 3 3 5 6 6
Insurance carriers and related
activities........................ 2.5 3 3.9 5 6
Professional and business services.... 1.3 3 3 4.8 5
Education and health services......... 1.5 1.5 2.1 3 4
Health care and social assistance... 1.5 1.5 2 3 3
1 to 99 workers......................... 1.3 1.5 3 4 5
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1 to 49 workers....................... 1.3 1.5 3 4 6
50 to 99 workers...................... 1 1.5 3 4 5
100 workers or more..................... 1.5 2.1 3 5 6
100 to 499 workers.................... 1.5 2.5 3 5 5
500 workers or more................... 2 2.1 3.5 5 6
Geographic area
New England............................. 1.5 3 3.6 5 6
M iddle Atlantic......................... 1 2.5 3.6 5 6
East North Central...................... 1.5 2.1 3 4 5
South Atlantic.......................... 1.5 2 3 4 5
East South Central...................... 1.5 3 3 5 6
M ountain................................ 1.3 2 3 4 6
Pacific................................. 1.3 3 4 5 6
1 The maximum potential employer contribution is determined by multiplying the maximum
employee contribution subject to matching by the employer matching percent, for those
plans that specify both values.
2 The categories are based on the average wage for each occupation surveyed, which may
include workers with earnings both above and below the threshold. The average wages are
based on the estimates published in the "National Compensation Survey: Occupational
Earnings in the United States, 2009." See Technical Note for more details.
NOTE: Dashes indicate that no data were reported or that data do not meet publication
criteria. For definitions of major plans, key provisions, and related terms, see the
"Glossary of Employee Benefit Terms" at www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/glossary20lO2Oll.htm.
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Employee Retirement Simulation Assumptions, Methodology, and Detailed Results
Employee Retirement Simulation Assumptions:
e CSRS and FERS employees will follow historical retirement ages with a normal distribution.
o CSRS employees over the period 2000 - 2012 had an average age at retirement of 58.97
with a standard deviation of 4.81 years.
o FERS employees over the period 2000 - 2012 had an average age at retirement of 61.21
with a standard deviation of 4.59 years.
e The hiring requirement would be based on an estimate of full time employee needs estimated
from 2013 to 2020 based on declining workload
Employee Retirement Simulation Methodology:
The total estimate of employees was based on the data obtained from the Thrift Savings Plan
contribution data file which includes a listing of all employees paid during pay period 26 from Calendar
year 2012. It is possible employees have retired since that time, but for purposes of this analysis, this is
assumed to be the starting point. Employee counts were aggregated by age and a decision variable was
created for the retiree age based on the average retiree age for CSRS employees and their standard
deviation, and the average retiree age for FERS employees and their standard deviation for each
employee age category. This analysis did not treat each employee independently due to the constraints
of both the software and hardware of the equipment utilized. This approach was deemed reasonable in
light of existing computing constraints.
Employees were aged through time from 2013 - 2030. A comparison was made at each year to
determine if the estimated retirement age was less than the current employee age at that point in time.
If the age was less it was assumed that group of employees would retire. This was simulated utilizing
the average and standard deviation of retirement ages for 226,800 trials (the allowable trials based on
the memory available to the workstation, based on the results obtained this number of trials provided a
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reasonable result). The total remaining employees for each trial was aggregated. The hiring
requirement is estimated by comparing the total employees required and the total on roll employees
which is based on the remaining legacy employees plus the total employees hired to date. The total
new employees are than determined by summing the total hiring requirement to that date.
The simulation was asked to forecast the total remaining employees for each year 2013-2030,
hiring requirement for each year from 2013 - 2030, total new employees from 2013-2030 and the total
hiring through 2016. Those detailed results are provided in below and in summary within the
document.
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Employee Retirement Simulation Detailed Results:
USPS Hiring Requirement Estimates -2013 - 2030
Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring
Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement
Statistics 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Trials 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800
Base Case 0 36,000 5,288 7,638 13,266 24,875 26,509 28,566 23,687 22,894 19,920 15,783 12,666 10,596 9,023 8,301 8,309 7,156
Mean 0 51,516 6,935 5,564 7,039 13,109 16,965 19,999 17,557 16,658 15,839 14,900 13,958 12,926 11,829 10,681 9,679 8,588
Median 0 50,128 0 0 0 6,926 14,695 19,159 16,457 14,457 13,197 11,791 10,289 8,880 8,186 7,091 5,436 4,313
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Standard Deviation 0 26,090 11,383 10,581 12,061 15,958 17,479 18,450 17,714 17,283 16,813 16,142 15,529 14,720 13,885 12,950 12,023 11,043
Varia nce 0 680,681,872 129,563,589 111,956,291 145,461,205 254,646,395 305,522,476 340,411,131 313,792,629 298,688,188 282,684,298 260,548,353 241,142,853 216,688,740 192,787,091 167,711,061 144,545,576 121,944,762
Skewness - 0.3246 2.13 2.48 2.20 1.39 1.10 0.9343 1.08 1.14 1.19 1.23 1.28 1.34 1.40 1.49 1.53 1.60
Kurtosis - 2.92 8.13 9.99 8.44 4.83 4.03 3.71 4.06 4.23 4.36 4.49 4.61 4.83 5.03 5.41 5.51 5.81
Coeff. ofVariability - 0.5064 1.64 1.90 1.71 1.22 1.03 0.9226 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.17 1.21 1.24 1.29
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 0 179,023 105,795 106,618 116,733 128,096 140,280 150,197 139,561 137,158 132,782 129,863 120,685 115,884 125,474 114,131 106,450 89,772
Range Width 0 179,023 105,795 106,618 116,733 128,096 140,280 150,197 139,561 137,158 132,782 129,863 120,685 115,884 125,474 114,131 106,450 89,772
MeanStd.Error 0 55 24 22 25 34 37 39 37 36 35 34 33 31 29 27 25 23
Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring Hiring
Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement
Percentiles 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5% 0 10,175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10% 0 18,351 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15% 0 24,113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20% 0 28,750 0 0 0 0 0 245 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25% 0 32,878 0 0 0 0 0 2,093 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30% 0 36,613 0 0 0 0 1,776 5,127 1,565 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35% 0 40,149 0 0 0 0 3,897 7,071 4,259 3,300 2,211 1,719 541 0 0 0 0 0
40% 0 43,506 0 0 0 1,936 6,957 12,528 10,135 9,197 8,192 7,066 5,430 4,301 3,227 1,640 920 103
45% 0 46,793 0 0 0 3,688 10,892 16,695 13,442 12,621 10,818 9,460 8,451 7,556 5,657 4,473 4,025 2,540
50% 0 50,128 0 0 0 6,926 14,695 19,158 16,457 14,457 13,197 11,790 10,288 8,880 8,186 7,090 5,436 4,313
55% 0 53,478 979 0 0 10,154 17,106 20,904 17,428 16,481 15,483 14,040 12,695 10,925 9,460 8,418 8,056 6,402
60% 0 56,923 3,040 0 1,642 13,271 19,063 21,981 18,388 17,790 17,149 16,140 14,965 13,321 11,504 9,620 8,581 8,173
65% 0 60,576 4,752 1,749 4,715 16,374 20,388 23,057 19,205 18,430 18,112 17,790 17,185 15,635 14,056 12,589 10,818 8,901
70% 0 64,427 7,456 3,981 7,712 18,790 22,843 26,213 22,612 20,878 19,476 18,553 18,362 17,790 16,904 15,101 12,968 11,016
75% 0 68,706 9,995 6,862 9,889 21,236 25,959 29,869 27,295 25,762 24,324 22,753 20,825 19,067 18,388 17,473 15,863 13,885
80% 0 73,501 13,660 10,075 13,627 24,946 31,150 36,033 33,186 31,643 30,265 28,413 26,398 24,220 21,892 19,538 18,310 16,977
85% 0 79,003 18,162 14,818 18,205 30,251 36,625 40,837 37,603 36,028 34,579 32,702 30,903 29,195 26,860 24,265 21,953 19,648
90% 0 86,084 23,475 20,712 24,805 36,642 41,515 44,608 40,868 40,120 39,302 37,906 36,378 33,738 31,579 29,494 27,149 24,513
95% 0 96,739 31,282 28,905 33,222 44,979 50,717 55,394 52,703 51,274 49,455 46,708 44,664 41,828 39,751 37,063 34,094 31,026
100% 0 179,023 105,795 106,618 116,733 128,096 140,280 150,197 139,561 137,158 132,782 129,863 120,685 115,884 125,474 114,131 106,450 89,772
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USPS New Employee Estimates - 2013 - 2030
Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New
Statistics 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Trials 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800
Base Case 0 36,000 41,288 48,926 62,192 87,067 113,576 142,142 165,829 188,723 208,643 224,426 237,092 247,688 256,711 265,012 273,321 280,477
Mean 0 51,516 58,451 64,015 71,054 84,162 101,128 121,126 138,683 155,341 171,180 186,080 200,038 212,963 224,793 235,473 245,153 253,740
Median 0 50,128 57,203 62,889 70,082 83,311 100,056 119,944 137,958 155,198 171,602 186,687 200,963 214,074 225,950 236,863 246,618 255,055
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 0 118,146 118,146 160,100 156,672 196,164 192,258 222,670 220,547 245,063 241,141 261,778 269,951
Standard Deviation 0 26,090 26,679 27,090 27,717 29,317 30,811 31,699 31,553 30,963 30,162 29,038 27,683 26,190 24,590 22,970 21,322 19,696
Variance 0 680,681,872 711,785,545 733,889,991 768,250,459 859,499,734 949,323,801 1,004,808,990 995,568,882 958,683,786 909,756,610 843,204,484 766,370,143 685,893,626 604,644,723 527,640,653 454,611,390 387,946,107
Skewness - 0.3246 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.13 0.0525 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.16 -0.20 -0.25 -0.29 -0.32 -0.34 -0.37
Kurtosis - 2.92 2.93 2.94 2.96 2.94 2.89 2.86 2.87 2.90 2.90 2.93 2.95 2.99 3.05 3.07 3.11 3.17
Coeff.ofVariability - 0.5064 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.2617 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,343 22,718 45,569 54,390 65,579 76,117 103,903 115,030 133,238 147,668
Maximum 0 179,023 194,746 194,746 203,725 228,369 241,187 256,242 276,589 287,777 287,777 302,711 302,711 306,116 314,776 314,776 316,159 317,889
Range Width 0 179,023 194,746 194,746 203,725 228,369 241,187 256,242 267,246 265,059 242,208 248,321 237,132 229,999 210,873 199,746 182,921 170,221
Mean Std. Error 0 55 56 57 58 62 65 67 66 65 63 61 58 55 52 48 45 41
Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New Total New
Percentiles 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,343 22,718 45,569 54,390 65,579 76,117 103,903 115,030 133,238 147,668
5% 0 10,175 16,320 21,288 27,248 37,574 51,548 69,598 87,188 104,330 120,952 137,345 153,011 167,936 182,353 195,543 208,063 219,389
'10% 0 18,351 24,764 29,835 35,974 46,996 61,709 79,861 97,042 114,303 131,194 147,933 163,634 178,341 192,361 205,044 216,957 227,820
15% 0 24,113 30,571 35,739 42,156 53,466 69,019 88,499 106,430 123,521 139,956 155,805 171,006 185,521 199,156 211,503 222,989 233,230
20% 0 28,750 35,286 40,595 47,210 58,803 74,404 94,040 112,137 129,601 146,117 161,829 176,975 191,186 204,426 216,538 227,534 237,497
25% 0 32,878 39,535 44,856 51,583 63,678 79,413 98,617 116,412 133,937 150,756 166,619 181,533 195,783 208,839 220,603 231,499 241,199
30% 0 36,613 43,333 48,780 55,580 68,043 84,438 103,913 121,376 138,529 154,986 170,791 185,928 199,729 212,665 224,366 234,908 244,374
35% 0 40,149 46,926 52,437 59,349 71,936 88,874 109,205 127,168 144,073 160,047 175,382 190,079 203,764 216,350 227,665 237,815 247,116
40% 0 43,506 50,409 55,985 62,990 75,663 92,646 113,111 131,350 148,384 164,449 179,703 193,945 207,447 219,871 230,856 240,849 249,830
45% 0 46,793 53,851 59,450 66,582 79,457 96,256 116,516 134,751 151,904 168,036 183,274 197,588 210,916 222,874 233,903 243,867 252,587
50% 0 50,128 57,202 62,889 70,082 83,310 100,055 119,943 137,957 155,198 171,602 186,687 200,962 214,074 225,950 236,863 246,618 255,055
55% 0 53,478 60,689 66,398 73,552 87,220 104,548 124,685 142,083 158,948 175,032 190,282 204,401 217,297 229,062 239,635 249,073 257,401
60% 0 56,923 64,217 69,932 77,165 90,935 108,978 129,787 147,412 163,916 179,571 194,316 207,990 220,656 232,097 242,332 251,662 259,761
65% 0 60,576 67,880 73,644 80,905 94,717 112,846 133,965 151,749 168,336 183,913 198,351 211,839 224,246 235,312 245,311 254,454 262,283
70% 0 64,427 71,803 77,659 85,002 98,775 116,649 137,623 155,502 172,128 187,707 202,222 215,541 227,619 238,786 248,726 257,406 265,104
75% 0 68,706 76,101 81,942 89,393 103,569 121,196 141,694 159,428 176,225 191,811 206,091 219,443 231,409 242,244 251,908 260,372 267,640
80% 0 73,501 80,883 86,746 94,253 109,031 127,647 148,416 165,428 181,532 196,726 210,939 223,814 235,325 245,433 254,842 263,135 270,255
85% 0 79,003 86,485 92,473 99,919 114,699 133,798 155,089 172,426 188,250 202,987 216,585 228,946 240,108 250,313 259,415 267,177 273,960
90% 0 86,084 93,659 99,639 107,540 122,145 140,534 161,503 179,024 194,785 209,519 222,875 235,051 246,141 255,801 264,303 271,607 278,036
95% 0 96,739 104,328 110,335 118,210 134,427 153,806 174,722 191,218 205,997 220,148 232,610 243,792 254,156 263,358 271,121 277,965 284,046
100% 0 179,023 194,746 194,746 203,725 228,369 241,187 256,242 276,589 287,777 287,777 302,711 302,711 306,116 314,776 314,776 316,159 317,889
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USPS Financial Impact Assumptions, Methodology, and Detailed Results
USPS Financial Impact Assumptions:
* Only newly hired employees would be eligible for a new retirement plan and all remaining
legacy employees would remain within their current plan (this is for simplification purposes and
to provide a low end estimate of the savings that could be realized through such a change).
* The average new salary would grow through time as employees are hired based on an estimate
of the average wage based on union contracts assuming no cost of living adjustments for
simplification purposes
e Assumed new hires would be proportionate to the current employee types
* Assumed non-union employees (approximately 9.56% of current workforce) would maintain the
same wage premium over union employees for each new hire
* The legacy salary would remain constant through time (no cost of living adjustments are taken
into account)
e The savings associated with a new plan is the difference between assuming all employees
remain within FERS with legacy employees contributing .8% to the annuity, and new employees
contributing 3.1% compared to the new plan cost for new employees.
* Assume legacy employees are receiving a full 5% match by USPS.
* Assume future employees contribute to the match as specified in the scenario summary.
USPS Financial Impact Methodology:
Utilizing the results of the employee retirement age simulation model, financial estimates were
developed for each trial associated with that assumed hiring requirement for each alternative plan
design.
The first step was to estimate an average wage associated with the population of new
employees. This was done by estimating a blended salary level across the organization for new
employees based on the current distribution of employees across the organization. Utilizing the new
salary structure associated with the 4 unions (APWU, NRLCA, NALC and NPMHU) received from USPS, a
determination was made for what the salary would be for each two week period over a 35 year career
for each union. That salary was blended to create an average salary for each two week period based on
the percentage of employees belonging to each union (this sums to 100%). Utilizing the current wage
premium for non-union employees, an estimate was made of the two week period salary for all other
employees (approximately 9.56% of employees). The union employees (approximately 90.44% of
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employees) were then blended with non-union employees (approximately 9.56%) to estimate the total
average salary for the two week period. The salaries were aggregated to determine an average blended
annual salary for use within the models.
Once the average salary was known by employee year, an estimate was made based on the
simulated number of new hires through time in terms of what the salary structure would look like by
year. I.e., the numbers of new hires for a given year started at the blended average salary level for a
year 1 employee, new hires from the year prior were at the blended average salary level for a year 2
employee, etc. The average salary for that year was then calculated as the weighted average of salary
based on the number of hires at a given year within their career salary structure. This salary was than
utilized within each trial of the simulation to estimate the financial impact of the various pension plans.
Utilizing the total number of legacy and new hires based on the retirement age simulation
combined with the salary information for both legacy employees (assumed the same for simplification
purposes) and the new hires based on the simulated environment, a financial estimate was made. This
estimate was based on multiplying the number of employees times their salary times the percent
contribution by USPS. These were compared to an assumed environment of all FERS to understand the
change in cost structure. For the all FERS environment, USPS contributions for FERS employees were
reduced based on the new contribution requirements.
The simulation was asked to provide forecasts for the present value of the cost savings for all
plans from 2013 through 2030, the total savings expected to be realized in the year 2020, and the total
cost difference between year 2030 and year 2013 of the total retirement cost.
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USPS Financial Impact Detailed Results
Financial Impact - 2030 Cost minus 2013 Costs
Plan 1 &2- Plan 3 - Plan 4 - Plan 5 - Plan 6 - Plan 7 - Plan 8 - Plan 9 - Plan 10 - Plan 11 - Plan 12 -
2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030-
Statistics 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013
Trials 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800
Base Case (1,553) (1,796) (1,850) (1,904) (2,174) (2,174) (2,174) (1,904) (2,174) (2,445) (2,715)
Mean (1,531) (1,748) (1,796) (1,845) (2,086) (2,086) (2,086) (1,845) (2,086) (2,328) (2,569)
Median (1,535) (1,753) (1,802) (1,850) (2,093) (2,093) (2,093) (1,850) (2,093) (2,336) (2,578)
Mode (1,739) (1,962) (2,015) (2,067) (2,328) (2,328) (2,328) (2,067) (2,328) (2,589) (2,849)
Standard Deviation 99 102 103 104 111 111 111 104 111 120 131
Variance 9,877 10,387 10,574 10,788 12,262 12,262 12,262 10,788 12,262 14,407 17,224
Skewness 0.2484 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.3787 0.33 0.38 0.41 0.43
Kurtosis 3.19 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.22 3.25 3.26 3.27
Coeff. ofVariability -0.0649 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.0531 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Minimum (1,928) (2,132) (2,177) (2,222) (2,469) (2,469) (2,469) (2,222) (2,469) (2,729) (2,994)
Maximum (1,024) (1,187) (1,222) (1,257) (1,432) (1,432) (1,432) (1,257) (1,432) (1,607) (1,781)
Range Width 905 944 955 965 1,037 1,037 1,037 965 1,037 1,122 1,213
Mean Std. Error 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Planl&2- Plan 3 - Plan 4 - Plan 5 - Plan 6 - Plan 7 - Plan 8 - Plan 9 - Plan 10 - Plan 11 - Plan 12 -
2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030- 2030-
Percentiles 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013
0% (1,928) (2,132) (2,177) (2,222) (2,469) (2,469) (2,469) (2,222) (2,469) (2,729) (2,994)
5% (1,687) (1,906) (1,956) (2,005) (2,256) (2,256) (2,256) (2,005) (2,256) (2,510) (2,768)
10% (1,654) (1,874) (1,924) (1,973) (2,223) (2,223) (2,223) (1,973) (2,223) (2,475) (2,731)
15% (1,632) (1,852) (1,901) (1,951) (2,199) (2,199) (2,199) (1,951) (2,199) (2,451) (2,704)
20% (1,614) (1,834) (1,883) (1,933) (2,180) (2,180) (2,180) (1,933) (2,180) (2,430) (2,682)
25% (1,599) (1,819) (1,868) (1,917) (2,164) (2,164) (2,164) (1,917) (2,164) (2,412) (2,662)
30% (1,585) (1,804) (1,853) (1,902) (2,149) (2,149) (2,149) (1,902) (2,149) (2,396) (2,645)
35% (1,571) (1,791) (1,840) (1,889) (2,134) (2,134) (2,134) (1,889) (2,134) (2,381) (2,628)
40% (1,559) (1,778) (1,827) (1,876) (2,120) (2,120) (2,120) (1,876) (2,120) (2,366) (2,611)
45% (1,547) (1,766) (1,814) (1,863) (2,107) (2,107) (2,107) (1,863) (2,107) (2,351) (2,595)
50% (1,535) (1,753) (1,802) (1,850) (2,093) (2,093) (2,093) (1,850) (2,093) (2,336) (2,578)
55% (1,522) (1,741) (1,789) (1,837) (2,079) (2,079) (2,079) (1,837) (2,079) (2,321) (2,562)
60% (1,510) (1,727) (1,776) (1,824) (2,065) (2,065) (2,065) (1,824) (2,065) (2,305) (2,545)
65% (1,496) (1,714) (1,762) (1,810) (2,050) (2,050) (2,050) (1,810) (2,050) (2,289) (2,527)
70% (1,482) (1,699) (1,747) (1,795) (2,034) (2,034) (2,034) (1,795) (2,034) (2,272) (2,508)
75% (1,467) (1,683) (1,731) (1,779) (2,016) (2,016) (2,016) (1,779) (2,016) (2,252) (2,487)
80% (1,449) (1,665) (1,713) (1,760) (1,996) (1,996) (1,996) (1,760) (1,996) (2,231) (2,463)
85% (1,428) (1,643) (1,691) (1,738) (1,972) (1,972) (1,972) (1,738) (1,972) (2,204) (2,434)
90% (1,402) (1,615) (1,662) (1,709) (1,941) (1,941) (1,941) (1,709) (1,941) (2,170) (2,397)
95% (1,361) (1,572) (1,618) (1,664) (1,893) (1,893) (1,893) (1,664) (1,893) (2,117) (2,338)
100% (1,024) (1,187) (1,222) (1,257) (1,432) (1,432) (1,432) (1,257) (1,432) (1,607) (1,781)
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Financial Impact - Present Value of Plan Savings
Plan 3 - Plan 4 - Plan 5 - Plan 6 - Plan 7 - Plan 8 - Plan 9 - Plan 10 - Plan 11 - Plan 12 -
Present Prent Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present
Statistics Value Value Value Value Value Value Value Value Value Value
Trials 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800
Base Case 1,489 1,819 2,150 3,804 3,804 3,804 2,150 3,804 5,458 7,112
Mean 1,352 1,653 1,953 3,455 3,455 3,455 1,953 3,455 4,958 6,460
Median 1,351 1,651 1,951 3,451 3,451 3,451 1,951 3,451 4,952 6,452
Mode 956 1,168 1,380 2,442 2,442 2,442 1,380 2,442 3,504 4,566
Standard Deviation 191 233 276 488 488 488 276 488 700 913
Variance 36,484 54,501 76,121 238,273 238,273 238,273 76,121 238,273 490,508 832,828
Skewness 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.0509 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Kurtosis 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96
Coeff. ofVariability 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.1413 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Minimum 548 670 792 1,402 1,402 1,402 792 1,402 2,011 2,620
Maximum 2,234 2,731 3,227 5,710 5,710 5,710 3,227 5,710 8,192 10,674
Range Width 1,686 2,060 2,435 4,308 4,308 4,308 2,435 4,308 6,181 8,054
Mean Std. Error 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Plan 3 - Plan 4 - Plan 5 - Plan 6 - Plan 7 - Plan 8 - Plan 9 - Plan 10 - Plan 11 - Plan 12 -
Present Prent Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present
Percentiles Value Value Value Value Value Value Value Value Value Value
50% 48 670 792 1,402 1,402 1,402 792 1,402 2,011 2,620
5% 1,039 1,270 1,501 2,656 2,656 2,656 1,501 2,656 3,811 4,966
10% 1,107 1,353 1,599 2,830 2,830 2,830 1,599 2,830 4,060 5,290
15% 1,154 1,410 1,666 2,948 2,948 2,948 1,666 2,948 4,230 5,512
20% 1,191 1,455 1,720 3,043 3,043 3,043 1,720 3,043 4,366 5,689
25% 1,222 1,494 1,766 3,124 3,124 3,124 1,766 3,124 4,482 5,840
30% 1,251 1,529 1,807 3,196 3,196 3,196 1,807 3,196 4,586 5,975
35% 1,277 1,561 1,845 3,264 3,264 3,264 1,845 3,264 4,683 6,102
40% 1,302 1,592 1,881 3,328 3,328 3,328 1,881 3,328 4,775 6,222
45% 1,327 1,621 1,916 3,390 3,390 3,390 1,916 3,390 4,864 6,338
50% 1,351 1,651 1,951 3,451 3,451 3,451 1,951 3,451 4,952 6,452
55% 1,374 1,680 1,985 3,512 3,512 3,512 1,985 3,512 5,039 6,566
60% 1,399 1,710 2,021 3,576 3,576 3,576 2,021 3,576 5,131 6,685
65% 1,425 1,741 2,058 3,640 3,640 3,640 2,058 3,640 5,223 6,806
70% 1,451 1,774 2,097 3,709 3,709 3,709 2,097 3,709 5,322 6,935
75% 1,480 1,809 2,138 3,783 3,783 3,783 2,138 3,783 5,428 7,072
80% 1,513 1,849 2,185 3,866 3,866 3,866 2,185 3,866 5,547 7,228
185% 1,551 1,895 2,240 3,963 3,963 3,963 2,240 3,963 5,686 7,410
90% 1,599 1,954 2,309 4,085 4,085 4,085 2,309 4,085 5,861 7,638
95% 1,669 2,039 2,410 4,264 4,264 4,264 2,410 4,264 6,118 7,972
100% 2,234 2,731 3,227 5,710 5,710 5,710 3,227 5,710 8,192 10,674
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Financial Impact - Year 2020 Estimated Savings
Plan 3 Year Plan 4 Year Plan 5 Year Plan 6 Year Plan 7 Year Plan 8 - Plan 9 - Plan 10 - Plan 11 - Plan 12 -
2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 Year202O Year202O Year202O Year202O Year202O
Statistics Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings
Trials 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 226800 Lb8UU L oUU LLOUU LOOUU
Base Case (98) (120) (142) (251) (251) (251) (142) (251) (360) (470)
Mean (87) (106) (126) (222) (222) (222) (126) (222) (319) (415)
Median (87) (106) (125) (221) (221) (221) (125) (221) (317) (414)
Mode (91) (111) (131) (232) (232) (232) (131) (232) (332) (433)
Standard Deviation 22 27 32 57 57 57 32 57 82 106
Variance 497 742 1,037 3,244 3,244 3,244 1,037 3,244 6,679 11,340
Skewness -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.0356 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Kurtosis 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88
Coeff. ofVariability -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.2565 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26
Minimum (178) (217) (257) (454) (454) (454) (257) (454) (651) (849)
Maximum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Range Width 178 217 257 454 454 454 257 454 651 849
Mean Std. Error 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Plan 3 Year Plan 4 Year Plan 5 Year Plan 6 Year Plan 7 Year Plan 8 - Plan 9 - Plan 10 - Plan 11 - Plan 12 -
2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 Year2020' Year2020 Year2020 Year2020 Year2020
Percentiles Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings
0% (178) (217) (257) (454) (454) (454) (257) (454) (651) (849)
5% (124) (151) (179) (317) (317) (317) (179) (317) (454) (592)
10% (116) (141) (167) (296) (296) (296) (167) (296) (424) (553)
15% (110) (135) (159) (282) (282) (282) (159) (282) (405) (527)
20% (106) (129) (153) (270) (270) (270) (153) (270) (388) (505)
25% (102) (125) (147) (260) (260) (260) (147) (260) (374) (487)
30% (99) (121) (142) (252) (252) (252) (142) (252) (362) (471)
35% (96) (117) (138) (245) (245) (245) (138) (245) (351) (457)
40% (93) (113) (134) (237) (237) (237) (134) (237) (340) (442)
45% (89) (109) (129) (229) (229) (229) (129) (229) (328) (427)
'50% (87) (106) (125) (221) (221) (221) (125) (221) (317) (414)
55% (84) (103) (121) (214) (214) (214) (121) (214) (308) (401)
60% (81) (99) (117) (207) (207) (207) (117) (207) (298) (388)
65% (78) (96) (113) (200) (200) (200) (113) (200) (287) (374)
70% (75) (92) (108) (191) (191) (191) (108) (191) (275) (358)
75% (71) (87) (103) (183) (183) (183) (103) (183) (262) (341)
80% (68) (83) (98) (174) (174) (174) (98) (174) (249) (325)
85% (64) (78) (92) (163) (163) (163) (92) (163) (234) (304)
90% (58) (71) (84) (148) (148) (148) (84) (148) (213) (277)
95% (51) (62) (73) (129) (129) (129) (73) (129) (185) (241)
100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Contributions Assumptions, Methodology, and Results
Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Contributions Assumptions:
* Assumed the percent contributions based on the plans defined in Chapter 9
e Tax savings were estimated based on an assumed single filer applying the standard deduction
and 1 exemption based on 2013 IRS rules
Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Contributions Methodology:
The starting salary and ending salary was multiplied by the contribution levels for both the USPS
and employee across each of the various pension plan designs. Tax savings were estimated utilizing a
15% tax bracket for the initial salary level and a 25% tax bracket for the final salary level.
This provides estimates of individual employee requirements from a percentage perspective, as
well as a dollar perspective.
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Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Contributions Results:
Individual Employee Analysis Contributions Estimated based on estimated initial salary (Percentages)
Current Curr. New Hires
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee:
Assumed Years of Svc: 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Est. Beginning Salary $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456
Percent Contributions
USPS
Annuity 11.90% 9.60% 4.80% 2.40% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Auto TSP 1.00% 1.00% 4.00% 4.00% 6.00% 4.00% 2.00% 0.00% 12.00% 10.00% 8.00% 6.00%
Match TSP 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Social Security 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20%
Total: 23.10% 20.80% 19.00% 18.60% 18.20% 16.20% 16.20% 16.20% 18.20% 16.20% 14.20% 12.20%
Employee
Annuity Match:
TSP
Social Security
Total:
Total Overall Percent:
0.80%
5.0%
6.20%
12.00%
35.10%
3.10%
5.0%
6.20%
14.30%
35.10%
1.55%
4.0%
6.20%
11.75%
30.75%
0.78%
6.0%
6.20%
12.98%
31.58%
0.00%
6.0%
6.20%
12.20%
30.40%
0.00%
6.0%
6.20%
12.20%
28.40%
0.00%
8.0%
6.20%
14.20%
30.40%
0.00%
10.0%
6.20%
16.20%
32.40%
0.00%
5.0%
6.20%
11.20%
29.40%
0.00%
5.0%
6.20%
11.20%
27.40%
0.00% o
5.0%
6.20%
11.20%
25.40%
5.0%
6.20%
11.20%
23.40%
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Individual Employee Analysis Contributions Estimated based on estimated initial salary (Dollars)
Current Curr. New Hires
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee:
Assumed Years of Svc: 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Est. Beginning Salary $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456 $ 33,456
Dollar Contributions
USPS:
Annuity $ 3,981 $ 3,212 $1,606 $ 803 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
Auto TSP $ 335 $ 335 $ 1,338 $ 1,338 $ 2,007 $ 1,338 $ 669 $ - $ 4,015 $ 3,346 $ 2,676 $ 2,007
Match TSP $ 1,338 $ 1,338 $ 1,338 $ 2,007 $ 2,007 $ 2,007 $ 2,676 $ 3,346 $ - $ - $ - $ -
Social Security $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074
Total $ 7,728 $ 6,959 $ 6,357 $ 6,223 $ 6,089 $ 5,420 $ 5,420 $ 5,420 $ 6,089 $ 5,420 $ 4,751 $ 4,082
% Change from New Hire Current: -10.0% -8.7% -10.6% -12.5% -22.1% -22.1% -22.1% -12.5% -22.1% -31.7% -41.3%
Employee
Annuity $ 268 $ 1,037 $ 519 $ 259 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
Tax Savings Estimate @15% $ (40) $ (156) $ (78) $ (39) $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
TSP $ 1,673 "$ 1,673 $ 1,338 '$ 2,007 $ 2,007 r$ 2,007 '$ 2,676 '$ 3,346 '$ 1,673 'r$ 1,673 '$ 1,673 r$ 1,673
Tax Savings Estimate @15% $ (251) $ (251) $ (201) $ (301) $ (301) $ (301) $ (401) $ (502) $ (251) $ (251) $ (251) $ (251)
Social Security $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074 $ 2,074
Total $ 3,724 $ 4,378 $ 3,653 $ 4,001 $ 3,781 $ 3,781 $ 4,349 $ 4,918 $ 3,496 $ 3,496 $ 3,496 $ 3,496
% Change from New Hire Current: 17.6% -16.6% -8.6% -13.6% -13.6% -0.6% 12.3% -20.1% -20.1% -20.1% -20.1%
Total Dollar Contributions:
Annuity $ 4,249 $ 4,249 $ 2,124 $ 1,062 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
TSP
Social Security
Total:
% Change from New Hire Current:
% of Total Salary:
$ 3,346 $
$ 4,149 $
$ 11,743 $
35.1%
3,346 $
4,149 $
4,015 $
4,149 $
5,353 $
4,149 $
11,743 $ 10,288 $ 10,564
0.0% -12.4% -10.0%
35.1% 30.8% 31.6%
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6,022 $
4,149 $
$$ 10,171
-13.4%
30.4%
5,353 $
4,149 $
9,501 $
-19.1%
28.4%
6,022 $
4,149 $
10,171
-13.4%
30.4%
$
$
$
6,691
4,149
$ 10,840
-7.7%
32.4%
5,688 $
4,149 $
9,836 $
-16.2%
29.4%
5,018 $
4,149 $
9,167 $
-21.9%
27.4%
$
$
$
4,349
4,149
8,498
-27.6%
25.4%
3,680
4,149
7,829
-33.3%
23.4%
Individual Employee Analysis Contributions Estimated based on estimated ending salary (Percentages)
Current Curr. New Hires
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee:
Assumed Years of Svc: 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Est. Beginning Salary $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490
Percent Contributions
USPS
Annuity 11.90% 9.60% 4.80% 2.40% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Auto TSP 1.00% 1.00% 4.00% 4.00% 6.00% 4.00% 2.00% 0.00% 12.00% 10.00% 8.00% 6.00%
Match TSP 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Social Security 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20% 6.20%
Total: 23.10% 20.80% 19.00% 18.60% 18.20% 16.20% 16.20% 16.20% 18.20% 16.20% 14.20% 12.20%
Employee
Annuity Match:
TSP
Social Security
Total:
Total Overall Percent:
0.80%
5.0%
6.20%
12.00%
35.10%
3.10%
5.0%
6.20%
14.30%
35.10%
1.55%
4.0%
6.20%
11.75%
30.75%
0.78%
6.0%
6.20%
12.98%
31.58%
0.00%
6.0%
6.20%
12.20%
30.40%
0.00%
6.0%
6.20%
12.20%
28.40%
0.00%
8.0%
6.20%
14.20%
30.40%
0.00%
10.0%
6.20%
16.20%
32.40%
0.00%
5.0%
6.20%
11.20%
29.40%
0.00%
5.0%
6.20%
11.20%
27.40%
0.00%
5.0%
6.20%
11.20%
25.40%
0.00%
5.0%
6.20%
11.20%
23.40%
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Individual Employee Analysis Contributions Estimated based on estimated ending salary (Dollars)
Current Curr. New Hires
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 Plan 11 Plan 12
Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee: Employee:
Assumed Years of Svc: 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Est. Beginning Salary $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490 $ 54,490
Dollar Contributions
USPS:
Annuity $ 6,484 $ 5,231 $ 2,616 $ 1,308 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
Auto TSP $ 545 $ 545 $ 2,180 $ 2,180 $ 3,269 $ 2,180 $ 1,090 $ - $ 6,539 $ 5,449 $ 4,359 $ 3,269
Match TSP $ 2,180 $ 2,180 $ 2,180 $ 3,269 $ 3,269 $ 3,269 $ 4,359 $ 5,449 $ - $ - $ - $ -
Social Security $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378
Total $ 12,587 $ 11,334 $ 10,353 $ 10,135 $ 9,917 $ 8,827 $ 8,827 $ 8,827 $ 9,917 $ 8,827 $ 7,738 $ 6,648
% Change from New Hire Current: -10.0% -8.7% -10.6% -12.5% -22.1% -22.1% -22.1% -12.5% -22.1% -31.7% -41.3%
Employee
Annuity $ 436 $ 1,689 $ 845 $ 422 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
Tax Savings Estimates @25% $ (109) $ (422) $ (211) $ (106) $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
TSP r$ 2,725 7$ 2,725 $ 2,180 7$ 3,269 7$ 3,269 $ 3,269 7$ 4,359 7$ 5,449 7$ 2,725 7$ 2,725 r$ 2,725 $ 2,725
Tax Savings Estimates @25% $ (681) $ (681) $ (545) $ (817) $ (817) $ (817) $ (1,090) $ (1,362) $ (681) $ (681) $ (681) $ (681)
Social Security $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378 $ 3,378
Total $ 5,749 $ 6,689 $ 5,647 $ 6,147 $ 5,830 $ 5,830 $ 6,648 $ 7,465 $ 5,422 $ 5,422 $ 5,422 $ 5,422
% Change from New Hire Current: 16.4% -15.6% -8.1% -12.8% -12.8% -0.6% 11.6% -18.9% -18.9% -18.9% -18.9%
Total Dollar Contributions:
Annuity $ 6,920 $ 6,920 $ 3,460 $ 1,730 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ -
TSP
Social Security
Total:
% Change from New Hire Current:
% of Total Salary:
$ 5,449 $
$ 6,757 $
$ 19,126 $
35.1%
5,449 $
6,757 $
6,539 $
6,757 $
8,718
6,757
$ 9,808 $
$ 6,757 $
8,718 $ 9,808 $ 10,898 $ 9,263 $
6,757 $ 6,757 $ 6,757 $ 6,757 $
8,174 $
6,757 $
7,084 $
6,757 $
19,126 $ 16,756 $ 17,205 $ 16,565 $ 15,475 $ 16,565 $ 17,655 $ 16,020 $ 14,930 $ 13,841 $
0.0% -12.4% -10.0% -13.4% -19.1% -13.4% -7.7% -16.2% -21.9% -27.6%
35.1% 30.8% 31.6% 30.4% 28.4% 30.4% 32.4% 29.4% 27.4% 25.4%
5,994
6,757
12,751
-33.3%
23.4%
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Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Income Methodology, Assumptions and Results
Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Income Assumptions
* Annual salary would be based on the estimated blended salary for an average employee
described in the financial analysis methodology.
* Contributions levels for each plan would be as described in the plan summary section
e Social security benefits are estimated at 13,044 per annum based on an assumed salary of
50,000 per year retiring at age 62 after 35 years of employment (hired at age 27) (Social Security
Administration)
* The FERS annuity portion for those plans described that have an annuity would be based off of
the final 3 years of salary averaged times 35 years of employment times the percent as
described in the plan summary section.
* The risky portfolio would consist of 50% in stocks and 50% in bonds.
* The risk free asset was assumed to provide an inflation free return of 2%
* The annuity would be based on an estimation provided through the Thrift Savings Plan website
(https://www.tsp.gov/planningtools/annuities/annuityCalc select.shtml) The estimate was
made for four types of annuities:
1. Growing Life Annuity with no survivor benefits
2. Level Payment Life Annuity with no survivor benefits
3. Growing Life Annuity with survivor benefits
4. Level Payment Life Annuity with no survivor benefits
* Inflation was removed from all returns based on the CPI for all Urban consumer estimates
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1914-2012
Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Income Methodology
Utilizing the average blended salary level by year for an average employee, the total
contributions provided into the defined contribution plan were estimated. These contributions were
grown through time over the 35 year career of the employee based on the risk free rate, as well as the
risky rate. The risky rate was estimated by utilizing the return data from 1928 - 2012 based on the work
of Aswath Damodaran at the Stern School of Business at New York University. Inflation was estimated
by year based on the CPI for urban consumers and was subtracted from the returns for both the 10 year
bond, as well as a portfolio of the S&P 500. Based on these after inflation returns, a portfolio consisting
of 50% stock and 50% bonds was constructed. The historic after inflation return for stocks was 8.11%
with a standard deviation of 20.36% and the after inflation return for bonds was 2.23% with a standard
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deviation of 8.56%. The correlation between the two assets was -.07212. Utilizing the formulas for the
construction of a portfolio of two risky assets the expected return was estimated to be 5.17% and the
standard deviation of this portfolio was estimated to be 10.75%. A simulation was run for 250,000 trials
to estimate the total value of the defined contribution plan at the end of year 35 based on this level of
risk. The total value was converted into annuities based on the results of the Annuity calculator. An
estimate was made for the total monthly income for $100,000 investment. The monthly income was
divided by $100,000 to determine a monthly income per 1$ of investment and multiplied by 12 to
determine a per annum rate. A risk free estimate of total savings was also estimated for each of the
plans assuming a 2% after inflation return for the contributions.
The total per annum annuity constructed was added to the annuity associated with the FERS
annuities based on the percentage of the plans modeled, as well as the average annual social security
income expected. For the risk free investment portfolio there was no simulation necessary since the
expected return was assumed, therefore the FERS annuity portion, the defined contribution annuity
portion and social security income was aggregated to determine the total income which was compared
to the final salary level to determine the percent replacement level. For the risky investment portfolio,
the simulation was run which estimated the total annuity income, total retirement income and total
replacement income for the 250,000 trials to understand the dispersion of income and the level of risk
taken which could lead to less income opportunity.
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Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Income Results (Risky Investments)
Total Defined Contribution Plan Value
Total Defined Contribution Plan Va
Statistics
250000
$176,753.51
250000
$176,753.51
$445,559.36 $445,559.36
$408,810.64 $408,810.64
$187,738.43
$35,245,716,599.13
1.48
7.29
0.4214
$76,357.71
$2,760,014.65
$2,683,656.94
$375.48
$187,738.43
$35,245,716,599.13
1.48
7.29
0.4214
$76,357.71
$2,760,014.65
$2,683,656.94
$375.48
250000 250000 250000
$212,104.21 $282,805.61 $318,156.32
$534,671.23 $712,894.98 $802,006.85
$490,572.77 $654,097.02 $735,859.15
--- ... ....
$225,286.11 $300,381.48 $337,929.17
$50,753,831,902.75 $90,229,034,493.78 $114,196,121,781.20
1.48 1.48 1.48
7.29 7.29 7.29
0.4214
$91,629.25
$3,312,017.58
$3,220,388.33
$450.57
0.4214
$122,172.33
$4,416,023.45
$4,293,851.11
$600.76
250000
$282,805.61
$712,894.98
$654,097.02
250000 250000 250000
$318,156.32 $353,507.02 $300,480.96
$802,006.85 $891,118.72 $757,450.91
$735,859.15 $817,621.28 $694,978.09
$300,381.48 $337,929.17 $375,476.85
$90,229,034,493.78
1.48
7.29
0.4214 0.4214
$137,443.88 $122,172.33
$4,968,026.38 $4,416,023.45
$4,830,582.50 $4,293,851.11
$675.86 $600.76
$114,196,121,781.20 $140,982,866,396.54
1.48
7.29
0.4214
$137,443.88
$4,968,026.38
$4,830,582.50
$675.86
1.48
7.29
0.4214
$152,715.42
$5,520,029.31
$5,367,313.89
$750.95
250000
$265,130.26
$668,339.04
$613,215.96
$319,155.32 $281,607.64
$101,860,120,971.50 $79,302,862,348.05
1.48
7.29
0.4214
$129,808.10
$4,692,024.91
$4,562,216.81
$638.31
1.48
7.29
0.4214
$114,536.56
$4,140,021.98
$4,025,485.42
$563.22
7
$137,443.88
$389,836.25
$446,761.85
$490,804.46
$529,588.31
$564,898.92
$598,990.21
$632,302.45
$665,531.13
$700,366.72
$735,851.99
$774,099.30
$813,842.56
$857,861.94
$907,778.96
$964,637.18
$1,032,282.39
$1,119,039.82
$1,237,018.93
$1,436,419.92
8
$152,715.42
$433,151.39
$496,402.05
$545,338.29
$588,431.46
$627,665.47
$665,544.68
$702,558.28
$739,479.03
$778,185.25
$817,613.32
$860,110.33
$904,269.51
$953,179.93
$1,008,643.29
$1,071,819.09
$1,146,980.44
$1,243,377.58
$1,374,465.48
$1,596,022.14
9
$129,808.10
$368,178.68
$421,941.74
$463,537.55
$500,166.74
$533,515.65
$565,712.98
$597,174.54
$628,557.17
$661,457.46
$694,971.32
$731,093.78
$768,629.08
$810,202.94
$857,346.79
$911,046.22
$974,933.37
$1,056,870.94
$1,168,295.66
$1,356,618.81
10
$114,536.56
$324,863.54
$372,301.54
$409,003.72
$441,323.59
$470,749.10
$499,158.51
$526,918.71
$554,609.27
$583,638.94
$613,209.99
$645,082.75
$678,202.13
$714,884.95
$756,482.46
$803,864.32
$860,235.33
$932,533.18
$1,030,849.11
$1,197,016.60
11
$99,265.02
$281,548.40
$322,661.33
$354,469.89
$382,480.45
$407,982.55
$432,604.04
$456,662.88
$480,661.37
$505,820.41
$531,448.66
$559,071.72
$587,775.18
$619,566.95
$655,618.14
$896,682.41
$745,537.28
$808,195.43
$893,402.56
$1,037,414.39
12
$83,993.48
$238,233.26
$273,021.13
5299,936.06
$323,637.30
$345,21 01
$366,049.57
$386,407.05
$406,713.47
$428,001.89
$449,687.32
$473,060.68
$497,348.23
$524,248.96
$554,753.81
$589,500.50
$630,839.24
$683,857.67
$755,956.01
$877,812.17
$4,968,026.38 $5,520,029.31 $4,692,024.91 $4,140,021.98 $3,588,019.05 $3,036,016.12
lue:
Trials
BaseCase
4 5
Mode
Standard Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Coeff. of Variability
M inirrum
M aximum
RangeWidth
M ean Std. Error
7 8 9 10 11 12
2 3 4
250000
$229,779.56
$579,227.17
$531,453.83
$244,059.95
$59,565,261,052.54
1.48
7.29
0.4214
$99,265.02
$3,588,019.05
$3,488,754.03
$488.12
250000
$194,428.86
$490,115.30
$449,691.70
$206,512.27
$42,647,317,084.95
1.48
7.29
0.4214
$83,993.48
$3,036,016.12
$2,952,022.64
$413.02
Percentiles
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
$76,357.71
$216,575.69
$248,201.03
$272,669.14
$294,215.73
$313,832.73
$332,772.34
$351,279.14
$369,739.51
$389,092.62
$408,806.66
$430,055.17
$452.134.75
$476,589.97
$504,321.64
$535,909.54
$573,490.22
$621,688.79
$687,232.74
$798,011.07
$2,760,014.65
$76,357.71
$216,575.69
$248,201.03
$272,669.14
$294,215.73
$313,832.73
$332,772.34
$351,279.14
$369,739.51
$389,092.62
$408,806.66
$430,055.17
$452,134.75
$476,589.97
$504,321.64
$535,909.54
$573,490.22
$621,688.79
$687,232.74
$798,011.07
$2,760,014.65
$91,629.25
$259,890.83
$297,841.23
$327,202.97
$353,058.87
$376,599.28
$399,326.81
$421,534.97
$443,687.42
$466,911.15
$490,567.99
$516,066.20
$542,561.70
$571,907.96
$605,185.97
$643,091.45
$688,188.26
$746,026.55
$824,679.29
$957,613.28
$3,312,017.58
$122,172.33
$346,521.11
$397,121.64
$436,270.63
$470,745.16
$502,132.37
$532,435.74
$562,046.63
$591,583.22
$622,548.20
$654,090.65
$688,088.27
$723,415.60
$762,543.94
$806,914.63
$857,455.27
$917,584.35
$994,702.06
$1,099,572.39
$1,276,817.71
$4,416,023.45
5
$137,443.88
$389,836.25
$446,761.85
$490,804.46
$529,588.31
$564,898.92
$598,990.21
$632,302.45
$665,531.13
$700,366.72
$735,851.99
$774,099.30
$813,842.56
$857,861.94
$907,778.96
$964,637.18
$1,032,282.39
$1,119,039.82
$1,237,018.93
$1,436,419.92
$4,968,026.38
6
$122,172.33
$346,521.11
$397,121.64
$436,270.63
$470,745.16
$502,132.37
$532,435.74
$562,046.63
$591,583.22
$622,548.20
$654,090.65
$688,088.27
$723,415.60
$762,543.94
$806,914.63
$857,455.27
$917,584.35
$994,702.06
$1,099,572.39
$1,276,817.71
$4,416,023.45
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Percent of Final Year Salary - Growing Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits
Statistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Trials 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000
BaseCase 70.97% 70.97% 55.87% 51.93% 45.59% 43.18% 45.59% 47.99% 44.39% 41.98% 39.57% 37.17%
M ean 89.26% 89.26% 77.82% 81.20% 78.51% 72.45% 78.51o 84.58% 75.48% 69.42% 63.35% 57.29%
Median 86.76% 86.76% 74.82% 77.20% 74.01% 68.45% 74.01% 79.58% 71.23% 65.67% 60.10% 54.54%
M ode -- --- --- -- -- - -- --- -- --- - -
Standard Deviation 12.78% 12.78% 15.33% 20.44% 23.00% 20.44% 23.00% 25.55% 21.72% 19.16% 16.61% 14.05%
Variance 1.63% 1.63% 2.35% 4.18% 529% 4.18% 5.29% 6.53% 4.72% 3.67% 2.76% 197%
Skewness 148 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48
Kurtosis 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29
Coeff. of Variability 0.1431 0.1431 0.1970 0.2517 0.2929 0.2821 0.2929 0.3021 0.2877 0.2761 0.2621 0.2453
Minimum 64.13% 64.13% 47.67% 41.00% 33.29% 32.25% 33.29% 34.33% 32.77% 31.73% 30.69% 29.65%
Maxinum 246.75% 246.75% 266.82% 333.19% 362.01% 324.44% 362.01% 399.57% 343.22% 305.66% 268.10% 230.54%
RangeWidth 182.62% 182.62% 219.14% 292.19% 328.71% 292.19% 328.71% 365.24% 310.45% 273.93% 237.41% 200.88%
Mean Std. Error 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03%
Percentiles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
64.13%
73.68%
75.83%
77.49%
78.96%
80.29%
81.58%
82.84%
84.10%
85.42%
86.76%
88.20%
89.71%
91.37%
93.26%
95.41%
97.96%
101.24%
105.70%
113.24%
246.75%
1%
0%
100%
P95%
F20%
W5%
0o%
I5%/
M0%
55%
0;%
P5% /
0o%
%5%
P/0%
/ 5%
F60%
PE5%/.
40%
1§5%
1900%
64.13%
73.68%
75.83%
77.49%
78.96%
80.29%
81.58%
82.84%
84.10%
85.42%
86.76%
88.20%
89.71%
91.37%
93.26%
95.41%
97.96%
101.24%
105.70%
113.24%
246.75%
47.67%
59.12%
61.71%
63.70%
65.46%
67.07%
68.61%
70.12%
71.63%
73.21%
74.82%
76.56%
78.36%
80.36%
82.62%
85.20%
88.27%
92.20%
97.56%
106.60%
266.82%
41.00%
56.27%
59.71%
62.38%
64.72%
66.86%
68.92%
70.93%
72.94%
75.05%
77.20%
79.51%
81.92%
84.58%
87.60%
91.04%
95.13%
100.38%
107.51%
119.57%
333.19%
33.29%
50.47%
54.34%
57.34%
59.98%
62.38%
64.70%
66.97%
69.23%
71.60%
74.01%
76.61%
79.32%
82.31%
85.71%
89.58%
94.18%
100.09%
108.12%
121.68%
362.01%
32.25%
47.52%
50.96%
53.63%
55.97%
58.11%
60.17%
62.18%
64.19%
66.30%
68.45%
70.76%
73.17%
75.83%
78.85%
82.29%
86.38%
91.63%
98.76%
110.82%
324.44%
33.29%
50.47%
54.34%
57.34%
59.98%
62.38%
64.70%
66.97%
69.23%
71.60%
74.01%
76.61%
79.32%
82.31%
85.71%
89.58%
94.18%
100.09%
108.12%
121.68%
362.01%
34.33%
53.41%
57.72%
61.05%
63.98%
66.65%
69.23%
71.75%
74.26%
76.89%
79.58%
82.47%
85.47%
88.80%
92.58%
96.87%
101.99%
108.55%
117.47%
132.55%
399.57%
32.77%
48.99%
52.65%
55.48%
57.97%
60.24%
62.43%
64.58%
66.71%
68.95%
71.23%
73.69%
76.24%
79.07%
82.28%
85.93%
90.28%
95.86%
103.44%
116.25%
343.22%
31.73%
46.04%
49.27%
51.77%
53.97%
55.97%
57.91%
59.79%
61.68%
63.65%
65.67%
67.84%
70.09%
72.59%
75.42%
78.64%
82.48%
87.40%
94.09%
105.39%
305.66%
30.69%
43.10%
45.89%
48.06%
49.97%
51.70%
53.38%
55.01%
56.65%
58.36%
60.10%
61.98%
63.94%
66.10%
68.55%
71.35%
74.67%
78.93%
84.73%
94.53%
268.10%
29.65%
40.15%
42.52%
44.35%
45.96%
47.43%
48.85%
50.23%
51.61%
53.06%
54.54%
56.13%
57.78%
59.61%
61.69%
64.05%
66.87%
70.47%
75.38%
83.67%
230.54%
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Percent of Final Year Salary - Level Life Annuity, No Survivor Benefits
Statistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Trials 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000
BaseCase 77.27% 77.27% 63.44% 62.02% 56.94% 53.27% 56.94% 60.61% 55.11% 51.44% 
47.77% 44.11%
Mean 105.15% 105.15% 96.90% 106.63% 107.13% 97.88% 107.13% 116.37% 102.50% 
93.26% 84.02% 74.78%
Median 101.34% 101.34% 92.32% 100.53% 100.26% 91.78% 100.26% 108.75% 96.02% 
87.54% 79.06% 70.58%
Mode ------------ 3 .5 31%2 .1 53 %2.2
Standard Deviation 19.47% 19.47% 23.37% 31.16% 35.05% 31.16% 35.05% 38.95% 33.10% 2921% 25.32% 2142%
Variance 3.79% 3.79% 5.46% 9.71% 12.29% 9.71% 12.29% 15.17% 10.96% 
8.53% 6.41% 4.59%
Skewness 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 
1.48 1.48 1.48
KLrtosis 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 
7.29 7.29 7.29
Coeff. of Variability 0.1852 0.1852 0.2412 0.2922 0.3272 0.3183 0.3272 0.3347 0.3230 
0.3132 0.3013 0.2865
Minimum 66.86% 66.86% 50.94% 45.36% 38.19% 36.61% 38.19% 39.78% 37.40% 
35.82% 34.23% 32.65%
Maximum 345.22% 345.22% 384.98% 490.74% 539.25% 481.99% 539.25% 596.50% 510.62% 
453.36% 396.10% 338.85%
Range Width 278.36% 278.36% 334.03% 445.38% 501.05% 445.38% 501.05% 556.72% 
473.21% 417.54% 361.87% 306.20%
Mean Std. Error 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.06% 0.07% 0.06% 0.07% 0.08% 0.07% 
0.06% 0.05% 0.04%
Percentiles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
11 12
50 1949%in OL 'I 78/- 3740% 3582% 34.23% 32.65%
'0%
WO5%
110%
115%
P40%
'95%
'90%
n5%
P40%
5%
00%
t5%
0S%
W5%
F5%
P0%
V5%
10%
15%/
0100%
66.86%
81.40%
84.68%
87.22%
89.46%
91.49%
93.45%
95.37%
97.29%
99.30%
101.34%
103.55%
105.84%
108.37%
111.25%
114.53%
11842%
123.42%
130.22%
14171%
345.22%
66.86%
81.40%
84.68%
87.22%
89.46%
91.49%
93.45%
95.37%
97.29%
99.30%
101.34%
103.55%
105.84%
108.37%
111.25%
114.53%
118.42%
123.42%
130.22%
141.71%
345.22%
50.94%
68.40%
72.33%
75.38%
78.06%
80.50%
82.86%
85.16%
87.46%
89.87%
92.32%
94.97%
97.72%
100.76%
104.21%
108.14%
112.82%
118.82%
126.98%
140.77%
384.98%
45.36%
68.63%
73.88%
77.94%
81.52%
84.77%
87.91%
90.99%
94.05%
97.26%
100.53%
104.06%
107.72%
111.78%
116.39%
121.63%
127.86%
135.86%
146.74%
165.13%
490.74%
64.37%
70.28%
74.85%
78.87%
82.53%
86.07%
89.52%
92.97%
96.58%
100.26%
104.23%
108.35%
112.92%
118.10%
123.99%
131.01%
140.01%
152.25%
172.93%
539.25%
59.88%
65.13%
69.19%
72.77%
76.02%
79.16%
82.24%
85.30%
88.51%
91.78%
95.31%
98.97%
103.03%
107.64%
112.88%
119.11%
127.11%
137.99%
156.38%
481.99%
64.37%
70.28%
74.85%
78.87%
82.53%
86.07%
89.52%
92.97%
96.58%
100.26%
104.23%
108.35%
112.92%
118.10%
123.99%
131.01%
140.01%
152.25%
172.93%
539.25%
68.87%
75.43%
80.50%
84.97%
89.04%
92.97%
96.81%
100.64%
104.66%
108.74%
113.15%
117.73%
122.81%
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89.14%
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510.62%
57.63%
62.56%
66.36%
69.71%
72.77%
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81.46%
84.48%
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453.36%
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57.51%
59.75%
61.91%
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94.87%
102.35%
114.99%
338.85%
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Percent of Final Year Salary - Growing Life Annuity, with Survivor Benefits
Statistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Trials 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000
Base Case 68.12% 68.12% 52.46% 47.39% 40.47% 38.64% 40.47% 42.31% 39.55% 37.72% 35.88% 34.04%
M ean 82.09% 82.09% 69.23% 69.74% 65.62% 60.99% 65.62% 70.25% 63.30% 58.67% 54.04% 49.41%
M edian 80.19% 80.19% 66.93% 66.68% 62.18% 57.93% 62.18% 66.43% 60.06% 55.81% 51.56% 47.31%
M ode - --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Standard Deviation 9.76% 9.76% 11.71% 15.61% 17.56% 15.61% 17.56% 19.51% 16.59% 14.64% 12.68% 10.73%
Variance 0.95% 0.95% 1.37% 2.44% 3.08% 2.44% 3.08% 3 .8 1o 2.75% 2.14% 1.61% 1.15%
Skewness 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48
Kurtosis 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29
Coeff. of Variability 0.1189 0.1189 0.1691 0.2239 0.2676 0.2560 0.2676 0.2778 0.2620 0.2494 0.2347 0.2172
M inimrum 62.91% 62.91% 46.20% 39.04% 31.08% 30.29% 31.08% 31.88% 30.68% 29.89% 29.10% 28.30%
Maximum 202.38% 202.38% 213.57% 262.20% 282.14% 253.45% 282.14% 310.83% 267.79% 239.11% 210.42% 181.73%
Range Width 139.48% 139.48% 167.37% 223.16% 251.06% 223.16% 251.06% 278.95% 237.11% 209.21% 181.32% 153.42%
Mean Std. Error 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02%
Percentiles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
P%
05%
190%
P15%
F20%
745%
F30%
745%
70%
745%
0%P5
S5
70%
% 5%
F0%
05%
Mo0%
62.91%
70.19%
71.84%
73.11%
74.23%
75.25%
76.23%
77.20%
78.15%
79.16%
80.18%
81.29%
82.44%
83.71%
85.15%
86.79%
88.74%
91.25%
94.66%
100.41%
202.38%
62.91%
70.19%
71.84%
73.11%
74.23%
75.25%
76.23%
77.20%
78.15%
79.16%
80.18%
81.29%
82.44%
83.71%
85.15%
86.79%
88.74%
91.25%
94.66%
100.41%
202.38%
46.20%
54.95%
56.92%
58.44%
59.79%
61.01%
62.19%
63.35%
64.50%
65.70%
66.93%
68.26%
69.64%
71.16%
72.89%
74.86%
77.20%
80.21%
84.30%
91.21%
213.57%
39.04%
50.70%
53.33%
55.36%
57.15%
58.79%
60.36%
61.90%
63.43%
65.04%
66.68%
68.45%
70.29%
72.32%
74.63%
77.2 5%
80.38%
84.39%
89.84%
99.05%
262.20%
31.08%
44.20%
47.16%
49.45%
51.46%
53.30%
55.07%
56.80%
58.53%
60.34%
62.18%
64.17%
66.24%
68.52%
71.12%
74.07%
77.59%
82.10%
88.23%
98.59%
282.14%
30.29%
41.95%
44.58%
46.61%
48.40%
50.04%
5161%
53.15%
54.68%
56.29%
57.93%
59.70%
61.54%
63.57%
65.88%
68.50%
71.63%
75.64%
81.09%
90.30%
253.45%
31.08%
44.20%
47.16%
49.45%
51.46%
53.30%
55.07%
56.80%
58.53%
60.34%
62.18%
64.17%
66.24%
68.52%
7112%
74.07%
77.59%
82.10%
88.23%
98.59%
282.14%
31.88%
46.45%
49.74%
52.28%
54.52%
56.56%
58.53%
60.45%
62.37%
64.38%
66.43%
68.64%
70.94%
73.48%
76.36%
79.64%
83.55%
88.56%
95.37%
106.89%
310.83%
30.68%
43.07%
45.87%
48.03%
49.93%
51.67%
53.34%
54.97%
56.61%
58.32%
60.06%
61.93%
63.89%
66.05%
68.50%
71.29%
74.61%
78.87%
84.66%
94.44%
267.79%
29.89%
40.82%
43.29%
45.20%
46.87%
48.40%
49.88%
51.32%
52.76%
54.27%
55.81%
57.46%
59.19%
61.09%
63.25%
65.72%
68.65%
72.40%
77.51%
86.15%
239.11%
29.10%
38.57%
40.71%
42.36%
43.82%
45.14%
46.42%
47.67%
48.92%
50.23%
51.56%
52.99%
54.49%
56.14%
58.01%
60.15%
62.69%
65.94%
70.37%
77.86%
210.42%
28.30%
36.32%
38.13%
39.53%
40.76%
41.88%
42.96%
44.02%
45.08%
46.18%
47.31%
48.52%
49.79%
5118%
52.77%
54.58%
56.72%
59.48%
63.23%
69.56%
18173%
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Estimated Annuity Value - Level Annuity, with Survivor Benefits
Statistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Trials 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000
Base Case $8,187.22 $8,187.22 $9,824.67 $13,099.56 $14,737.00 $13,099.56 $14,737.00 $16,374.45 $13,918.28 $12,280.83 $10,643.39 $9,005.94
Mean $20,638.31 $20,638.31 $24,765.97 $33,021.30 $37,148.96 $33,021.30 $37,148.96 $41,276.62 $35,085.13 $30,957.46 $26,829.80 $22,702.14
Median $18,936.11 $18,936.11 $22,723.33 $30,297.77 $34,085.00 $30,297.77 $34,085.00 $37,872.22 $32,191.39 $28,404.16 $24,616.94 $20,829.72
Mode --- --- --- --- -
Standard Deviation $8,696.04 $8,696.04 $10,435.25 $13,913.67 $15,652.88 $13,913.67 $15,652.88 $17,392.09 $14,783.27 $13,044.07 $11,304.86 $9,565.65
Variance $75,621,179.38 $75,621,179.38 $108,894,498.31 $193,590,219.22 $245,012,621.20 $193,590,219.22 $245,012,621.20 $302,484,717.53 $218,545,208.41 $170,147,653.61 $127,799,793.16 $91,501,627.05
Skewness 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48
Kurtosis 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29
Coeff. of Variability 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214 0.4214
Minimunm $3,536.89 $3,536.89 $4,244.27 $5,659.02 $6,366.40 $5,659.02 $6,366.40 $7,073.78 $6,012.71 $5,305.33 $4,597.96 $3,890.58
Maximunm $127,843.88 $127,843.88 $153,412.65 $204,550.21 $230,118.98 $204,550.21 $230,118.98 $255,687.76 $217,334.59 $191,765.82 $166,197.04 $140,628.27
Range Width $124,306.99 $124,306.99 $149,168.39 $198,891.18 $223,752.58 $198,891.18 $223,752.58 $248,613.98 $211,321.88 $186,460.48 $161,599.09 $136,737.69
M ean St d. Error $17.39 $17.39 $20.87 $27.83 $31.31 $27.83 $31.31 $34.78 $29.57 $26.09 $22.61 $19.13
Percentiles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
389 05$3,536.89
$10,031.79
$11,496.67
$12,630.03
$13,628.07
$14,536.73
$15,414.01
$16,271.25
$17,126.33
$18,022.77
$18,935.92
$19,920.16
$20,942.88
$22,075.65
$23,360.18
$24,823.33
$26,564.07
$28,796.62
$31,832.62
$36,963.87
$127,843.88
F%
S%
b0%
P15%
F0%
P5%
0 %
F5%/.
04%
F5%
I0%
P5% /
So%
15% /
P70%
5% .
0a%
P5%
10%
l5%
00%
$3,536.89
$10,031.79
$11,496.67
$12,630.03
$13,628.07
$14,536.73
$15,414.01
$16,271.25
$17,126.33
$18,022.77
$18,935.92
$19,920.16
$20,942.88
$22,075.65
$23,360.18
$24,823.33
$26,564.07
$28,796.62
$31,832.62
$36,963.87
$127,843.88
$4,244.27
$12,038.14
$13,796.01
$15,156.04
$16,353.69
$17,444.08
$18,496.82
$19,525.50
$20,551.60
$21,627.32
$22,723.11
$23,904.19
$25,131.46
$26,490.78
$28,032.21
$29,788.00
$31,876.88
$34,555.95
$38,199.14
$44,356.65
$153,412.65
$5,659.02
$16,050.86
$18,394.67
$20,208.06
$21,804.92
$23,258.77
$24,662.42
$26,034.00
$27,402.13
$28,836.43
$30,297.48
$31,872.25
$33,508.61
$35,321.04
$37,376.29
$39,717.33
$42,502.51
$46,074.60
$50,932.19
$59,142.20
$204,550.21
$6,366.40
$18,057.22
$20,694.01
$22,734.06
$24,530.53
$26,166.12
$27,745.23
$29,288.25
$30,827.40
$32,440.99
$34,084.66
$35,856.28
$37,697.19
$39,736.16
$42,048.32
$44,681.99
$47,815.32
$51,833.92
$57,298.72
$66,534.97
$230,118.98
$5,659.02
$16,050.86
$18,394.67
$20,208.06
$21,804.92
$23,258.77
$24,662.42
$26,034.00
$27,402.13
$28,836.43
$30,297.48
$31,872.25
$33,508.61
$35,321.04
$37,376.29
$39,717.33
$42,502.51
$46,074.60
$50,932.19
$59,142.20
$204,550.21
$6,366.40
$18,057.22
$20,694.01
$22,734.06
$24,530.53
$26,166.12
$27,745.23
$29,288.25
$30,827.40
$32,440.99
$34,084.66
$35,856.28
$37,697.19
$39,736.16
$42,048.32
$44,681.99
$47,815.32
$51,833.92
$57,298.72
$66,534.97
$230,118.98
$7,073.78
$20,063.57
$22,993.34
$25,260.07
$27,256.15
$29,073.46
$30,828.03
$32,542.50
$34,252.67
$36,045.54
$37,871.85
$39,840.31
$41,885.76
$44,151.29
$46,720.36
$49,646.66
$53,128.13
$57,593.25
$63,665.24
$73,927.75
$255,687.76
$6,01.1 1
$17,054.04
$19,544.34
$21,471.06
$23,167.72
$24,712.44
$26,203.83
$27,661.12
$29,114.77
$30,638.71
$32,191.07
$33,864.26
$35,602.90
$37,528.60
$39,712.30
$42,199.66
$45,158.91
$48,954.26
$54,115.45
$62,838.58
$217,334.59
$15,047.68
$17,245.01
$18,945.05
$20,442.11
$21,805.10
$23,121.02
$24,406.87
$25,689.50
$27,034.16
$28,403.89
$29,880.23
$31,414.32
$33,113.47
$35,040.27
$37,235.00
$39,846.10
$43,194.94
$47,748.93
$55,445.81
$191,765.82
$13,041.32
$14,945.67
$16,419.05
$17,716.49
$18,897.75
$20,038.22
$21,152.62
$22,264.23
$23,429.60
$24,616.70
$25,896.20
$27,225.75
$28,698.34
$30,368.23
$32,270.33
$34,533.29
$37,435.61
$41,382.41
$48,053.03
$166,197.04
$11,034.96
$12,646.34
$13,893.04
$14,990.88
$15,990.41
$16,955.42
$17,898.37
$18,838.97
$19,825.05
$20,829.52
$21,912.17
$23,037.17
$24,283.21
$25,696.20
$27,305.66
$29,220.47
$31,676.29
$35,015.88
$40,660.26
$140,628.27
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Percent of Final Year Salary - Level Annuity, with Survivor Benefits
Statistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Trials 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000
Base Case 73.96% 73.96% 59.47% 56.73% 50.98% 47.98% 50.98% 53.99% 49.48% 46.48% 43.47% 40.47%
M ean 96.81% 96.81% 86.89% 93.29% 92.11% 84.54% 92.11% 99.69% 88.33% 80.75% 73.18% 65.60%
Median 93.69% 93.69% 83.14% 88.29% 86.49% 79.54% 86.49% 93.44% 83.02% 76.07% 69.11% 62.16%
Mode --- --- -- -~ --- --- ~
Standard Deviation 15.96% 15.96% 19.15% 25.53% 28.73% 25.53% 28.73% 31.92% 27.13% 23.94% 20.75% 17.55%
Variance 2.55% 2.55% 3.67% 6.52% 8.25% 6.52% 8.25% 10.19% 7.36% 5.73% 4.30% 3.08%
Skewness 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48
Kurtosis 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29 7.29
Coeff. of Variability 0.1648 0.1648 0.2204 0.2737 0.3119 0.3020 0.3119 0.3202 0.3072 0.2964 0.2835 0.2676
M inimum 65.43% 65.43% 49.23% 43.07% 35.62% 34.32% 35.62% 36.92% 34.97% 33.67% 32.38% 31.08%
Maximum 293.56% 293.56% 322.98% 408.08% 446.25% 399.33% 446.25% 493.17% 422.79% 375.86% 328.94% 282.02%
Range Width 228.13% 228.13% 273.75% 365.00% 410.63% 365.00% 410.63% 456.25% 38781% 342.19% 296.56% 250.94%
M ean Std. Error 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.06% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04%
Percentiles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
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101.94%
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399.33%
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119.06%
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446.25%
36.92%
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66.14%
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73.96%
77.29%
80.51%
83.66%
86.80%
90.09%
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97.05%
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104.96%
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115.05%
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63.34%
66.46%
69.29%
72.03%
74.70%
77.37%
80.17%
83.01%
86.09%
89.28%
92.81%
96.82%
101.38%
106.81%
113.78%
123.25%
139.26%
422.79%
51.55%
55.59%
58.71%
61.45%
63.95%
66.37%
68.73%
71.08%
73.55%
76.06%
78.77%
81.59%
84.71%
88.24%
92.27%
97.06%
103.21%
111.57%
125.69%
375.86%
47.87%
51.37%
54.07%
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49.43%
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55.05%
56.79%
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64.15%
66.22%
68.50%
71.10%
74.05%
77.56%
82.07%
88.20%
98.56%
282.02%
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Individual Employee Estimates of Retirement Income Results (Risk Free Investments)
Growing Annuity Single Employee
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Total Value end of Year 35 $247,049 $247,049 $296,459 $395,279 $444,689 $395,279 $444,689 $494,099 $419,984 $370,574 $321,164 $271,754
Total Annuity value @ year 35 $ 9,161 $ 9,161 $ 10,993 $ 14,657 $ 16,489 $ 14,657 $ 16,489 $ 18,321 $ 15,573 $ 13,741 $ 11,909 $ 10,077
With Risk Free investments: $ 41,276 $ 41,276 $ 33,573 $ 32,469 $ 29,533 $ 27,701 $ 29,533 $ 31,365 $ 28,617 $ 26,785 $ 24,953 $ 23,121
Risk Free Investments: 75.75% 75.75% 61.61% 59.59% 54.20% 50.84% 54.20% 57.56% 52.52% 49.16% 45.79% 42.43%
Level Annuity Single Employee
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Total Value end ofYear35 $247,049 $247,049 $296,459 $395,279 $444,689 $395,279 $444,689 $494,099 $419,984 $370,574 $321,164 $271,754
Total Annuity value @ year 35 $ 13,963 $ 13,963 $ 16,756 $ 22,341 $ 25,134 $ 22,341 $ 25,134 $ 27,926 $ 23,737 $ 20,945 $ 18,152 $ 15,360
With Risk Free Investments: $ 46,079 $ 46,079 $ 39,336 $ 40,153 $ 38,178 $ 35,385 $ 38,178 $ 40,970 $ 36,781 $ 33,989 $ 31,196 $ 28,404
Risk Free Investments: 84.56% 84.56% 72.19% 73.69% 70.06% 64.94% 70.06% 75.19% 67.50% 62.38% 57.25% 52.13%
Growing Annuity - Spousal Benefits
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Total Value end ofYear35 $247,049 $247,049 $296,459 $395,279 $444,689 $395,279 $444,689 $494,099 $419,984 $370,574 $321,164 $271,754
Total Annuity value @year 35 $ 6,996 $ 6,996 $ 8,396 $ 11,194 $ 12,594 $ 11,194 $ 12,594 $ 13,993 $ 11,894 $ 10,495 $ 9,095 $ 7,696
With Risk Free Investments: $ 39,112 $ 39,112 $ 30,976 $ 29,006 $ 25,638 $ 24,238 $ 25,638 $ 27,037 $ 24,938 $ 23,539 $ 22,139 $ 20,740
Risk Free Investments: 71.78% 71.78% 56.85% 53.23% 47.05% 44.48% 47.05% 49.62% 45.77% 43.20% 40.63% 38.06%
Level Annuity - Spousal Benefits
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Total Value end of Year 35
Total Annuity value @ year 35
With Risk Free Investments:
Risk Free Investments:
$247,049
$ 11,443
$ 43,559
79.94%
$247,049
$ 11,443
$ 43,559
79.94%
$296,459
$ 13,732
$ 36,312
66.64%
$395,279
$ 18,309
$ 36,121
66.29%
$444,689
$ 20,598
$ 33,642
61.74%
$395,279
$ 18,309
$ 31,353
57.54%
$444,689
$ 20,598
$ 33,642
61.74%
$494,099
$ 22,887
$ 35,931
65.94%
$419,984
$ 19,454
$ 32,498
59.64%
$370,574
$ 17,165
$ 30,209
55.44%
$321,164
$ 14,876
$ 27,920
51.24%
$271,754
$ 12,588
$ 25,632
47.04%
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